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Enhancing the Participation of Small-scale Fishing Sector in Decision-Making

Scenarios for a broader impact of the small-scale
fisheries on governance structures in South-Western
Waters

Content

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1. The overall aim of the study

The general aim of this project is to enhance the participation of small-scale fisheries (SSF) in decision-making. To achieve this, the project identifies the actions that encourage and enable broadened participation of the SSF organisations in decision-making. It also examines, using gap analysis, the potential issues that might impede this process. The project inspects the existing organisations and bodies representing the SSF that promote the strengthening of the SSF involvement in the industrial institutions (e.g. producer organisations) and established public bodies. In the case of the latter, it makes sense to investigate the potential of enhanced involvement, which might be achieved by encouraging and enabling the participation of fishermen in the decision processes on a regional basis. The actions necessary to promote this process were specifically evaluated within the structure of the South-Western Waters Advisory Council (SWWAC, widely known as CCS).

This objective has been sought at several levels: local, national, regional and European, in three different countries within the South-Western Waters area ((ICES zones VIII, IX and X (waters around the Azores), and CECAF zones 34.1.1, 34.1.2 and 34.2.0 (waters around Madeira and the Canary Islands)).

1.2. Specific objectives

- ✓ To gather information on the organisations, bodies and networks representing the SSF at local, national and European levels. The final aim was to build a reference database (DB) incorporating the data on the organisations and bodies that represent the SSF in the European Union (EU) study area at different levels. The scope of this DB was limited to the geographical area of South-Western Waters in Spain, France and Portugal. The DB is not case study-based; however, it includes all the relevant organisms in the study area.
- ✓ To merge the information obtained from different stakeholders using (mainly) face-to-face interviews, questionnaires and focus groups using participatory toolkits. The main emphasis will be on SSF representatives, local, national and European administrations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
- ✓ To establish State of the Art status of the current representation and involvement of the SSF in the industry bodies and advisory councils (ACs). For this purpose, a case study-based approach will be used, covering the geographic area of South-Western Waters. Each case study will be analysed following the established general methodology, examining a set of good governance principles. The governability is a complex concept with many dimensions. Its complexity can be captured using well-known governance principles: accountability, transparency, inclusiveness, fairness, connectivity, legitimacy and engagement.
- ✓ Different focus groups and various supporting materials (such as videos) will be employed to communicate and transfer the methodology used in the project to the stakeholders.

- ✓ Diagnostic analysis of State of the Art. First, the general context (SSF governance assessment) will be examined using a qualitative tool, SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats).
- ✓ As a part of the diagnostic analysis, examples of successful and failing SSF governance will be obtained from case studies in Aquitaine, Bay of Biscay, Galicia, North of Portugal, Canary Islands and the EU SSF governance space, with an emphasis on the CCS. The project will promote the exchange of experiences (of successes and failures) acquired in the case studies in the South-Western Waters. The final aims are to set up and/or strengthen the organisations ensuring appropriate representation of SSF and to improve or facilitate the involvement of the SSF in the decision-making. The project analyses various driving forces, including the management model and external factors affecting these processes. Only after understanding these drivers, the transfer of experiences between the regions can be efficiently performed.
- ✓ This work reviews good practices specific for the governance of SSF, drawing on the conclusions of SWOT analysis and the examples of successful and unsuccessful governance. Good practice guidelines are provided to improve the involvement of the SSFS in the advisory and decision-making processes. The aim is to propose specific actions for the future SSF management under a workable co-management system, which should contribute to the consolidation and strengthen the involvement of the bodies and organisations representing SSF sector. These specific actions should promote (among others):
 - ✓ The consolidation of the participation of organisations and bodies representing SSF in the already existing fora. This work puts emphasis on already existing structures and fora rather than proposing new structures.
 - ✓ The cooperation between the main South-Western Waters area organisations and bodies representing the SSF, with special emphasis on those under the umbrella of the South-Western Waters Advisory Council, CCS.
- ✓ The final objective of the diagnostic stage is to perform a gap analysis to identify the key issues or obstacles that the SSF sector must face. Particular emphasis is placed on the institutional and legal apparatus issues, for which it is difficult to find solutions or good practices improving the involvement of SSF in the decision-making.
- ✓ Finally, this work will present the main conclusions and scenarios for the future SSF governance, the SSF management and economic support.

1.3. Methodology

First, the study set up the methods to be used to define **State of the Art in the representation of the SSF in decision processes**.

- ✓ **Baseline information** is essential to understand the landscape of the small-scale sector in the studied area. Thus, particular effort was devoted to the collection of data on entities representing the SSF sector in France, Spain and Portugal. The few networks in which the SSF sector participates at the national, EU and international levels were also examined. The project team carried out an extensive review of the scientific and grey literature, conducted e-mail surveys, searches of official national and regional

documentation and interviews with key stakeholders. The collected data were used to build a reference database of existing organisations and bodies.

✓ **The study examined the degree of representativeness of the SSF** at each of the different levels of engagement in the decision-making process. This was analysed using the following steps: (i) description of the general context of the analysis, (ii) the structure of the governance model (SSF sector and industrial fisheries) and (iii) the goodness of the governance model in each of the regions.

✓ First, **the governance should be defined**. The concept of governance is wider than that of a government. Governance does not just consist of defining rules and regulations; it also includes interactions between many non-governmental actors in the society, in the civil society and in the private sector (Kooiman et al., 2005). This study analyses **the current structure of governance**, in which both the artisanal and industrial sectors can take part in the decision-making. The diagrams of governance show the structure of artisanal and industrial sectors at the local, regional, national, and EU level. **¡Error! No se encuentra el origen de la referencia.** shows, as an example, the diagrams of governance for the Basque Country.

✓ Once the structure of governance is well identified, **the study can examine the goodness of the governance model**. Good governance analysis should be seen as the indispensable framework for analysing the effectiveness of the involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process. The objective is to establish whether the necessary governance principles are followed. The goodness of governance should be analysed to understand the degree of representation of SSF stakeholders at different decision-making fora. The perception of stakeholders, their experiences and the objective data should be examined. **The quality of the governance affects the degree of SSF stakeholder participation. The good governance principles used here to build the analytical framework are based on the study of Turner et al., 2014. These good governance principles are legitimacy, inclusiveness, accountability, connectivity, transparency, fairness, resilience and engagement.** They were assessed for the case studies in Aquitania, Bay of Biscay, Galicia, Canary Islands, North of Portugal and the EU decision space.

✓ The study employed **Traffic Light Approach Matrix (TLAM) to obtain a qualitative assessment of the degree of SSF representation**. The TLAM includes a set of indicators for evaluating the degree of involvement in public bodies and private organisations and the level of participation and influence in the decision-making process.

✓ **This is a case study-based analysis; specific geographical areas are examined.** However, the outcomes are not solely valid in these regions. Some of the conclusions might be extrapolated to other Western Waters areas. The case studies were chosen (i) to provide sufficient geographical coverage, (ii) to examine the regions most relevant to SSF regarding the number of vessels and the related economic activity and (iii) to examine the participatory processes at different levels (local, regional and European). In particular, the French and Portuguese case studies (Aquitaine and North of Portugal) are good examples of management systems more centralised than in Spain (Galicia, Canarias, Basque Country), where regionalised/decentralised models prevail. The Northern Portuguese fishing fleet is one of the largest in number, with some of the largest total tonnages and engine power (data from The Community Fishing Fleet Register).

✓ Once state of the art is established, the study can introduce **the methods for the diagnostic analysis. The project promoted the exchange of experiences** (of

successes and failures) from the chosen case studies in South-Western Waters (i) to set up and/or strengthen the organisation ensuring appropriate representation of SSF and (ii) to improve or facilitate the involvement of the SSF in the decision-making process.

✓ **The general context (SSF governance assessment) was analysed using SWOT analysis**, a qualitative method intended for the strategic planning of decision-making (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats analysis). The examples of successful and failing SSF governance were obtained for the chosen case studies.

✓ **The final aim was the identification of good practices to improve the involvement of the SSF in the advisory and decision-making processes.** The project proposed specific actions for the future SSF management under a workable co-management system. It is hoped that such actions will contribute to the consolidation and strengthened the involvement of the bodies and organisations representing SSF sector.

✓ The study was conducted **by organising focus groups, round-table discussions and personal interviews with stakeholders in all the cases covered in this report.** Comparisons based on qualitative data obtained from these groups were performed.

✓ The existing management models in the South-Western Waters were analysed, considering various types of co-management between the government and stakeholders and the external socioeconomic driving forces (such as the biological status of the stocks, competition, the size of the SSFs, etc.).

✓ **To complete the diagnostics, it is necessary to identify the obstacles contributing to the gaps between the real-life governance and the “ideal” governance system.** This should help to enhance the participation, visibility and influence of the SSF in the decision-making processes. With this aim in mind, the “solution capacity” provided by the set of good practices, among others, should be analysed. This report employed **gap analysis to identify the problems that could not be overcome in the short or medium term.** The results were used to build a complete list of issues/obstacles and examine the solution capacity levels that might be achieved following good practices or other measures.

✓ Finally, **the study summarised the future scenarios for the SSF activity in South-Western Waters.** They were identified based on consultations with stakeholders.

1.4. Results

❖ **As a part of the State of the Art investigation, the project provides a publicly available reference database containing information on all organisations and bodies representing the South-Western Waters SSF** (<http://mare.azti.es/action-1/>). The nature of these organisations and their geographical data are two of the major dimensions of the database.

State of the Art

The database built for this study comprises 342 organisations representing small-scale and large-scale fishing sectors, and other organisations related to fisheries. Around 23% of these organisations deal with a variety of fishery topics that do not include fishing fleet representation. These organisms might support the SSF-related management proposals, provide economic resources for SSF representatives to participate in the decision-making and become involved in the leadership. They might also help to solve various technical and/or bureaucratic problems. Examples include networks of fishing workers, fisherman wives, shellfish collectors, net-menders associations, NGOs and FLAGS. They represent around 28% of the organisations when the producer organisations (POs) and associations of POs are included. These last organisations represent the fishing sector but also carry out other tasks not related to the governance, such as market-oriented activities. The remaining 72% of the organisations represent exclusively fishing fleet interests. They include various types of *cofradías* and federations in Spain, associations of shipowners, federations and confederations in Portugal and fishery committees in France. Galicia is the region with the highest concentration of organisations representing fishing fleets. The region has 63 *cofradías*, almost 30% of the organisations that represent fishing fleet interests.

The organisations exclusively devoted to small-scale matters exist in Portugal and Spain but not in France. In France, small-scale and non-small-scale boats are jointly represented by the fishery committees. The only country in which the POs represent the small-scale sector is Portugal. However, the representation of the small-scale fishing in that country is never exclusive, as it is combined with the representation of other sectors. In Spain, the representation roles are well defined; in general, the small-scale sector and the inshore sector are represented by the *cofradías* and their federations, while the POs are oriented towards the industrial fleets. This distinction does not exist in France and Portugal.

However, it is important to note that some of the smaller organisations, representing the SSF exclusively, might not participate in decision-making processes. They are mainly devoted to other administrative tasks, i.e. the management of the landings, the sales procedures and even the commercial activity designed to attract vessels from other regions. This is often seen in Spain, while in France, these administrative activities are not included under the umbrella of the fishery committees; this reinforces the management using human and economic resources exclusively devoted to the governance issues.

Good practices are now being considered in all regions to strengthen the internal SSF representation in the organisms including both small-scale and non-small-scale fleets. One of the examples is the creation of unofficial commissions (under the umbrella of these official bodies) for an exclusive discussion of SSF-related topics. This does not increase the complexity of the structure of the official body or the need for more human and/or economic resources. Some regions with a very large number of organisations are introducing sectoral working groups specifically devoted to SSF issues.

From the point of view of the stakeholders, the structure provided by the many (342) stakeholders involved in SSF representativeness seems to be sufficient. Only around 18% of the fishing sector organisations represents the SSF exclusively, but the stakeholders are not interested in increasing the number of these organisations. The communication channels are in place, and the system is stable although it needs strengthening. In the regions where SSF is not exclusively represented, good practices could be implemented to reinforce the internal organisation without increasing the complexity of the system. However, the base of the representativeness is that all SSF vessels should belong to these organisations. This is not true in Portugal.

❖ **The study examined the degree of representation and involvement of the SSF in the industry bodies and the ACs.** It evaluated the level of proactivity of the SSF in the decision-making fora. The selected methodology was used to assure that the information on the degree of representation, based on the good governance principles, would be transferred to the SSF representatives. See more details at <http://mare.azti.es/action-2/>.

State of the Art- The analysis of governance goodness shows

A legitimate SSF representation: In general, the stakeholders recognise the SSF organisations as legitimate. The cofradías and federations in Spain and the French fishery committees are composed of elected professionals. The internal processes employed by SSF fishermen and cofradías to elect its decision-making bodies and their representatives are supported by the free, voluntary, and democratic election of its partners. Both the representatives of the decision-making bodies and the major elected officials are strongly legitimated before the society and before the administrative bodies.

However, it is important to state that the “internal legitimacy,” that is, the mechanisms of internal participation within each organisation, can give rise to different degrees of legitimacy. The situation is different in Portugal, where the fishing associations have a completely private legal nature.

Accountability – a good structure in place. The governance structure is in place in all the examined cases, creating the ways and conditions for stakeholder participation in the decision-making. The Spanish case studies analysed a decentralised model, in contrast to the centralised model followed by the French and Portuguese. There are very few organisations exclusively representing the SSF. In France and some other regions, such as the Basque Country, representatives do not see the need to create more SSF-related organisations; they feel that the adequate governance structure is already in place. In other regions, SSF fishermen are not strong enough to create a specific entity that will bring together the artisanal fishing groups. There is no clear definition of an artisanal fleet, which makes the potential union of SSF fishermen difficult and weakens the case for the creation of one specific SSF channel. However, some exceptions should be mentioned. In France, some SSF fishermen consider the structure should be improved to increase the SSF participation.

Accountability – weak responsibility, commitment, and willingness to improve the sector and the sustainability of fishing resources. Accountability means more than the mere presence of the governance structure. It also implies responsibility, commitment, and willingness to improve the activities leading to sustainability. This part of the accountability principle shows weaknesses across the regions. Some of the SSF fishermen lack the motivation to join trade unions or to be elected (in the case of French fishing committees). This lack of motivation and responsibility prevents achieving a good representation level of the fishermen who complain of weak representation. Spanish fishermen consider that under a government-based model, the degree of their influence is low, which reduces their motivation to participate in the decision-making fora. These weaknesses are less pronounced in the French community-based model. However, even in that model, the SSF representativeness by port diminishes at the higher levels of fishing committees, which according to some SSF fishermen affect the accountability and reduces at certain degree the responsibility level.

Inclusiveness – good passive participation in decision-making fora but insufficient to influence the decisions.

The representatives take part in several decision-making fora at different levels. However, in most cases, the participation only implies a mere presence with little active participation, and, therefore, has little or no effect on the management processes. This passive participation is closely related to the level of connectivity between stakeholders taking part in the governance structure. Strong differences are found between French and Spanish governance models. Given the current governance structure good passive participation exists, but under the centralised French model, specific SSF fishermen consider that passive participation could be improved.

Inclusiveness – low active participation and low degree of influence in decision-making.

Several factors affect the degree of goodness of the inclusiveness principle. One of the most important factors is the usually adopted co-management type (a consultative co-management in all the studied cases). However, in Spain and Portugal, although the government interacts with the fishermen and asks for advice using consultative processes, it still makes most of the decisions. Besides, the administration bodies lack the effective mechanisms for monitoring governance. Consultation with the sector is one such mechanism. However, the consultations are not always carried out under the conditions of appropriate participation and representation. In addition, the SSF fishermen remain at the local level, while their representatives reach the regional, national, and European levels. The governance model is completely different in the French case study, where a centralised model based on a more participatory system is in place. Even though a consultative co-management is assumed (because the government makes the final decisions), it has elements of a collaborative co-management in practice. In addition, the SSF fishermen can also take responsibility at the national level (although the degree of SSF port representation becomes lower at higher decision levels which also reduce the active participation).

Transparency exists but should be improved. There is a limited top-down transfer of the knowledge about European issues, moderate-to-high top-down transfer of knowledge on daily issues, and scarce-to-moderate bottom-up knowledge transfer on the SSF activity.

On the one hand, the information related to topics of specific interest to the fishing community (such as the fishing allocation possibilities) or related to the technical measures (such as fishery closures) is efficiently transmitted. Consequently, all decision levels should be well informed. However, the information quality might decrease at a local level, depending on the engagement of the fishermen and their reaction to large amounts of information. Moreover, in the SSF sector, there is a high level of functional illiteracy, which makes maintaining transparency problematic.

On the other hand, when the information is related to general issues, the transparency principle is affected; it gradually weakens from the European to the local level. Important information about Fisheries Local Action Groups (FLAGs) or Advisory Councils (ACs), latest directives, transition from the last to the current EU Common Fishery Policy (CFP), or proposals discussed in the different decision-making fora might not be efficiently transmitted. They might even remain completely unknown at the local level. This weakness is due mostly to a lack of SSF fishermen interest and a lack of time and human and financial resources to promote a more appropriate (complete) information transfer. This is especially relevant for the European-level information, which is usually complex. At the European level, the EC communication with the CCS is not sufficiently transparent. Some proposals arrive at the traditional fishery group too late to provide feedback to the EC. They are also written English, without a general description or explanation of the

technical background. These proposals are often very complex and difficult to understand; under such circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect timely advice from the CCS partners.

Finally, the bottom-up knowledge transfer should also be improved. The local-level representatives usually know little or nothing about the SSF vessel activity (the landed species, the weight of the landings, the fishing locations, etc.). It is true that the fishermen are obliged to fill logbooks and/or supply the first sales notes, depending on the length overall (LOA). However, sometimes, the provided information is insufficient or unreliable. The lack of accurate data makes the development of an appropriate SSF representation difficult. However, the knowledge transfer and availability have been gradually increasing during the last few decades. In France, the SSF data is being gathered, and other countries are progressively improving their data systems thanks to the introduction of new technology (e.g., the geographical location devices, AIS, in vessels under twelve meters in the Basque Country).

Good connectivity between stakeholders has been established, but it is sometimes broken. Weak connectivity at the European level. It is worth pointing out that the communication among existing stakeholders is usually good. Cofradías and federations (Spain), committees (France), and associations (Portugal) form a base for a good assessment of the accountability principle of governance. In some cases, the upward interactions between stakeholders might be broken due to the lack of clear rules of participation. This is especially relevant in Spain and Portugal but not in France, where the rules are clearly established.

It is also important to note that, in some cases, the good connectivity might have been affected by the disparate local views of sectoral problems, as in the case of Galicia, where the SSF is fragmented into 63 cofradías. In other cases, the connectivity is affected because of conflict of interests, which creates antagonistic attitudes and complicates the dialogue between representatives (The Canary Islands and Galicia).

At the European level, the CCS represents the Traditional Fishery Working Group, trying to change the future rules affecting the SSF. There is a way to maintain the European space that might be influenced by the SSF. However, the connectivity between the Traditional Fishery Working Group and the scientific and political fora working in that European space should be improved.

Finally, it is also important to mention that the connectivity between the SSF and the Large-scale fisheries (LSF) is weak in Galicia (this is one of the most important case studies for analysis of the relationship between SSF and LSF). Collaborative interactions between the parties are not frequent, and the demands of the artisanal sector tend to be less visible than those of the industrial sector.

Thus, the engagement could be improved by reinforcing active participation under the inclusiveness principle and strengthening the willingness to improve the responsibility and the commitment of the stakeholders under the accountability principle.

Low level of fairness: SSF vs LSF representativeness. The SSF heterogeneity makes its representation difficult, and the LSF has higher lobbying capacity based on their abundant economic and management resources.

Different regions have various distinctive definitions of artisanal fishing, which allows it to be identified at least at the regional level. However, such identification at the higher level

(e.g., European) is not simple. This makes it difficult to establish a distinct SSF channel across the governance structure. In contrast, the LSF organisations are in a good position to participate in decision-making processes. They have large economic and human resources at their disposal. Their representatives are professionals with experience in management, in contrast to the representatives working in *cofradías* and federations, who usually come from the fishing sector. Therefore, LSF organisation can have a strong effect on decision-making (e.g., the Spanish cases, which the LSF negotiated directly with the EC through CEPESCA and/or EUROPÊCHE). The LSF can create lobbies with the aim of increasing their degree of influence at the high levels of decision-making.

Another reason why it is difficult to develop a good SSF representation is the complexity of this sector. SSF use a wide variety of fishing techniques to target a very large number of species even though the overall catch is low (in contrast to the overall catch of large-scale vessels). In addition, the SSF sector uses seasonal fishing techniques, changing during the year, which contributes to the management complexity. Thus, the complexity of their management and the difficulties in putting forward the SSF management-related proposals lead to problems in developing an effective representation. The management of the large vessels is less complex. However, the ability of SSF and LSF to represent their associates seems not only related to the complexity of their fishing activity but also to the availability of resources to address such problems. In the case of the SSF, the difficulty of representation is exacerbated by the lack of economic and technical resources.

The Galicia case study is worth a separate mention. It represents the best case in Spain for analysis of fairness and connectivity between the SSF and LSF. In Galicia, there are 8 *cofradías* including both the SSF and contingent fishing gears (especially trawlers, purse seiners; and nets ("volanta")). When the social weight of the contingent fishing gears is greater than that of the minor fishing gears, the role of the "Patrón Mayor" is usually played by a representative of contingent fishing gears. In some cases, there is a clear imbalance in the governability in favour of the contingent fishing gears.

Weak resilience in Spain and Portugal due to the rigid governance structure:

Current governance structures greatly limit the possibility of improving the current SSF management rules. Both the procedures and governance structures are very rigid and make it difficult to put forward alternative proposals. This is heavily affecting the Spanish and Portuguese SSF representation. The governance structure currently adopted in France is more collaborative, allowing a better resilience assessment

❖ The diagnostic part of this study **provides examples of successful and failing SSF governance systems in the analysed case studies**. The final aim is to promote the exchange of experiences obtained from these studies. This should help (i) to set up and/or strengthen the organisation ensuring appropriate representation of SSF and (ii) to improve or facilitate the involvement of the SSF in the decision-making process. The project analyses a set of driving forces, including the management model and external factors affecting these processes. **A SWOT analysis was performed first**. It scrutinised (i) the strengths: competitive advantages and internal SSF governance strengths; (ii) weaknesses: competitive disadvantages and internal SSF governance weaknesses; (iii) opportunities: competitive advantages external to the SSF governance and (iv) threats: competitive disadvantages external to the SSF governance.

The study provides good practice guidelines for improving the involvement of the SSF in the advisory and decision-making processes. However, it is difficult to obtain a set of good

practices that would apply to SSF governance in all the regions (<http://mare.azti.es/action-3/>)

Diagnostics – good practices

The study emphasises the increasing necessity of adopting more participatory systems, such as community-based or even co-management models. Few regions use those or similar systems. Some of the regions are moving towards the combination of these models, interacting with each other to provide good local or regional SSF governance even when European or national legislation is in place. Including consultation processes and co-governance in the most traditional top-down systems is essential for improving the SSF participation in decisions. In such systems, the SSF representatives and fishers only take part in decision-making through consultative processes. Good SSF governance cannot be conducted using such top-down management models on their own. To enhance the proactivity and influence of SSF stakeholders, their capacity to participate should be reinforced; the current final decisors should cede some of their own power to the stakeholders. Top-down models (even those with associated consultative processes) can be used to protect the resources but cannot provide good management outputs. This study includes a list of actions for putting in practice the transition towards more participatory models. It also proposes some solutions to associated problems such as weak international or interregional, connections between different SSF representatives. In addition, solutions are also proposed to overcome the commonly low technical and economic capacity of the representatives. The European Maritime Fisheries Fund (EMFF) can provide economic support, at the national and regional levels, to improve the SSF governance. The administration should prioritise the limited funds towards this objective, i.e. use them to improve the stakeholder interactions and empower SSF representatives to develop inclusive roles in the decision-making processes.

Some of the examples discussed here indicate that the involvement of external agents improves the SSF governance. Sometimes, the efforts to improve the governance processes are hampered by the differing interests of (even legitimate) SSF representatives with substantial responsibility and influence. This is especially important in very atomised regions (Galicia case study). It often helps to involve third-party stakeholders (such as the civil society: NGOs, trade unions, etc.) in the SSF governance. These stakeholders might even have different primary aims, such as leading a new process or providing knowledge from a different point of view.

The pathways towards enhancing the SSF participation in decision-making should be based on strengthening and continuing drive towards local/regional empowerment of the SSF representatives. The participatory processes, co-governance across different decision levels or even self-regulation mechanisms implemented at the community level should be included. Strong support from outside stakeholders is also essential; economic support is necessary to avoid bureaucratic obstacles and to increase the technical capacity of the SSF representatives. Empowering the representatives and stakeholders by using external contacts (e.g. the civil society) and developing new networks are effective ways of improving the quality of governance. The solution at the local and regional levels is not to create more organisations to represent SSF but to reinforce their connectivity by creating new networks, platforms or even non-official commissions within the already existing bodies.

Poor quality of the top-down flow of information related to European topics and the weakness of bottom-up transfer of data on the daily SSF activities are important barriers to overcome. In several cases, the SSF information seemed inadequate; new collaborative platforms involving the fishers and onboard devices that can be used intuitively might be a good solution.

However, one of the most relevant issues observed in the analysed case studies is the stakeholder perception of the governance system. This is strongly linked to the responsibility of stakeholders towards the SSF governance improvements. Only a substantial enhancement in the responsibility of the fishers and representatives can assure improved SSF governance. However, increasing the level of responsibility is a challenging task, given few opportunities to engage these stakeholders and their lack of skill in the governance area.

❖ The internal complexity and heterogeneity of the SSF and external drivers from the legal, institutional and organisational levels make it difficult to implement solutions (such as good practices) translated from real-life experiences. This is the reason why this approach often fails (most of the failures are due to inappropriate governance models). **The study presented here identified four impediments contributing to the gap between the current management and the ideal system of SSF management. The four impediments/obstacles discussed are (1) lack of institutional definition of SSF, (2) legal nature of Spanish *cofradías*, (3) top-down models and (4) lack of equilibrium in the numbers of organisations (multi-level, etc.).**

Diagnostics – gap analysis

The three first obstacles are of legal nature. The SSF can do little to modify the legal and institutional framework to solve these issues. The actions proposed in the present study (see obstacle tables in Section 4.2) require the involvement of decision-makers at the EU and national levels. The EU and national authorities have the technical and economic resources to launch consultations and outsource technical studies to establish the actual status of the issues in question. These inputs are necessary to launch the debate at the national and regional levels. Such discussions will require the active participation of the stakeholders. Gap determinants 1 and 3 could be addressed through a stepwise process, where the consensus achieved in the dialogue would result in concrete proposals to the EC and the EU Parliament, as a basis for future legislation. Obstacle 2 requires a thorough discussion within the Spanish sector, but no *ad hoc* measures are proposed to solve this issue. To overcome the Obstacle 4, some incentives should be deployed by the management (instead of legislative changes). However, some changes of institutional and legal nature are also likely to be required.

To overcome the Obstacle 1, the problem of formulating the definition of SSFs has to be faced. The SSF activities vary from region to region due to the intrinsic features of their fishing resources. The potential solution is to prepare regional definitions, employing as the basis the current definitions used in different regions. The solution also proposes *ad hoc* definitions for specific purposes and organisations, such as Traditional Fishery Working Group in the SWW AC or regional fishery management plans. New rules improving access to financial resources or other means to protect the small-scale fishing activities might be opposed by the stakeholders.

Obstacle 2, predicated on the legal nature of *cofradías*, requires an effort on the part of the national and regional administrations; they should address the problem of the lack of independence of the *cofradías*. A thorough discussion of the problems of *cofradías*, the main representatives of the small-scale sector in Spain, should be either launched by the administrations or requested by the SSF sector. It is likely that the issue will meet resistance of the administration representatives. The model of *cofradías* is ancient and widely accepted by the public. During its long history, it has adopted the legal form of public bodies whose role is framed by the Spanish legislation. No changes to the model are expected. However, some means could be found to address the strong dependency of these institutions on the administration, particularly regarding economic resources.

The problems of top-down management of fishery resources, identified as Obstacle 3, have been widely recognised by the scientific community. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that this dominant form of management is resisted by the fishermen, reducing the legitimacy of the management process. Moreover, this type of management prioritises the conservation point of view, paying little attention to the human dimension of the activity. Changing the model is a task that demands a deep reflection from all stakeholders. Legal and institutional framework changes will be needed at the EU, national and regional level. At the regional level, such changes are likely to be achieved; some relevant experiences in the implementation of bottom-up approach have been reported. As for the other obstacles, a process of consultation and debate should take place to gather the insights of the interested parties. A gradual implementation in the fisheries in which co-management is most needed would supply new data, allowing extending the process to other fisheries. This study includes a list of tools (good practices) based on the lessons learnt, which might help to move towards a co-management model.

Unlike the other gap determinants, the proposed solution for the Obstacle 4 is not related to legal changes; the legal apparatus in force does not restrict associationism. However, there is no multi-level governance structure in continental Portugal. The causes of the low level of associationism should be first analysed, in a process led by the national administration. Different regional stakeholders should be able to identify the type of multi-level organisation that fits best the needs of their regions. As the process of associationism is voluntary by nature, the national and regional administrations should provide incentives to motivate active stakeholder engagement in the creation of the missing governance structures.

❖ Finally, **the report presents conclusions and discussion of the future scenarios for governing the SSF organisation structure, management models and economic opportunities, which should help to ensure the SSF resilience.** These final remarks are detailed in <http://mare.azti.es/action-6/>. Seven scenarios, categorised into three topical groups, were identified. **The first topic considers the financial opportunities for enhancing the resilience of the artisanal sector. Scenario 1.1, in which nothing changes,** examines the current system with its scarce use of the EMFF. Under such circumstances, the SSF remains vulnerable and does not improve its resilience. However, the alternative **Scenario 1.2 allows SSF stakeholders to introduce certain governance-related innovation costs** into the SSF Action Plans, improving their economic power. **The second topic deals with the SSF management model.** Stakeholders discussed the option of maintaining the current management with no specific regulations for SSF, except for the introduction of certain preferential conditions for the implementation of the CFP and EMFF rules. The current regulations are strongly linked to

the quota management. The adoption of specific regulations for the artisanal fisheries and linked fleets was also discussed. The necessity of introducing other measures, effort management and spatial management was also mentioned. As a result, three additional scenarios were considered. **Scenario 2.1, with no changes in the management (currently following the CFP)**, was strongly supported by Portuguese stakeholders. **Scenario 2.2 also maintains the current management but indicates that a regionalisation process is needed** to adapt the EU rules to regional realities. The last scenario in this topic, **Scenario 2.3, assumes the introduction of specific measures for managing the SSF**. It was strongly supported by stakeholders from France and Spain. Finally, **the two last scenarios considered the organisational framework. Scenario 3.1 accepts the current situation (good organisation structure in place) with no need for new SSF organisations. However, the project results show that these conditions do not favour the involvement in decision-making. Scenario 3.2 strengthens the partnerships.**

2 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AAPN	Associação de Armadores de Pesca do Norte (Portugal)
AC	Advisory Council
DB	Database
CECAF	Fisheries Committee for the Eastern Central Atlantic
CEPESCA	Spanish Fish federation (Confederación Española de Pesca)
CFP	Common Fishery Policy
SWWAC	South-Western Waters Advisory Council
/CCS	
DG - MARE	The Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
EU	European Union
EC	European Commission
EMFF	European Maritime and Fishery Fund
EUROPÊCHE	Association of National Organisations of Fishing Enterprises in the European Union
FLAG	Fishery Local Action Group
LIFE	Low Impact Fishers of Europe
LOA	Length overall
LSF	Large-scale fisheries
MS	Member State
NGOs	Non-government organisations
ORs	Outermost regions
POs	Producer organisations
RAC	Regional Advisory Council
SWOT	Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats analysis
SSF	Small-scale fisheries
TLAM	Traffic Light Approach Matrix
TAC	Total Allowable Catch

3 INTRODUCTION

Fishing activities are key in providing food, income and employment for fishing communities. Links with these communities are particularly important in the case of the small-scale fisheries (SSF). In the EU, the importance of this sector in the local coastal economies is evident. The fishing communities of Portugal, Spain and France and the Atlantic Outermost Regions analysed in this study supply fish for the consumption of local populations and other economic sectors. Furthermore, the SSF fishing activities help to preserve the valuable local cultural assets. In the study area, the SSF sector comprises approximately 11500 fishing vessels. Sixty-two organisations represent SSF interests exclusively. This is the largest sector in the area.

The SSF activity faces many problems. They are mostly caused by the heterogeneity of the fleet interests, means of production and products, geographical atomisation, restricted access to finance and strong dependence on administrative decisions and support. All these factors make it difficult to take advantage of the current mechanisms of representation and participation in decision-making. Thus, the sector cannot defend its interests effectively or provide insights into the functioning of the fisheries. Its influence in the current fishery management system of the EU remains diluted in spite of the considerable fleet size, with a large number of fishermen.

The fishing sector is highly regulated since its activity depends on the exploitation of natural resources, whose evaluation (when made) is costly and not always conclusive. Traditionally, the fishery management has paid little attention to the human dimension of the fishing activity. Thus, the socioeconomic wellbeing of the SSF sectors has not been a priority on the political agendas although some effort is now being made (in the EU and at other levels) to address those concerns. Nonetheless, in the EU, the fishery management depends on centralised decisions, often made by institutions far removed from the main actors in the system. The complexity of decisions made at the highest political levels strongly affects the SSF activity, which is mostly conducted at the regional and local levels. Such decisions are usually not understood and may lack legitimacy from the point of view of the fishermen. Meaningful engagement of the sector in the decision-making process is difficult due to the top-down design of the system.

The creation of advisory councils (AC), and particularly of the South-Western Waters Advisory Council (SWWAC, usually known as CCS), has been a breakthrough in fisheries governance; the decisions are discussed with many of the participating actors. However, the participation of the sector has been largely confined to a consultative role at the EU and national levels. To address this problem, some changes have been proposed by different groups, including civil society, to provide a voice for the SSF sector. Unfortunately, the consultative role is strongly entrenched in the institutional and legal setup, which restricts the effective participation of the SSF sector.

Co-management systems might improve the management of locally exploited fish and shellfish populations. However, the desired decentralisation seems to be still a long way away, and the role of the sector remains merely consultative. Under a scenario of diminishing resources, the environmental concerns and new actors force the revision of agendas. The scarce technical and economic capacities of the SSF make clear that rethinking of the roles of this sector is necessary. The means to enhance its

competitiveness, especially weak in comparison with the industrial fishing sector, must be urgently sought.

With the future of the SSF sectors at stake, enhancing their participation in the decision-making in the EU becomes increasingly important. This study presents a general view of the existing organisational structures in which the SSF sector participates. It identifies the obstacles impeding improvement and presents good practices to overcome those obstacles. The gaps between the current and ideal governance and the problems to be addressed (which are beyond the ability of SSF to solve) are analysed.

The report consists of two sections. The first part presents the data on existing organisations, bodies and networks representing SSF and the networks in which the SSF participates (State of the Art). This is completed by analysing the degree of involvement of these entities in the decision-making process in the South-Western Waters. As a result, a reference framework can be presented. The second part is a diagnostic stage, in which good practices and barriers to broader involvement in the decision-making process are identified. The final subsections of this report distil the conclusions and discuss the possible scenarios affecting the future of the SSF.

4 OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY

Programmes

The decision C (2014) 6313 of 12 September 2014 concerning the adoption of financing in the framework of the general budget of the European Commission for the financial year 2014 for a pilot project "Marine protected areas: network(s) for enhancement of sustainable fisheries in the EU Mediterranean waters", a pilot project "Support measures for small-scale fishing" and a Preparatory Action "Guardians of the Sea".

The reference number of the call for proposals was MARE/2014/01

General objective

The general objective of this study is to enhance the participation of SSF in decision-making. To achieve this, the work identifies the actions that encourage and enable broader participation of the small-scale fishing organisations in decision-making and inspects potential impediments to this process. The study examines the existing organisations and bodies representing the SSF. It promotes the strengthening of the SSF involvement in the industry organisations (e.g. producer organisations) and publically established bodies. In the case of the latter, it makes sense to investigate the potential of enhanced involvement by encouraging and enabling the participation of fishermen in the decision process on a regional basis. The actions necessary to promote this process are also evaluated within the structure of the ACs.

This objective is sought at several levels: local, national, regional and European, in different countries within the South-Western Waters ((ICES zones VIII, IX and X (waters around the Azores), CECAF zones 34.1.1, 34.1.2 and 34.2.0 (waters around Madeira and the Canary Islands)) area.

Specific objectives

- To gather information on the organisations, bodies and networks representing the SSF at local, national and European level.
- To analyse the degree of representation and involvement of the SSF in private and public organisations, with special emphasis on their representation in the ACs.
- To merge the information from different stakeholders (using mainly face-to-face interviews and focus groups with participatory toolkits). The major emphasis will be on SSF representatives, local, national and European administrations and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
- To develop ways of dynamic exchange of good practices to (i) strengthen the organisations and improve their participation in the decision-making process at different levels (local, national and European level) and (ii) further encourage and enable SSF participation in the decision process (e.g. improve transparency of communication, among others).
- To create an online (web-based) monitoring platform for SSF, to promote the exchange of information and cooperation among the different organisations and bodies representing SSF.
- To consolidate the participation of organisations and bodies representing SSF in the already existing networks and/or platforms or promote (if possible and accepted as necessary) the creation of specific networks. However, this project will put the emphasis on already existing networks rather than promote new structures.
- To promote the cooperation between the main South-Western Waters area organisations and bodies representing the SSF, with special emphasis on those under the umbrella of the CCS.
- To contribute to the objectives of the new Common Fisheries Policy.

PART ONE

State of the Art

The first part of this report gathers information on the existing organisations, bodies and networks representing the SSF and the networks in which it participates (State of the Art). This is completed by adding data on the degree of involvement of these entities in the decision-making process in the South-Westerns Waters. As a result, a reference framework can be presented.

5.1 A reference database of existing organisations and bodies representing small-scale fisheries

A Database of reference

The project website publicly available at <http://mare.azti.es/> can be used to access two versions (online access and a downloadable Excel) of the reference database. Using the online access, one can see the summary of the database and the map of the different organisations and bodies (see Image 1). A downloadable Excel version is also available (<http://mare.azti.es/action-1/>)




Image 1. Online database: mapping

The database built for this study comprises 342 organisations representing small-scale and large-scale fishing sectors, and other organisations related to fisheries. Around 23% of these organisations deal with a variety of fishery topics that do not include fishing fleet representation. These organisms might support the SSF-related management proposals, provide economic resources for SSF representatives to participate in the decision-making and become involved in the leadership. They might also help to solve various technical and/or bureaucratic problems. Examples include networks of fishing workers, fisherman wives, shellfish collectors, net-menders associations, NGOs and FLAGS. They represent around 28% of the organisations when the producer organisations (POs) and associations of POs are included. These last organisations represent the fishing sector but also carry out other tasks not related to the governance, such as market-oriented activities. The remaining 72% of the organisations represent exclusively fishing fleet interests. They include various types of *cofradías* and federations in Spain, associations of shipowners, federations and confederations in Portugal and fishery committees in France. Galicia is the region with the highest concentration of organisations representing fishing fleets. The region has 63 *cofradías*, almost 30% of the organisations that represent fishing fleet interests.

These entities represent small-scale vessels and large-scale vessels such as trawlers, purse seiners, gillnetters and long-liners. As the fleets are highly heterogeneous, many organisations represent both small-scale and other vessels. This makes the representation a challenging task. Given that there is no generally accepted definition of small-scale fishing. The database presented in this study assumes that small-scale vessels are those below twelve meters in length overall (LOA) following the EMFF definition. Approximately 18% of the total organisations identified by the present study represents the small-scale fishing sector exclusively. In turn, these small-scale fishing organisations are around a quarter of the organisations representing general fishing fleet interests. The various organisations represent almost 18,000 vessels, among which around 65% are below 12-m LOA.

The organisations exclusively devoted to small-scale matters exist in Portugal and Spain but not in France. In France, small-scale and non-small-scale boats are jointly represented by the fishery committees. The only country in which the POs represent the small-scale sector is Portugal. However, the representation of the small-scale fishing in that country is never exclusive, as it is combined with the representation of other sectors. In Spain, the representation roles are well defined; in general, the small-scale sector and the inshore sector are represented by the *cofradías* and their federations, while the POs are oriented towards the industrial fleets. This distinction does not exist in France and Portugal.

However, it is important to note that some of the smaller organisations, representing the SSF exclusively, might not participate in decision-making processes. They are mainly devoted to other administrative tasks, i.e. the management of the landings, the sales procedures and even the commercial activity designed to attract vessels from other regions. This is often seen in Spain, while in France, these administrative activities are not included under the umbrella of the fishery committees; this reinforces the management using human and economic resources exclusively devoted to the governance issues.

Good practices are now being considered in all regions to strengthen the internal SSF representation in the organisms including both small-scale and non-small-scale fleets. One of the examples is the creation of unofficial commissions (under the umbrella of these official bodies) for an exclusive discussion of SSF-related topics. This does not increase the complexity of the structure of the official body or the need for more human and/or economic resources. Some regions with a very large number of organisations are introducing sectoral working groups specifically devoted to SSF issues.

From the point of view of the stakeholders, the structure provided by the many (342) stakeholders involved in SSF representativeness seems to be sufficient. Only around 18% of the fishing sector organisations represents the SSF exclusively, but the stakeholders are not interested in increasing the number of these organisations. The communication channels are in place, and the system is stable although it needs strengthening. In the regions where SSF is not exclusively represented, good practices could be implemented to reinforce the internal organisation without increasing the complexity of the system. However, the base of the representativeness is that all SSF vessels should belong to these organisations. This is not true in Portugal.

5.2 The degree of representation and involvement of the SSF in decision-making processes

The State of the Art analysis was completed by examining the degree of representation and involvement of the SSF in industry bodies and advisory councils. For this analysis, a new approach based on case studies was adopted. Each case study in the South-Western Waters was characterised employing a set of indicators used to assess the degree of involvement. Consultations with the stakeholders were indispensable for the analysis of complex management responsibilities in the SSF.

The degree of involvement and representation is closely linked to the regionalisation concept. The last CFP discusses the areas to decentralise (importance of different geographical levels), whom to decentralise (the extent to which stakeholders should be involved in the fishery management process) and what to decentralise (which tasks should remain at the central level and which can be dispersed). This subsection will provide the answers to these questions, i.e. it will present the most suitable management responsibility model for the SSF in the South-Western Waters.

The stakeholder consultations on SSFs governance issues benefited from the personal contacts in the different organisations and bodies. The existing sources of data and/or literature on governance issues concerning the SSF involvement in decision-making were also examined. Apart from the geographical dimension, the report considered case studies and fisheries of reference that could provide examples of successful or unsuccessful involvement of the SSF stakeholders in the decision process.

5.2.1 Methods: structure and goodness of the SSF governance models in Western Waters

The CFP remains a top-down hierarchical system, with the EU Commission, the Council of Ministries, and the EU Parliament formulating and adopting the basic regulations. These are then implemented and enforced, primarily by the Member States under the auspices of the Commission. The introduction of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) during the reform of the previous CFP was a major step towards the enhancement of the role of stakeholders in the advisory and decision-making processes. However, the engagement of fishery sector in the decision-making process is not restricted to the communitarian fishery-management apparatus. In fact, the sector is engaged in the decision-making process at various other levels, i.e., local, regional, and national. One should note that in most of the cases, the fishing sector in the EU plays an advisory role. The degree of participation of the sector in each of the diverse modalities of engagement in the decision-making will be analysed using the framework described below.

The proposed methodology comprises three steps to describe:

- The general context in which the analysis will be conducted
- The structure of the governance model (SSFs and industrial fisheries)
- The goodness of the governance model

First, it is worth defining the governance. The concept of governance is wider than that of a government. Governance does not just consist of defining rules and regulations; it also includes interactions among many actors in the society outside the government, in the civil society and the private sector (Kooiman et al., 2005).

The present study analyses the current structure of governance, which enables both the artisanal and industrial sectors to take part in the decision-making. We use the diagrams of governance to describe the structure of artisanal and industrial sectors at local, regional, national, and EU level (Figure 1). The framework for participation at the communitarian level is described separately, including the official and non-official fora, in which the small-scale and industrial fishery sectors might participate. Particular attention is paid to the mechanisms deployed to influence decision-making in the industrial sectors. The human capital involved in the industrial sector is reflected in the analysis. We also examine the judiciary nature of the bodies/entities since it determines, at least in the case of “cofradías,” their engagement in the decision-making and, their effectiveness in defending and promoting the small-scale interests in the national and EU administrations.

It is also important to analyse the structure of the governance. The governance system described here is framed by the EU fisheries management system, where decisions are made at the level of the EC and implemented by the Member States. Thus, the governance structure incorporates the EU, national, and regional institutions and organisations, all of which have a role in the decision-making. A certain degree of co-management is implied. Sen and Nilsen (1996), and Nilsen et al. (2004) define co-management as an arrangement where the management responsibility is shared between the government and the fishers. It can be viewed as a set of institutional and organisational arrangements; these include the rights and rules defining cooperation between the decision-makers and fishing communities at various stages of the management process, from the design of the system to its implementation and monitoring. The co-management system has emerged to engage the resource users in decisions about their own livelihood. It also improves the efficacy of the management measures by reducing the implementation costs and increasing compliance. *Co-management is regarded as a means to enhance democracy by increasing the engagement of resource users. The efficacy should be improved by engaging the concerned parties in a decision-making process. In this process, the interests, rights, insights and, to a lesser extent, the empirical knowledge of the parties, are taken into consideration. The decisions are then seen as legitimate and likely to be respected by all the concerned participants.*

To analyse the different cases, we have to identify the categories of co-management to which they correspond. We use classification of the co-management systems following the typology proposed by McConney et al. (2003), see Figure 1. The typologies of Sen and Nilsen (1996) and Pommeroy (1995) were also considered for use in the analyses. However, we decided that the typology of McConney would be the best for categorising the different case studies.




Figure 1. Co-management types (McConney et al. (2003))

Figure 1 illustrates different stages of co-management across the spectrum. There are two extreme situations with no co-management: the first, where decisions are made exclusively by the government and, the second, where the community mostly controls the decisions. Outside these polarised situations, McConney describes "consultative co-management" as a scenario where the decision-maker consults or seeks the opinion of other stakeholders on the decisions to be made. This is probably the most common procedure in the world fisheries. In contrast, a "collaborative co-management" implies a stronger and more equitable partnership. Under this type of management, the decision-makers and stakeholders work together and interact through the channels and platforms expressly created to this end. Some of the decisions are shared among the interested parties. Finally, a "delegated co-management" is a scenario in which the government lets stakeholders make the decisions. Thus, the decisions are decentralised. An example of such situation is community-based management, where the community makes the decisions in resource management. However, the government is likely to control the important variables of the management such as the setup of total allowable catches (TACs).

The initial hypothesis in this study is that, in a defined/applied decentralised system, the central governments will delegate certain management functions (formal or informal). The key to the efficiency of the current system is not decentralisation but a management system based on cooperation. Decentralisation should be understood as a mechanism that would need to build new institutions based on cooperative management. The collaborative co-management is the most efficient model to achieve those aims.

*To identify the current systems, it is necessary to establish the conditions and parameters of decentralisation. In this step, **we attempt to describe the current participatory approaches and decide whether the institutional governance framework is ready for further decentralisation.** This analysis is conducted through interviews with stakeholders at local, regional, national, and EU levels. The main aim is to define the governance structure that allows answering the questions about the conditions and methods of decentralisation (whom, how, and where to decentralise).*

To obtain this information, **we will use the governance structure diagrams** reflecting the flow of fishery information/communication (artisan and industrial) from their representative institutions to the institutions representing the administration, autonomous state, central state, or EU (the spaces in which the decisions are taken). This communication system should fulfil the purpose of informing, communicating, influencing, resolving, and negotiating the important decisions. The analysis includes flow diagrams or simply describes how the fishers and their institutions really function (fragmented sector: different fleet segments, different leadership, etc.) to inform, communicate, influence, and negotiate.

Once the structure of governance is well identified, we can measure the goodness of that governance model. Good governance analysis should be seen as a necessary framework for analysing the effectiveness of the involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process. The objective is to find out whether the necessary governance principles are satisfied. This can be achieved by using the empirical evidence provided by many

case studies in the Atlantic Area. Among other types of information, the perceptions of the stakeholders are of vital importance.

The goodness of governance should be analysed to understand the degree of representation of SSF stakeholders at different decision-making fora. The perception of stakeholders, the objective data, and their experiences should be examined. The quality of the governance

affects the degree of SSF stakeholder participation. The institutions in the governance structure should follow certain standards in their interactions with the stakeholders. The main objective of the analysis is to examine the stakeholder perceptions of the governance models in the different case studies and understand the extent of stakeholder involvement in the decision-making processes. With this objective in mind, to build the analytical framework, we studied the literature available in this field. Improved inclusiveness is expected when moving towards a more democratic decision-making mode, employing a community-oriented model.

The good governance principles used in this analysis are based on the study of Turner et al., 2014 (Table 1). Figure 2 illustrates these principles. Other references have also been considered to achieve this general assessment framework as Schumann (2010), Charbonneau (2012), Martín and Berkes (2010), Pérez de Oliveira (2013), Chuenpagdee (2011), Jones, Qui and De Santo (2013), Roldan Ortíz (2013), Turner et al. (2014), Kooiman and Bavinck (2005) and, Domínguez Torreiro and Malvido (2002).



Figure 2. Good governance principles and links between them

Table 1. List of good governance principles to satisfy in SSF governance.

Principle	Definition	Notes
Legitimacy	Stakeholders must act with integrity and commitment. Legitimacy is related to the processes of representation of an organisation or a collective. These processes must be participatory and democratic so that the representativeness of an organisation is perceived as legitimate by other actors and institutions.	A part of legitimacy assessment might be the endorsement of managers by the community members; it is important to assess the ability of managers to lead and to promote the representativeness.
Accountability	The existence of a governance structure that allows stakeholders to participate in decision-making institutions, fora, etc. The representatives are answerable to their constituency. The SSF and its representatives must have a desire for improvement by promoting a sustainable activity, a sense of responsibility, and commitment.	Accountability is a part of the engagement concept. Are there ways to challenge the rules? Are there a will, commitment and responsibility for changes?
Inclusiveness	This governance principle is understood as the degree of participation at different decision stages. It is the ability of stakeholders to participate in decisions. Inclusive management should include the marginalised stakeholders. It has to be made clear whether the term refers to the mere presence of stakeholders in the different fora (passive) or to their ability to influence the decision-making by active participation. The active participation should mean taking part in the definition, development and assessment of new management issues.	(i) Do SSF stakeholders have the opportunity to participate in decision-making? (ii) are SSF fishers and local organisations willing to be involved in decision-making fora?, (iii) are they obliged to do so?, (iv) which type of participation is being developed (passive/active form)?
Transparency	The level and quality of the information transferred from the top to the bottom levels, in particular from the European level to the local level across the governance structure in place. The information flow from the bottom to top levels.	What is the way of imparting the information (e.g., from the federation to cofradías (Spain))? Does the information reach all the represented stakeholders?
Connectivity	The representative bodies are effectively connecting with other (governing) bodies. The relationship between the private and public organisations that, despite their differences, are aligned and articulated to achieve the same objective (the economic, social, and environmental sustainability of the fisheries).	Does connectivity exist between the stakeholders? There might be competing interests and lack of cooperation between the stakeholders. Such behaviour hampers the connectivity, which is important in a good governance system. Poor connectivity affects the rest of the goodness principles.
Fairness	All the stakeholders (artisanal and industrial segments) are treated fairly by the same representing organisms.	Are all the stakeholders in the same representation system treated fairly? It is recognised that artisanal and industrial actors do not possess the same economic and technical resources; this makes a difference in pursuing their respective goals. The industrial sector has the human capital to pressurise the government to adopt the norms that are aligned with their interests and objectives. The cofradías, however, have limited human capital although they have a huge social capacity, which is sometimes exploited by the politicians.
Resilience	Resilience is the ultimate goal of the governance. It is the capacity to withstand pressure and adapt to changes in the management environment. It means that the organisations are flexible, can learn, and respond efficiently to the challenges of the socioeconomic, political, and environmental character.	Does the system have enough resilience to withstand the future changes represented by the SSF? Are there any plans in place?
Engagement	Engagement includes the accountability and inclusiveness principles. It is the ability to participate in decisions and use the opportunities to challenge the rules.	

5.2.2 Studied cases in Western Waters

This project performs the analysis across the selected geographical area. The culture or philosophy of developing a strong participation (including all the stakeholders) in the decision-making process might lead to a new-style governance of the South-Western Waters area (ICES zones VIII, IX, and X (waters around the Azores)) and CECAF zones 34.1.1, 34.1.2, and 34.2.0 (waters around Madeira and Canary Islands), which is especially relevant to the case of the SSF.

The social, economic, environmental and traditional importance of SSF has been accepted worldwide. However, there is no single internationally accepted definition of this activity since its characteristics differ depending on the location. This is also the case within the South-Western Waters area; it is also generally accepted that the artisanal and industrial fishing activities have clearly different characteristics.

In some regions, specific definitions of SSF have been adopted. These definitions differ from the current legal definition accepted by the EC, which is based exclusively on the vessel length (< 12 m).

The Autonomous Government of Galicia (Xunta de Galicia) uses in their definition of the minor fishing gears some formal criteria different from those employed by the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) for artisanal fishing. The Decree 15/2011 (Xunta de Galicia), Article 6.3, states that the "maximum length of vessels using minor gear cannot exceed 15 meters between perpendiculars or 18 meters in length overall (LOA)". In the Article 6.4 of the same Decree, it is stated, "the maximum power (CV) to exercise the minor fishing-gear activities is 270 CV.



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In the Basque Country, the "fleet with traditional fishing gear" has been considered an artisanal fleet. The gear is handcrafted in keeping with the tradition of the local cultural area. The craft fleet works throughout the year using the so-called "minor fishing gear," mostly along the shorelines close to the coast, making short trips. Most of the boats are of small or medium size, with very few fishermen on board.



©AZTI. Basque Country

In France, the definition of artisanal fishing is not related to the length of the boat but to a social concept; artisanal fisherman is the owner who is also crew on the one or more artisanal boats, for at least 6 months of the year. Therefore, in France, it is possible to have artisanal vessels with a length greater than twelve meters, although most of them are above twenty-five meters.



© Serge Larzabal. Aquitaine

In the Canary Islands, 87% of the boats are less than 12 m in length. The order AAA/2536/2015 regulates the use of minor fishing gear in the fishing grounds of the Canary Islands. It states that vessels utilising minor fishing gear can have a maximum length of 15 m. It means that boats above twelve meters using traps or poles and lines are not artisanal from the point of view of the EU.



© José Manuel Ortíz Sánchez. Canary Islands.

In Portugal, the criteria are related to the type of fishing. The fleet is classified into three large groups: small-scale fleet, large-scale fleet, and distant-water fleet (AER 2016, STECF). The concept of artisanal fishing applies to the first two groups, with the additional criterion of the traditional fishing gear. Another criterion is the landing and sale of fresh fish, which should happen within less than a day from their capture. In almost all Portuguese regions, the segment of vessels with a length of less than 9 m (local fishing) constitutes a very large proportion of the fleet (data from The Community Fishing Fleet Register). This definition is not very different from the one using the criterion of 12-m LOA, as far as the EMFF definition of artisanal coastal vessels is concerned.



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This is a case study-based analysis, in the sense that specific geographical areas are examined. However, the outcomes are not solely associated with these geographical regions. As we will discuss later, some of the conclusions might be extrapolated to other Western Waters regions. The identification of the case studies was conducted (i) to provide sufficient geographical coverage, (ii) to examine the regions most relevant to SSF in terms of the number of vessels and the related economic activity, and (iii) to observe the participatory processes at different levels (local, regional, and European). The French and Portuguese case studies (Aquitaine and North of Portugal) are good examples of a management system more centralised than the Spanish cases, which use regionalised/ decentralised models. The Galician case study introduces a more detailed description of the fairness principle. The study examines the capacities of the artisanal and industrial fleets to influence the decisions at different levels (local, regional, national, and European). The Portuguese fishing fleet of the north region is one of the largest in number, with some of the largest total tonnages and engine power (data from The Community Fishing Fleet Register). Table 2 lists the selected case studies.

Table 2. Western Waters area: case studies selected

	Case study	Area	Country	NUTS*
1	Aquitaine	ICES zone	France	FR61
2	Basque Country	ICES zone	Spain	ES21
3	Canary Islands	CECAF zone	Spain	ES70
4	Galicia	ICES zone	Spain	ES11
5	North of Portugal (continental Portugal)	ICES zone	Portugal	PT11
6	European decision level Special focus on the CCS Advisory Council	European level, ICES and CECAF zones	Spain, France, and Portugal	---

(*) Nomenclature of Territorial Units of Statistics

5.2.3 Improving the degree of representation through good governance principles

The general conclusions can be now presented. Specific and detailed analysis for each country and case study can be found in *Deliverable 1.2. (Representativeness of the small-scale fisheries: evidence from Atlantic case studies in EU)* of this project. We also include the final output: A Traffic Light Approach Matrix (TLAM). The method uses a set of indicators to evaluate the degree of involvement of the SSF in public bodies and private organisations and the degree of their participation and influence in the decision-making process. The summary is shown in Table 3. The details can be found in the Report 2.1 of this project (*A Traffic Light Approach Matrix (TLAM) including a set of indicator to evaluate the degree of involvement in public bodies and private organisations*; <http://mare.azti.es/action-2/>).

This work uses a goodness-of-governance analysis as the framework (see Section 5.2.1). It is a good way to understand how the representation of SSF stakeholders is established in different decision-making fora at the local, regional, national and European levels. The goodness of governance is analysed by qualitative assessment using a set of governance principles: legitimacy, transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, engagement, fairness, connectivity and resilience (Table 1).

The inclusiveness and engagement are particularly closely related to the degree of participation at the different decision levels. However, they also depend on the goodness of the remaining principles. Thus, all the principles are analysed in this report.

The analysis of governance goodness is now presented, principle by principle.

A legitimate SSF representation: In general, the stakeholders recognise the SSF organisations as legitimate. The cofradías and federations in Spain and the French fishery committees are composed of elected professionals. The internal processes employed by SSF fishermen and cofradías to elect its decision-making bodies and their representatives are supported by the free, voluntary, and democratic election of its partners. Both the representatives of the decision-making bodies and the major elected officials are strongly legitimated before the society and before the administrative bodies.

However, it is important to state that the “internal legitimacy”, that is, the mechanisms of internal participation within each organisation, can give rise to different degrees of legitimacy. Take for instance the following key issue: a very big difference between Portugal and the other two countries is that not all the fishers in the North of Portugal are associated, which reflects an important deficiency in their governance system. This implies a weakness of the internal legitimacy even if the representation in Portugal is legitimate.

Accountability – a good structure in place in Spain and France but weak in Portugal. The governance structure is in place in almost all the examined cases, creating the ways and conditions for stakeholder participation in the decision-making. The exception is found in the northern region of Portugal. In Spain and France, the associationism is much higher than in Portugal, where the level of associationism of the fishers depends largely on the leading figures in the different localities, who attract the ship owners interested in taking advantage of the services provided by the organisation. The associations compete to attract more members. The existing associations are of local origin, and most of them maintain links with their municipality, where they retain their headquarters.

The SSF vessel-owners belong mainly to three of the four strongest and most representative fishery associations in the northern region, Vianapesca, APROPESCA and AAPN (artisanal fishery organisations). The fourth (Propeixe, a cooperative of industrial fishing vessels) is an association of small purse seiners exclusively dedicated to sardine fishing (the most important and representative target species in Portugal). There are also some small associations representing ship owners and fishermen (vessels of less than 9-m length), with little (if any) visibility, in small towns or in "freguesias" within municipalities. These organisations provide support for implementing administrative procedures, often a complicated process, especially for the elderly, relatively uneducated fishermen. They also help in the management of certain small markets in the ports. Thus, the representation of the fishermen of the Northern Portugal region and, ultimately, their participation in the decision-making are conducted on an informal level. The leaders or representatives of the four most important associations usually are in direct and continuous contact with the policy-makers of Portuguese central government to obtain the pertinent, up-to-date information. This approach maintains a top-down flow of data. Thus, in particular, the organisational fishing model of Northern Portugal does not represent a good governance structure, in which the connectivity between stakeholders could be established. All fisherman associations are local and multisectoral. There are no higher-level organisations that might embody the common interests of fishermen, making it difficult to identify the valid SSF representatives. There are no formal channels of communication; the connectivity between the associations and the administration (decision-makers) depends largely on the meetings with the representatives of four main associations. The connectivity with the smaller organisations is minimal, almost non-existent.

The Spanish case studies analysed a decentralised model, in contrast to the centralised model followed by the French and Portuguese. There are very few organisations exclusively representing the SSF. In France and some other regions, such as the Basque Country, representatives do not see the need to create more SSF-related organisations; they feel that the adequate governance structure is already in place. In other regions, SSF fishermen are not strong enough to create a specific entity that will bring together the artisanal fishing groups. There is no clear definition of an artisanal fleet, which makes the potential union of SSF fishermen difficult and weakens the case for the creation of one specific SSF channel. However, some exceptions should be mentioned. In France, some SSF fishermen consider that the structure should be improved to increase the SSF participation.

Accountability – weak responsibility, commitment, and willingness to improve the sector and the sustainability of fishing resources. Accountability means more than the mere presence of the governance structure. It also implies responsibility, commitment and willingness to improve the activities leading to sustainability. This part of the accountability principle shows weaknesses across the regions. Some of the SSF fishermen lack the motivation to join trade unions or to be elected (in the case of French fishing committees given an important number of fishers who do not agree with the work developed by the committees). This lack of motivation and responsibility prevents achieving a good representation level of the fishermen who complain of weak representation. Spanish fishermen consider that under a government-based model, the degree of their influence is low, which reduces their motivation to participate in the decision-making fora. These weaknesses are less pronounced in the French community-based model. However, even in that model, the SSF representativeness by port diminishes at the higher levels of fishing committees, which, according to some SSF fishermen, affects the accountability and reduces to a certain degree the responsibility level. In some cases, this is not exactly a problem of responsibility but a problem of not conforming with

the system. Therefore, an important number of fishers do not want even to be elected or to join trade unions.

A key issue here is that in France, the membership in the fishing committees is obligatory; the fishermen even have to pay a fee. In Spain, although all the fishermen belong to a *cofradía*, they do not usually pay a fee specifically associated with representation issues. An extreme situation is found in Portugal, where most of the SSF fishermen do not belong to fishing associations, which implies a complete lack of representation.

In general, the fishermen demand higher quotas and failing to obtain such quotas is perceived as a sign of bad representation. For a large proportion of the fishermen, a failure to meet their demands is a result of a weak representation. Therefore, the willingness to increase their commitment and responsibility gradually deteriorates even further. Thus responsibility is one of the key issues to reinforce and to work on in the close future.

Inclusiveness – good passive participation in decision-making fora but insufficient to influence the decisions. The representatives take part in several decision-making fora at different levels. This is reflected by good accountability in France and Spain, with a good structure in place. However, in most cases, the participation implies a mere presence with little active participation, and, therefore, has little or no effect on the management processes. This passive participation is closely related to the level of connectivity between stakeholders taking part in the governance structure. Strong differences are found between French and Spanish governance models. In the current governance structure, there is good passive participation. However, under the centralised French model, some SSF fishermen consider that the participation could be improved.

Inclusiveness – low active participation and therefore low degree of influence in decision-making.

Several factors affect the degree of goodness of the inclusiveness principle. One of the most important factors is the usually adopted co-management type (a consultative co-management in all the studied cases). However, in Spain and Portugal, although the government interacts with the fishermen and asks for advice using consultative processes, it still makes most of the decisions. Besides, the administration bodies lack the effective mechanisms for monitoring governance. Consultation with the sector is one such mechanism. However, the consultations are not always carried out under the conditions of appropriate participation and representation. In addition, the SSF fishermen remain at the local level, while their representatives reach the regional, national, and European levels. The governance model is completely different in the French case study, where a centralised model based on a more participatory system is in place. In particular, even though a consultative co-management is assumed (because the government makes the final decisions), it has elements of a collaborative co-management in practice. In addition, the SSF fishermen can also take responsibility at the national level (although the degree of SSF port representation becomes lower at higher decision levels which also reduce the active participation). However, other factors (mainly associated with the other principles) also affect the degree of active participation, such as the willingness to improve participation, responsibility, and commitment, the data and knowledge transfer, and the connectivity between stakeholders.

The difference between the degrees of influence exerted by the SSF and the LSF is especially important. The Galician case study provides significant results with special relevance to the two subsectors in that region. The scenario involves multiple actors and representative organisations (*cofradías*, private associations). The participants apply

different rules to the interactions and have different operative capacities. Thus, they generate disparate governance systems, in mechanisms and methods as well as in intentions. Many of the strategies are politically motivated rather than in search of a consensual solution through a dialogue between SSF and LSF.

Transparency exists but should be improved. There is a limited top-down transfer of knowledge about European issues, moderate-to-high top-down transfer of information on daily issues, and scarce-to-moderate bottom-up knowledge transfer on the SSF activity.

On the one hand, the information related to topics of specific interest to the fishing community (such as the fishing allocation possibilities) or related to the technical measures (such as fishery closures) is efficiently transmitted. Consequently, all decision levels should be well informed. However, the information quality might decrease at a local level, depending on the engagement of the fishermen and their reaction to large amounts of information. Moreover, in the SSF sector, there is a high level of functional illiteracy, which makes maintaining transparency problematic.

On the other hand, when the information is related to general issues, the transparency principle is affected; it gradually weakens from the European to the local level. Important information about Fisheries Local Action Groups (FLAGs) or ACs, latest directives, transition from the last to the current CFP, or proposals discussed in the different decision-making fora might not be efficiently transmitted. They might even remain completely unknown at the local level. This weakness is due mostly to a lack of SSF fishermen interest and a lack of time and human and financial resources to promote a more appropriate (complete) information transfer. This is especially relevant for the European-level information, which is usually complex.

At the European level, the consultative processes promoted by the EC are of high importance for the CCS as they can increase its influence. In general, these processes do not allow effective participation because the EC usually involves CCS at the late stage of the proceedings, when only comments on the specific EC proposals can be submitted. The consultations could be relevant for the already existing Traditional Fishery Working Group (CCS); however, they should be improved to promote a transparent and efficient active participation. Take for instance how some proposals from EC arrive at the traditional fishery group too late to provide feedback to the EC. They are also written English, without a general description or explanation of the technical background. These proposals are often very complex and difficult to understand; under such circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect timely advice from the CCS partners.

Finally, the bottom-up knowledge transfer should also be improved. The local-level representatives usually know little or nothing about the SSF vessel activity (the landed species, the weight of the landings, the fishing locations, etc.). It is true that the fishermen are obliged to fill logbooks and/or supply the first sales notes, depending on the LOA. However, sometimes, the provided information is insufficient or unreliable. The lack of accurate data makes the development of an appropriate SSF representation difficult. However, the knowledge transfer and availability have been gradually increasing during the last few decades. In France, the SSF data is being gathered, and other countries are progressively improving their data systems thanks to the introduction of new technology (e.g., the geographical location devices, AIS, in vessels under 12 m in the Basque Country).

Good connectivity between stakeholders has been established, but it is sometimes broken. Weak connectivity at the European level.

It is worth pointing out that the communication among existing stakeholders is usually good. Cofradías and federations (Spain), committees (France), and associations (Portugal) form a base for a good assessment of the accountability principle of governance. There are some

exceptions, as in the case of the FNCP (Spain), whose degree of representativeness is low, providing very little functionality for the SSF. In some cases, the upward interactions between stakeholders might be broken due to the lack of clear rules of participation. This is especially relevant in Spain and Portugal but not in France, where the rules are clearly established.

It is also important to note that, in some cases, the good connectivity might have been affected by the disparate local views of sectoral problems, as in the case of Galicia, where the SSF is fragmented into 63 *cofradías*. In other cases, the connectivity is affected because of conflict of interests, which creates antagonistic attitudes and complicates the dialogue between representatives (The Canary Islands and Galicia).

At the European level, the CCS represents the Traditional Fishery Working Group, trying to change the future rules affecting the SSF. There is a way to maintain the European space that might be influenced by the SSF. However, the connectivity between the Traditional Fishery Working Group and the scientific and political fora working in that European space should be improved.

Finally, it is also important to mention that the connectivity between the SSF and the LSF is weak in Galicia (this is one of the most important case studies for analysis of the relationship between SSF and LSF). Collaborative interactions between the parties are not frequent, and the demands of the artisanal sector tend to be less visible than those of the industrial sector.

Thus, the engagement could be improved by reinforcing active participation under the inclusiveness principle and strengthening the willingness to improve the responsibility and the commitment of the stakeholders under the accountability principle.

Low level of fairness: SSF vs LSF representativeness. The SSF heterogeneity makes its representation difficult, and the LSF has higher lobbying capacity based on their abundant economic and management resources.

Different regions have various distinctive definitions of artisanal fishing, which allows it to be identified at least at the regional level. However, such identification at the higher level (e.g., European) is not simple. This makes it difficult to establish a distinct SSF channel across the governance structure. In contrast, the LSF organisations are in a good position to participate in decision-making processes. They have large economic and human resources at their disposal. Their representatives are professionals with experience in management, in contrast to the representatives working in *cofradías* and federations, who usually come from the fishing sector. As a consequence, LSF organisation can have a strong effect on decision-making (e.g., the Spanish cases, which the LSF negotiated directly with the EC through CEPESCA and/or EUROPÊCHE). The LSFs are able to create lobbies with the aim of increasing their degree of influence at the high levels of decision-making.

Another reason why it is difficult to develop a good SSF representation is the complexity of this sector. SSF use a wide variety of fishing techniques to target a very large number of species even though the overall catch is low (in contrast to the overall catch of large-scale vessels). In addition, the SSF sector uses seasonal fishing techniques, changing during the year, which contributes to the management complexity. Thus, the complexity of their management and the difficulties in putting forward the SSF management-related proposals lead to problems in developing an effective representation. The management of the large vessels is less complex. However, the ability of SSF and LSF to represent their associates seems not only related to the complexity of their fishing activity but also to the

availability of resources to address such problems. In the case of the SSF, the difficulty of representation is exacerbated by the lack of economic and technical resources.

The Galicia case study is worth a separate mention. It represents the best case in Spain for analysis of fairness and connectivity between the SSF and LSF. In Galicia, there are 8 cofradías including both the SSF and contingent fishing gears (especially trawlers, purse seiners; and nets ("volanta")). When the social weight of the contingent fishing gears is greater than that of the minor fishing gears, the role of the "Patrón Mayor" is usually played by a representative of contingent fishing gears. In some cases, there is a clear imbalance in the governability in favour of the contingent fishing gears.

Weak resilience in Spain and Portugal due to the rigid governance structure:

Current governance structures greatly limit the possibility of improving the current SSF management rules. Both the procedures and governance structures are very rigid and make it difficult to put forward alternative proposals. This is heavily affecting the Spanish and Portuguese SSF representation. The governance structure currently adopted in France is more collaborative, allowing a better resilience assessment.

The following Table 3 summarises the outputs from the degree of representativeness analysis.

Table 3. The analysis of governance goodness: key issues

Goodness analysis principles	Analysis of governance goodness
A legitimate SSF representation	Stakeholders recognise the SSF organisations as legitimate. However, the internal legitimacy can give rise to different degrees of legitimacy.
Accountability – a good structure in place	The structure is in place: ways and conditions to participate in decision-making exist.
Accountability – weak responsibility, commitment, and willingness to improve the sector and the sustainability of fishing resources	Some of the SSF fishermen lack motivation and responsibility; this prevents achieving good representation.
Inclusiveness – good passive participation in decision-making fora	The representatives take part in some decision-making at different levels. In most cases, participation only implies mere presence with little active participation.
Inclusiveness - Low active participation and low degree of influence in decision-making	Consultative co-management model of governance is not always carried out under the conditions of appropriate participation and representation.
Transparency: limited top-down transfer of the knowledge about European issues, moderate-to-high top-down transfer of knowledge on daily issues, and scarce-to-moderate bottom-up knowledge transfer on the SSF activity	Topics of specific interest to the fishing community (such as the fishing allocation possibilities) are efficiently transmitted and, all decision levels are well informed. When the information is related to general issues, the transference is affected. It gradually weakens from the European to the local level. Bottom-up knowledge transfer should be improved.
Good connectivity between stakeholders has been established, but it is sometimes broken. Weak connectivity at the European level	The communication among existing stakeholders is usually good. However, in some cases, the upward interactions between stakeholders might be broken due to the lack of clear rules of participation. In some cases, the good connectivity might have been affected by the disparate local views of sectoral problems, also because of conflict of interests which creates antagonistic attitudes.
Engagement could be improved	By reinforcing active participation under the inclusiveness principle and strengthening the willingness to improve the responsibility and the commitment of the stakeholders under the accountability principle.
Low level of fairness: SSF vs LSF representativeness	<p>The SSF heterogeneity makes its representation difficult. The identification of an SSF definition at a higher level is not easy, which makes it difficult to establish a distinct SSF channel across the governance structure.</p> <p>The LSF has higher lobbying capacity based on their abundant economic and management resources. They have large economic and human resources at their disposal.</p>
Weak resilience due to the rigid governance structure in Spain and Portugal	Both the procedures and governance structures are very rigid and make it difficult to put forward alternative proposals. This is heavily affecting the Spanish and Portuguese SSF representation.

This section was designed to identify all the key conditions and parameters of decentralisation as the way of enhancing SSF participation in decision-making. We attempt to describe the current participatory approaches, using qualitative assessment of the governance principles. On the basis of this information, we can decide whether the SSF governance framework is ready for further decentralisation and, therefore, for strengthened participation in decision-making processes. To present the results, we used a Traffic Light Matrix, which allows visualising the main outputs from the completed governance diagnostics. Good governance is rated against the principles already described in this report (Figure 3). Attention should be paid to the lower part of the matrix, i.e. the principles shown in orange, reflecting the level of the readiness for strengthening the influence and participation in decision-making. The report proposes a set of good practices to enhance it. At the same time, the gaps that prevent achieving this objective will be identified. The two white cells are the fields not applicable to the assessment of the corresponding principles.




Figure 3. Good governance and representativeness rated against the principles in a Traffic Light Matrix. FR61, Aquitaine; ES21, Basque Country; ES70, Canary Islands; ES11, Galicia; PT11, North of Portugal. Finally, the CODE N.A is attached to the EU decision space analysis (with CCS emphasis).

The traffic light ratings used in Figure 3 are described below.



1. **Red** – the likelihood of this principle to be satisfied is very **low**
2. **Orange** – the likelihood of this principle to be satisfied is **unlikely**
3. **Yellow** – the likelihood of this principle to be satisfied is **possible**
4. **Green** – the likelihood of this principle to be satisfied is **likely**
5. **Dark green** – this principle will be satisfied (**certain**)

PART TWO

Diagnostics

This section describes the diagnostic stage, in which good practices and barriers to the broader involvement of organisations and bodies in the decision-making process are identified. The actions necessary to implement these good practices are also proposed, considering the barriers discovered in the State of the Art analysis.

6 DIAGNOSTICS: FROM SWOT ANALYSIS OF SSF GOVERNANCE TO GOOD PRACTICES

The diagnostics were obtained following a step-by-step method, briefly described in Figure 5. First, the general context was analysed using SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) analysis. This analysis is a qualitative method intended for the strategic planning of decision-making. The review of SWOT results should improve the understanding of external and internal factors affecting the governance of the SSF, and, therefore, the factors affecting the SSF influence in decision-making. Some of these factors are harmful, and others might help to improve the governance. If we are to achieve good SSF governance, the factors affecting its development must be identified. Later in this report, some successful and deficient governance examples will be presented, demonstrating certain issues identified by the SWOT analysis. The final aim of this diagnostic stage is to provide good practice guidance. The good practices will be linked to the good governance principles and the SWOT categories, which are (i) strengths: competitive advantages and internal SSF governance strengths; (ii) weaknesses: competitive disadvantages and internal SSF governance weaknesses; (iii) opportunities: competitive advantages external to the SSF governance and (iv) threats: competitive disadvantages external to the SSF governance.

SWOT analysis lists qualitative issues, derived from the State of the Art section, in a 2×2 matrix (Figure 4). The matrix should be later combined with the good practice proposal; this will indicate the internal weaknesses and help to face the external threats.



Figure 4. SWOT framework and good practices

The following section describes the exchange of experiences from selected representative case studies in South-Western Waters. This should help to set up and/or strengthen the organisation ensuring appropriate representation of SSF and to improve or facilitate the involvement of the SSF in the decision-making process. The project analyses the set of driving forces, including the management model and external factors affecting these processes. Only after understanding these drivers, the transfer of experiences between the regions can be efficiently performed.

The examples of successful and failing SSF governance were obtained from a set of case studies defined in *Section 5.2.2* (including Aquitaine, Bay of Biscay, Galicia, North of Portugal and Canary Islands). The EU decision-making space, with emphasis on the CCS consultations, is also considered. The final aim is the identification of good practices that should reduce some of the weaknesses and threats and increase the opportunities and

strengths shown in the SWOT analysis. Finally, Figure 5 shows the last step, which is the gap analysis of the institutional and legal apparatus hindering a broader involvement of SSF sector in the decision process.



Image 2. Focus group with stakeholders organised in AZTI (Derio, Basque Country, July 2017)

covered in this report. Comparisons based on qualitative data collected using the focus groups were then carried out (Image 2 shows a focus group organised by the research institute AZTI (Basque Country). Representatives from Aquitaine, Basque Country, Asturias, Galicia, Canary Islands, North of Portugal, scientists and the DG MARE took part. The existing management models in the South-Western Waters were analysed, considering various types of co-management between the government and stakeholders and the external socioeconomic driving forces (biological status of the stocks, competition, the size of the SSF, etc.).

This task was performed by organising focus groups and interviews with stakeholders in all the case studies




Figure 5. Diagnostics: from SWOT analysis to good practice guidelines and the final gap analysis

6.1 Enhancing the participation of small-scale fishing sector in decision-making: SWOT analysis

Some key factors found in the State of the Art analysis were classified according to the SWOT categories. These are introduced now, first the harmful and later, the potentially advantageous factors.

6.1.1 Harmful factors: weaknesses and threats

This subsection shows the main harmful factors, both weaknesses and threats (Table 4 and Table 5). The associated key governance principles introduced in *Section 5.2.1* are also shown.

Table 4. Harmful - threat factors limiting the participation of SSF in decision-making processes

Factors	Origin of the factor	Governance principles
There is no clear definition of the artisanal fleet/fishery concept. This hampers the potential union of SSF fishermen at supra-regional levels.	External	Legitimacy/accountability/inclusiveness.
The composition of the Traditional Fishery Working Group (CCS) should be improved to reflect better the SSF interests. It should appropriately represent the SSF fleet entities.	Internal	Internal legitimacy
Few opportunities to challenge the rules under the current government-oriented models	External	Accountability
The responsibility of administrations: Many of the decisions made and actions conducted by higher-level organisms are of a political character (electoral/lobbying pressure), rather than intended to improve the management of SSF.	External	Accountability/responsibility
In regions with a large number of organisations, the representativeness is very atomised (Galicia): the fisherman associations (mainly small organisations; in Galicia, 30% of the cofradías) perceive the federations as non-functional organisms, distanced from their real-life problems.	External	Accountability
Spain: the perception is that the fishery-management decisions at the national level do not take into consideration the needs of the SSF sector.	External	Accountability / perceptions
At the European level, the CCS does not have the power to change the future rules affecting SSF but can provide advice within a consultative process.	External	Accountability
Most of the decision-making fora are consultative; it is possible to provide advice, to receive information and to propose changes, rules, etc. However, there is little opportunity to participate in final decisions.	External	Accountability
<p>Low level of active participation due to the weaknesses in the consultation mechanism, which has not been developed under appropriate conditions of representation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - For the CCS, the consultative processes promoted by the EC are of high importance. In general, these processes do not allow real participation because the EC usually involves CCS at the late stage of the proceedings, when only comments on the specific EC proposals can be formulated. - Fishers usually take part in the decision-making fora (through federations and cofradías, fishing committees in France, etc.). However, the capacity of the fishers to maintain that participation is very low. 	External	Inclusiveness
Lack of incentives (e.g. of economic nature, to compensate for the lost fishing days) promoting the active participation of the interested parties.	External	Inclusiveness
Very few proposals are transmitted in the bottom-up direction.	Internal	Inclusiveness

Factors	Origin of the factor	Governance principles
The information other than the daily issues does not reach the bottom-level institutions immediately; bottlenecks form at different levels. Reasons: (i) the lack of economic resources at the top levels of representation to manage the information, (ii) poor top-to-bottom "return flow" and (iii), among the fishermen, lack of interest in the European or even national or regional issues.	Internal/external	Transparency
Developing the representativeness is a complex task, particularly in the case of SSF, whose vessels use many different technologies. Such heterogeneity creates management problems and difficulties in promoting appropriate representativeness. However, this is relatively easy to achieve for a group of vessels of the same type.	External	Fairness/ inclusiveness
All political leaders of institutions with responsibilities in fisheries claim that they represent all fishing sectors, whether artisanal or industrial, with the same impartiality and equity. This is not always true.	External	Fairness
The procedures and governance structures are very rigid; the introduction of alternative proposals is difficult and complex, and most of the implemented processes are consultation-based.	External	Resilience
Bureaucratic obstacles hinder the access to the EMFF economical resources.	External	Resilience
Low funding eligibility and lack of EMFF actions related to innovation in governance. Most of the financed actions are devoted to counteracting the effects of climate change and improving the sustainability. Good governance is not usually included in these activities.	External	Resilience
Large-scale sectors can count on a high level of economic, technical and administrative human resources. They can exert strong political pressure in the competition for better fishing opportunities and easily access the mass media, making their initiatives and needs visible to the public. There are even some examples of media reports derogatory towards the SSF.	External	Resilience

Table 5. Harmful - weakness factors limiting the participation of SSF in decision-making

Factors	Origin of the factor	Governance principles
In much-atomised sectors (Galicia), the internal legitimacy is usually broken leading to the creation of non-official associations, which might represent a variety of interests. This results in duplication of efforts in the representation process.	Internal	Legitimacy
Weak responsibility , low commitment and lack of willingness to improve the sector and the sustainability of fishing resources. The responsibility should be shared. However, some fishermen are reluctant to take part in the decision-making process; some representatives are unwilling to single out one particular represented segment, the SSF.	Internal	Accountability
The centralised governance models (e.g. French model) reduce the number of organisations. In contrast, in Spain, there are many cofradías at the port level. The French model seems to decrease the responsibility of the fishers towards the centralised system; the ports lose some their representativeness.	Internal	Accountability
The responsibility of fishers is strongly linked to fishing possibilities and the allocation rules for the different fishing technologies and vessels. The fishers are only interested in a few topics of immediate importance.	Internal	Accountability
In more decentralised models and in areas with a large number of organisations (such as Galicia), the representation might be duplicated; different individuals, sometimes with opposing opinions, can represent the same body.	Internal	Accountability
Accountability linked to fairness: some representatives are reluctant to represent the SSFs as an entity separate from other subsectors. The remaining subsectors face similar problems in trying to influence the decision-making processes.	Internal	Accountability
Due to the low educational profile of most small-scale fishermen, lack of activity on the Internet and weak digital culture, a part of the available information remains unnoticed even though it is published by the top-level organisations.	Internal	Transparency
Scarce-to-moderate bottom-up transfer of the information on the SSF activity (landings data, etc.). There is a lack of accurate data; improvement in this area is urgently needed. Some efforts to achieve this have been noted in most of the involved countries; however, developing appropriate representativeness this problem seems to be considered a sign of weakness.	Internal	Transparency
The information generated by the CCS, where the federations are represented, is transmitted to the cofradías. However, most of them are unaware of the existence and function of this advisory body and consider the information to be of low value.	Internal	Transparency
Unfortunately, there is a high level of illiteracy in the sector. The fishermen are not inclined to read the documents. This can give rise to a chain of misinterpretations, distorting, intentionally or not, the original message. When the message is complex, which is often true for the information received from Brussels (via, for instance, a provincial	Internal	Inclusiveness/ transparency

Factors	Origin of the factor	Governance principles
federation), the communication efficiency can be low and the active participation, weak. One such example is the case of European regulation on discards.		
The fishery-management systems and the mechanisms for participation (e.g. communications between the EC and AC) can be complex. The representatives of fishermen often find the technical and legal EC documents the management processes laid down by the EC difficult to understand.	External	Inclusiveness/ transparency
In the centralised French model, the fishermen take an active interest in fishery committees, even at the national level. However, they might find it difficult to attend those high-level meetings (capacity, economic resources, etc.), which reduces their influence in the decision-making process. In the Spanish decentralised model, this is also a problem because the federation representatives are also fishers. Except for some regions (such as the Basque Country) where fishers remain in the port, and they only attend meetings at the local level, although in this latter case, the low attendance level might also create problems (weaknesses related to the transparency principle, etc.).	Internal	Inclusiveness
Lack of incentives (e.g. of economic nature, to compensate for the lost fishing days) to encourage active participation of the diverse interested parties, i.e. the engagement in the AC process.	External	Inclusiveness
Connectivity between the diverse coastal stakeholders should be improved.	Internal	Connectivity
The atomisation of Galician fishing sector tends to generate local interpretations of the problems even though they might be sectoral. Some cofradía leaders are politically antagonistic towards their representatives in the federations; this makes the dialogue and collaboration difficult.	Internal	Connectivity
The ability of the SSF stakeholders to put forward new proposals or to participate in decision-making is generally poor.	Internal	Resilience
Small organisations, representing only the SSF, could face economic viability problems. The representatives of these organisations (i.e. small cofradías) are more likely to initiate commercial actions to obtain the economic resources rather than attempt to develop an active representation.	Internal	Resilience
Shortage of economic resources is often due to the inability of the SSF to respond to calls for funding (EMFF) and to manage the bureaucratic burden.	Internal	Resilience
In the government-oriented model, the fishermen are unwilling to propose rules or to participate actively in the different fora. They believe that all the decisions are taken without giving them an opportunity to influence the decision processes. This is also related to the responsibility (accountability principle).	Not applicable	Community/ perceptions
The representatives of the artisanal fisheries feel that the impartiality and equity principles are not followed. Their opinion is that the representation becomes increasingly unbalanced, in favour of industrial fishing, as it rises through the levels of the institutional scale.	Not applicable	Community/ perceptions
Portugal: A large percentage of the SSF remains outside the most representative associations.	Internal	All the principles

6.1.2 Helpful factors: opportunities and strengths

The main helpful factors, both opportunities and strengths, are presented in Table 6.

Table 6. SSF representativeness: opportunity and strength factors

Factors	Origin of the factor	Governance principles
Some organisations are moving towards a community-oriented model at the local level, in the context of a government-oriented model. It is a way of overcoming the rigidity of the system.	Internal	Accountability
Inclusiveness principle is very well represented in terms of participation and involvement of the representatives of different institutions.	Internal	Inclusiveness
Fishers at the local level are very well informed about the most important issues related to the fishing activity (mainly the fishing possibilities and the allocation rules for the different fishing technologies and vessels). All administrative problems are also very well managed.	Internal	Transparency
Formal structure is in place (see governance diagrams); channels of connectivity exist at the regional, national and EU level.	Internal	Accountability/ connectivity
A legitimate SSF representation with elected professionals is in place.	Internal	Legitimacy
EMFF resources are available, with a special emphasis on SSFs.	External	Resilience
FLAGS are in place, with potential emphasis on SSFs.	External	Resilience
There are some opportunities at the European level, thanks to the Traditional Fishery Working Group under the CCS. The CCS structure allows the fishermen (both industrial and SSF) to propose measures which are channelled to the EC and can be effectively followed.	External	All the principles
Some stakeholders, outside the formal fishery governance framework (see governance diagram), are actively engaged in the governance fora and are even proposing fishery-management measures for the small-scale sector, with active participation of the sector.	External	Inclusiveness
In general, the EC provides communication channels for the fishing sectors (both SSF and industrial) to convey their opinions of the management measures. Consultations have been launched sometimes, especially regarding the proposal for the new common fishery policy (CFP; Green Paper).	External	Community perception

6.2 Good practice guidelines

The basic motivation for the analysis presented in this report was to examine some good and bad governance examples in the selected case studies. The lessons learnt from these examples, supported by the results of the SWOT analysis, should help in the difficult task of improving the SSF governability. The examples supplied here are not just narrative descriptions of real-life experiences. They should also provide information to help in the identification of good practices and operational actions, which might also be adopted in other contexts. The results allowed the creation of good practice guidelines for strengthening the involvement of the SSF in the advisory and decision-making processes. The main aim of this study was to propose specific actions for the future SSF management under a workable co-management system, to contribute to the consolidation and boost the involvement of the bodies and organisations representing SSF.

Various general conclusions were drawn by comparing these experiences. For a detailed description of the examples, see *Report 3.1 Good practice guidelines: evidence from Atlantic case studies in EU* (<http://mare.azti.es/action-3/>). A summary of these examples is shown in Table 7 and Table 8.

This work was conducted using focus groups involving the stakeholders. Comparisons were performed based on qualitative data collected by these groups. The management models implemented in South-Westerns Waters were analysed to compare them with various types of co-management between the government and stakeholders. The external socioeconomic driving forces (biological status of the stocks, competition, price levels, etc.) were also considered.

6.2.1 Summary of the examples

A summary of key aspects of the best examples from the case studies will be now provided.

Table 7 shows the framework used to describe the selected successful and unsuccessful examples. The table presents the initiatives/proposals successfully implemented (or not) thanks to the governance system, the level (local/regional/national/European) of the proposal origin and the level affected. The driving stakeholders and the legal impact are also identified. The most representative successful examples (at the local/regional/national level) usually have some legal impact although there are some successful implementations with no legal effects. In general, there are no trade-offs, i.e. no strong indication of conflicts between LSF and SSF, which might be expected during the promotion of SSF initiatives. One of the examples shows that the fairness principle can be maintained without affecting the LSF (the Basque region example). Usually, the local/regional levels act as promoters, but the affected level can be local, regional or even European. In some of the cases, the CCS was used as a channel to reach the European decision space. The driving stakeholders were also identified. Notably, in some cases, the external agents, such as the civil society (NGOs) or appropriate research institutes, acted as the promoters or leaders of the proposals. The initiatives themselves are associated with tangible incentives and not necessarily linked to the fishing possibilities. The last column in Table 7 summarises the topics:

- Regionalisation processes using participatory models: self-management, co-management and less formal participatory processes
- Increase in the quality of the bottom-up information flow
- Increase in the influence in the European public consultation processes
- Diversification of the SSF activity within the sector
- Support of the introduction of local/regional management plans through participatory processes
- Introduction of amendments to already established regulations

Table 8 shows the key factors and the main governance principles associated with the example cases. The most important governance principle involved in the initiatives was the accountability principle. To achieve compliance with good governance principles, some difficulties must be overcome. One of the main obstacles was the top-down management model, which should be replaced with a more flexible co-management model or a participatory process.

Table 7. Example framework: key aspects

	Case study	Successful (S) or unsuccessful (NS)	Promotion level*	Affected level*	Legal impact	Driving stakeholder	Sector involved	The main problem/other aspects. The nature of the proposals developed under good/bad governance in the SSF	Trade-offs
1	Aquitaine								
1.1	Japanese clam stock management	S and NS	Local	Local	No	Fishers via regional, national fishing committee, CCS	SSF,	To change EU technical regulations. <u>Regionalisation - to develop local coastal management of the European-level regulation.</u> Economic profitability is also involved.	No
1.2	Influencing EU EMFF proposal at early stages	S and NS	Regional	Local, All Member States (European)	Yes (contribution)	CRPMEM through CCS	SSF	<u>To modify the draft of the EMFF proposal.</u> The change affects the aid for modernisation of the SSF fleet engines.	No
2	Basque Country								
2.1	SSF: data collection process	S	Regional	Regional/national	No	Research institute, regional administrations	SSF	<u>To increase the transparency of bottom-up information flow, empower small-scale representation</u>	No
2.2	Barnacle fishery management	S	Local	local	Yes	Fishers through government	SSF	To introduce a management plan <u>to diversify the fishing activity.</u> Low atomisation of the sector allows direct connections between the stakeholders (fishers-regional government). <u>No connection rules.</u>	No
2.3	SSF self-management	S	Local	Local	No	Regional (Bizkaia, Gipuzkoa) Federations	SSF and purse seiners	<u>Change the governance model; break down the top-down process to allow sharing of fishing opportunities</u> among vessels. <u>A self-management is introduced</u> to share the opportunities, based on a common pool. Evidence of fairness between purse seiners and SSF. One of the very few examples of this type of activity. Economic profitability is also involved.	No
3	Canary Islands								
3.1	Changes in the management of anchovy and	S	Regional	Regional	Yes	Fishers through CCS	SSF	Management issues involving the EU bodies (STECF) and external fisheries bodies (ICCAT).	No

	Case study	Successful (S) or unsuccessful (NS)	Promotion level*	Affected level*	Legal impact	Driving stakeholder	Sector involved	The main problem/other aspects. The nature of the proposals developed under good/bad governance in the SSF	Trade-offs
	bluefin tuna fisheries: a case of regional participation in the AC							Collaboration. Government (MAPAMA) supporting the management initiative.	
3.2	Development of an SSF management plan in the waters of Fuerteventura	S	Local	Local	Yes	NGO	SSF	A participatory process promoted by a third party (the NGO WWF) to develop an SSF management plan in a conservation area. Conservation and fishing control, surveillance and monitoring issues.	No
4	Galicia								
4.1	Spider crab management	NS	Regional	Regional (Galicia)	Yes (annual plan)	Regional administration	SSF	The management should be changed to move towards a new governance model to satisfy the governance principles.	No
4.2	Shellfish management plans	S	Local-Regional	Local-Regional	Yes	Regional administration, shellfish-collecting groups, cofradías	SSF	A participatory process to define the annual shellfish management plans.	No
4.3	Os Miñarzos marine reserve	S	Local	local	Yes	Local cofradía, NGO	SSF	The introduction of co-management model in the newly created MRFI.	Yes. Conflicts due to high atomisation of the small-scale sectors, also conflicts with other

	Case study	Successful (S) or unsuccessful (NS)	Promotion level*	Affected level*	Legal impact	Driving stakeholder	Sector involved	The main problem/other aspects. The nature of the proposals developed under good/bad governance in the SSF	Trade-offs
									fishing sectors.
5	North of Portugal								
5.1	Establishment and management of a compensation fund for fishing professionals	S and NS	National administration	National	Yes	National administration	The whole fishing sector, SSF and larger fleets	Social nature (economic aid). To assure the economic viability of the sector when fishing is curtailed due to circumstances beyond the control of the fishers.	No
6	European decision level. Special focus on the CCS AC								
6.1	EU Control regulation	S	European	Local, all Member States (European)	Yes	Traditional fishing working group - CCS	SSF, under 15-m length overall	Modification of EU control regulations.	No

*Promotion level: local, national, regional, European; Impact level: local, national, regional, European

**Key governance principle: to identify the key principles determining the (positive and/or negative) outcome

Table 8. Key drivers in the governance examples – main governance principles (followed successfully or not)

Nb	Case study	Key drivers	Governance principles followed	Governance principles not followed or at low compliance levels
1	Aquitaine			
1.1	Japanese clam stock management	Few fishers involved, and the fishing interests of these groups are similar. There is an economic incentive. Lack of updated/new biological/economic impact assessment reports. Poor biological state of the clam stock. Potential difficulties in controlling and enforcing the minimum sizes, market problems.	Connectivity - a good collaboration between French fishery committees, IFREMER and CCS. Accountability – high degree of fisher responsibility.	Inclusiveness – no response from the EC after many years of demanding the change. Resilience – the proposal still exists and high capacity from local to national representatives to influence on decision-making. No legal impact.
1.2	Influencing the EU EMFF proposal at its early stages	The initiative of great importance to SSF. Strong role of co-legislators.	Connectivity - a good collaboration between French fishery committees, CRPMEM, CNPMEM and CCS. Transparency . Good transference of information related to European matters (i.e. the knowledge on the draft text of the EMFF). Accountability – high degree of fisher responsibility. No immediate effect on the SSF but might have effects in the future.	Resilience – the proposal is still current and high capacity from local to national representatives. No legal impact observed thanks to the EC involvement but, eventually, a legal impact will be felt due to the co-legislators.
2	Basque Country			
2.1	SSF: data collection process	Strong involvement at the local level (a collaboration between a research institute, regional administration and SSF fishers). Economic support in place. External facilitator. Long collaboration between the stakeholders (for more than 10 years). The incentive of improving the reputation of the segment in comparison with other potential maritime users.	Accountability – high degree of fisher responsibility. Self-imposed measures for data collection. Connectivity – very good connectivity between fishers, scientists and administration at local/regional level.	Transparency - in general, the bottom-up transfer of catch data is poor (from local to regional and national levels). Inclusiveness – loss of opportunities due to lack of real-time data on quota use.
2.2	Barnacle fishery	Economic incentives for implementing the initiative. A pilot project promoted to protect the species and develop its exploitation by small-scale fishers. The measure is adopted in internal waters where the regional administration has exclusive competence. Very few vessels involved, and the group is very homogeneous.	Connectivity - a good and direct collaboration between cofradías, regional administration and the regional research institute.	
2.3	Self-management of an SSF mackerel fishery at the local level	High degree of fisher responsibility, the involvement of federations; self-management involving very different fleet segments can be developed. Good collaboration between federations and cofradías.	Accountability - the traditional top-down model for managing fishing possibilities is changed in favour of self-management at the local level. High degree of fisher	

Nb	Case study	Key drivers	Governance principles followed	Governance principles not followed or at low compliance levels
			responsibility, both in small-scale vessels and purse seiners.	
3	Canary Islands			
3.1	Changes in management measures for anchovy and bluefin tuna: a case of regional participation in the AC	<p>Opportunity to exploit resources with established market acceptance.</p> <p>The interaction between the sector and the national administration; technical support of the proposal.</p> <p>The availability of administrative capacity of the CCS. The CCS channel used to reach the highest levels of decision-making, the EC and ICCAT.</p> <p>The fisheries consist of homogeneous fleets involved in small-scale fishing.</p>	<p>Accountability - the governance elements are in place so the sector can propose effective improvements.</p> <p>Connectivity - good connectivity between the sector, regional and national administration and support from the rest of actors within the Working Group.</p>	
3.2	Development of the SSF management plan for the waters of Fuerteventura	<p>The fishing activity in a conservation zone needs to be regulated. The region has limited marine space for small-scale fishing activity; there is a threat of illegal fishing.</p> <p>The fishery consists of a homogeneous fleet involved entirely in small-scale fishing. An external agent (NGO) promotes the initiative.</p> <p>A working group engaging a large variety of stakeholders, i.e. fishing sector, public sector, NGOs, academia and forces of order.</p>	<p>Legitimacy - The promoter is legitimated to participate and play a leading role even though it does not belong to the governance framework.</p> <p>Accountability - The Spanish government provides sufficient flexibility to accommodate a management plan led by an external actor. Inclusiveness - All actors concerned participate in the development of the management plan.</p>	
4	Galicia			
4.1	Spider crab management	Species of high economic value. Complex regional management. Atomised sector. Low participation of fishers in the regulation. The management without a monitoring committee. Lack of transparency and poor communication with the regional administration (top-down). A large proportion of small-scale vessels in Galicia affected.		<p>Accountability- top-down management introduced by regional administration. Few influence opportunities. The annual work plan discussed in a couple of meetings with no contributions from stakeholders.</p> <p>Transparency - lack of transparency creates problems in connectivity.</p>

Nb	Case study	Key drivers	Governance principles followed	Governance principles not followed or at low compliance levels
4.2	Shellfish (beds of bivalves) management	Regional administrator promotes the initiative, but working groups and cofradías take part. Workshops and meetings with shellfish farmers from all regions, focus groups of shellfish-gathering women participate in the process and in the preparation of the annual plans (contact and exchange of experiences). Incorporation of technicians into cofradías. Sustainability and professionalisation of the sector as incentives.	Accountability – high degree of responsibility; the sector is involved in decision-making. Inclusiveness – the sense of belonging to working groups is strong, decisions are taken collectively. The sector is helped by technicians and the regional administration. Transparency and Connectivity – high.	
4.3	Co-management of Os Miñarzos marine reserve	Successful past experiences of the Cofradía of Lira. Confidence in the external collaborators in the process. Progressive decrease in the resources of the SSF fleet revealed by the participatory SWOT analysis. Confidence in an external actor who led the process dynamisation. Tools and actions to reinforce motivation. Strong motivation of fishermen and high receptivity of all political parties.	Accountability – a rarely used co-management system in place. Connectivity – external actor dynamises the process.	
5	North of Portugal (continental Portugal)			
5.1	Establishment and management of a compensation fund for fishing professionals	Economic and social incentives. A participatory management committee is created in which the administration and fishing sector take part.	Accountability/Inclusiveness – a management committee of the fund with fishing-sector participation. Transparency - good level of transparency	Accountability - A government-oriented model is used to introduce the fund measure. Connectivity - connectivity between stakeholders is non-existent.
6	European decision level. Special focus on the CCS AC			
6.1	EU Control regulation	The transversal topic discussed in the Traditional Fishery Working Group (CCS) The availability of the CCS capabilities.	Accountability – the structure is in place.	

6.2.2 List of good practices in governance

There is an urgent need to identify and implement good practices in the SSF governance. This section identifies a set of good practices with special attention to those favouring participatory management models, effective information flow (bottom-up and top-down) and encouraging the responsibility for SSF governance.

An important assumption of this study is that, in a decentralised system, the central governments will delegate certain management functions (formally or informally). The best way to increase the governance efficiency is not the promotion of decentralisation per se but the adoption of a management system based on cooperation. Decentralisation should be understood as a process of building new institutions based on cooperative management. Such co-management is the most efficient model to improve the quality of governance. The first two of the good practices presented here are associated with the transition towards collaborative models. A revision of the co-management governance models is included in Report 2.1 of this project *A Traffic Light Approach Matrix (TLAM) including a set of indicator to evaluate the degree of involvement in public bodies and private organisations* (<http://mare.azti.es/action-2/>), summarised in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Co-management types (McConney et al. (2003))

Here, good practices and actions to implement them are identified for each of the good governance principles used in this analysis.

6.2.2.1 Accountability principle

Good practice 1: Move towards community-focused governance as a way to exploit the opportunities to change or influence decision-making

Conventional SSF management constrains the potential of this sector to participate in decision-making. Thus, the adoption of a community-based approach should be encouraged, to replace the traditional top-down government-based model.

Specific actions to follow this approach in the short-to-medium term, at the local and regional levels, are given below.

- ✓ **To promote participatory processes by creating working groups** for specific topics or initiatives, engaging a large range of stakeholders, i.e. fishing sector, public sectors, NGOs, research institutes and social communities. These groups will take part in the governance procedures already existing in each region, participate in the relevant processes and, eventually, in the preparation of the final proposal (annual management plans and general proposals concerning technical changes, minimum size changes for certain species, etc.).
- ✓ **To promote participatory processes by organising workshops, focus groups and meetings with a large number of involved stakeholders.** In these sessions, the problems, challenges and strategies can be shared. Most importantly, lasting bonds can be created between the professionals who have no close partners or colleagues.
- ✓ **To create local sectoral working groups,** allowing the introduction of internal improvements and facilitating the activity of small organisms, such as the *cofradías*.
- ✓ **To identify fisher groups of reference,** including the fishers with the highest levels of responsibility towards the SSF governance. In the Basque Country, there are a few fishers in each port serving as a group of reference. These groups do not need to be official, but their members normally belong to the official organisations.
- ✓ **To identify the well-known and reliable external agents to dynamise** these participatory processes and **to use the available economic resources to support them. The civil society should be considered an appropriate agent** for this action, e.g. NGOs and trade union organisations. Such organisations can even achieve some binding agreements. Other third parties should also be considered, (such as scientific research institutes). These agents are usually well known to the governance stakeholders (fishermen, administration, etc.) and often play a key role in support of the management initiatives, even promoting new management models in the area. They are especially useful as leaders in very large, atomised regions and in the cases where lack of confidence among the stakeholders is apparent.
- ✓ **An online database identifying these external agents** is a helpful tool; it should improve and complement the existing internal capabilities of the SSF organisations. This project contributes to such online database; it is publically available, and it should carefully maintained and updated.
- ✓ **To promote the introduction of co-management tools by the creation of co-management committees at local and regional levels.** Even if the proposals are introduced under the top-down management of the national and/or European administration, these tools may be implemented to break down that model, advancing decentralisation at these levels.
- ✓ **To promote self-management at a local/regional level even when national and/or European legislation is in place.** Certain topics are no longer handle exclusively at the level of European or national regulations. They could be managed at local or regional levels (e.g. the allocation of fishing possibilities, the introduction of certain technical measures, etc.). To this end, it is important to introduce additional actions:

- To organise meetings and workshops to identify the topics that could be managed at the local or regional levels.
- To improve the motivation of stakeholders to increase their involvement and degree of responsibility.

Good practice 2: Empowerment of SSF representatives through co-management

A set of actions should be created to promote the participation of SSF fishermen in decision-making areas and encourage co-management, leading to the democratisation of the management of fishery resources. These actions would be implemented over a long period and for a range of governance principles. Some of the most important actions are listed below.

- ✓ **Recognise the legitimacy of the participants** in the creation of co-management models.
- ✓ **Develop mechanisms for equal, inclusive and proactive participation.**
- ✓ **Increase transparency in communication**, paramount for building trust.
- ✓ Establish mechanisms for horizontal and periodic communication.
- ✓ **Strengthen the sense of the responsibility** of the promoter group for the objectives to be achieved in the society.
- ✓ **Increase connectivity with other stakeholders** (NGOs, politicians, scientists).
- ✓ **The objective as an incentive generates commitment:** to participate in decision-making at parity with the public administration.
- ✓ **Engage a facilitator**, with extensive knowledge of the SSF sector, throughout the process: building trust and mediation/conflict management.
- ✓ **Promote a systematic dynamisation to be implemented by an external actor** with the knowledge of the participants and the local problems of the sector. A planned dynamisation should be executed, including tools and actions to reinforce the motivation and overcome the challenges and obstacles throughout the process.

6.2.2.2 Transparency Principle

Good practice 3: Improvement of top-down (from the EC to local levels) information transfer

The new approach to improve the small-scale governance should use the data from different decision-making fora and other sources. This information should be then processed and employed in decision-making. It should also be communicated to all stakeholders, reaching the fishers at the local level. The following actions could be put into effect:

- ✓ **Training** to improve the level of functional literacy in the sector. The fishermen are not trained to read the documents. This can give rise to a chain of misinterpretations, distorting, intentionally or not, the original message.
- ✓ **Promoting the use of digital tools** to access the European-level information.
- ✓ **National administration: to provide information on catches in real time.** The lack of this information heavily affects the SSF as they are highly dependent on species with low quotas. The scarcity of good-quality information (bottom-up flow) exacerbates this problem. This action should be combined with others to deliver the real-time information on the SSF catches.

✓ **The EC should improve the communication with the local/regional levels** by using the official SSF representatives, established networks and the local, regional and national administration.

✓ **Representatives should boost the knowledge transfer related to European issues** (e.g. the creation of FLAGS, the availability of ACs, and in particular the CCS, discussions about the application of certain European policies, regulations, etc.).

To achieve this, the below actions could be implemented:

- **National/regional administration could promote public discussions on European matters.** This has been done during the reform of the Green Book of the current CFP.
- **The EMFF economic support** should be used to increase the capacity of the representatives to manage and transfer the information from different decision-making fora.
- **Meetings with fishers should be organised on a periodic basis to discuss the European matters**, not just the daily issues (as these are usually transmitted efficiently to the local level).
- **To solve the absenteeism problem, the key fishers in each port should be nominated, using a rotary system**, to serve as representatives at the port level. They should regularly attend the meetings of the cofradías, federations or associations.
- **The external agents, who could help in the information transfer** on a periodic basis, should be engaged (local/regional research institutes, FLAGS, NGOs and networks, among others).

Good practice 4: Effective and transparent bottom-up flow of basic information (from local to national level) to ensure a fair share of fishing resources or fair application of MSP, among others

There is an urgent need to reinforce the basic data supply, i.e. the activity-related quality information (i.e. catches, landings, discards, effort, etc.) and its bottom-up flow from local to national levels in real time. This is necessary **to reflect the real status of the segment and to ensure a fair share of fishing resources**. This information is needed to propose new management rules to complement the existing regulations (e.g. quota allocation). There is also need to link the SSF with coastal area management. Good-quality information on current activity is of utmost importance. Active and effective participation of the fishers in decision-making will be only possible if they are involved in the processing of the base information (inclusiveness). The following actions should improve the general situation.

✓ **To promote the use of digital tools** (e.g. applications for mobiles) to transfer the weekly activity of vessels less than 10-m long. The real-time activity reports to the national authority are necessary for effective management (e.g. the national authorities cannot anticipate closure of a fishery if they do not receive updated catch data in real time).

✓ **To support training of the fishers in the use of digital tools:** this is urgently needed due to their weak digital culture.

✓ **To use the EMFF opportunities to support investment in new digital technologies.**

✓ **To develop collaborative platforms** with representative vessels to collect good-quality data in real time. Incentives are needed to increase the responsibility of the fishers towards this objective.

- **High degree of fisher responsibility is required. Meetings** between fishers and local/regional scientists should be organised to explain and strengthen the incentives.
- **To encourage the investment in new devices** assuring quality data collection. Regional administrations could provide this support using the regional allocation of the national EMFF grants.

6.2.2.3 Inclusiveness principle

Good practice 5: Improve the active participation in decision-making by strengthening the capacity of representative organisations and fishers

The SSF, like other segments, also contribute to the overexploitation of the fishing resources. Thus, any proposal/initiative coming from this sector should include sustainability analysis reports. This does not always happen, reducing the power of the organisations to propose changes; the lack of data on biological and environmental conditions makes it difficult to form a balanced opinion.

Increasing active participation requires supporting measures to build up the capabilities not only of the SSF organisations but also of the fishers themselves. Unfortunately, fishermen are not trained to read the documents. This can give rise to a chain of misinterpretations, distorting, intentionally or not, the original message. When the message is complex, which is often true for the information coming from Brussels via (for instance) a provincial federation, the communication efficiency can be low (e.g. the case of the European regulation on discards). This also lowers the level of active participation.

Specific actions should be implemented to improve the active participation:

- ✓ **To provide updated reports on biological/economic and environmental state of the resources in documents attached to the proposals.** Decision-making is based on scientific review of proposed management measures. The existing formal structures with scientific capacity provide a framework for the assessment of technical proposals and support for the managers.
- ✓ **To introduce and maintain technical assistance,** to compensate for the limited capacity of fishers and their representatives to participate in technical areas of decision-making.
- ✓ **To support the introduction of external agents, who may help in promoting and even leading** the proposals. The civil society should be considered an appropriate agent for this action, e.g. NGOs and trade union organisations. Such organisations can even reach binding agreements. Other third parties should also be considered, such as scientific research institutes.
 - **An online database identifying these potential external agents,** who could complement the internal capacity of the SSF organisations, should be used and updated. This project contributes to such online, publically available database.
- ✓ **To identify incentives** (economic, environmental, etc.). The identification of tangible outcomes is an important element of successful processes as it increases the responsibility of fishers towards the SSF governance. It is essential not to link the representativeness of the sector or the responsibility of the fishers to the allocation of fishing possibilities exclusively. Other incentives, such as professionalisation of the sector or its higher visibility should also be used.
- ✓ **To support training activities** to overcome the lack of knowledge of basic scientific and legal and policy matters. Training activities could be directed either

to fishermen or representatives of fishermen, but the length of the training may vary accordingly.

- ✓ **To facilitate access to economic resources** to allow the participation in the decision-making. Some of the stakeholders might not be able to attend meetings because of their difficult financial circumstances. It is not a problem for some organisations representing the SSF; however, for the small SSF bodies, this could present an important obstacle.

i) To use the EFMM resources provided for this purpose.

ii) To use similar resources provided by the already existing FLAGs.

6.2.2.4 Connectivity principle

Good practice 6: Empowerment of SSF organisms and enhancing their connectivity

There are channels in place for connecting all the stakeholders involved in governance in all regions. However, the connections between stakeholders from different regions in the same or different Member States could be reinforced. The database built for this study (*Deliverable 1.1*), mentioned in Section 3, comprises 342 organisations representing the fishing sector, small-scale and other fishing sectors. Almost 23% of these organisations deal with a variety of fishery topics that do not involve fishing fleet representation. These organisms can support the connections between stakeholders. Some of the examples are the networks of fishing workers and the associations of fisher wives and net-menders. However, these networks represent less than 2% of the organisations.

It is also necessary to increase the connectivity of the SSF fishers with their organisations. Some of these entities represent small-scale vessels and other, vessels such as trawlers, purse seiners, gillnetters and long-liners. Around 18% out of these bodies represent the small-scale fishing sector exclusively. There is a need to reinforce this connection, usually developed using tools such as e-mail; some other tools, e.g. WhatsApp groups, could be created.

Here are some actions to enhance the stakeholder connectivity:

- ✓ **To create cross-border networks with the economic support of the EMFF.** Already existing organisms should be connected in the regions sharing resources exploited by the SSF or those sharing SSF-related transversal topics.
- ✓ **To promote the participation of the newly created networks in the decision-making processes.**
- ✓ **To create *ad hoc* mixed committees** (fishermen, administrative bodies, research institutions, civil society, etc.) for specific purposes.
- ✓ **To create unofficial committees, exclusive to the SSF, under the umbrella of the regional organisms (federations, associations).** The regional fishing organisations usually represent several fleets, of small-scale nature or others. In general, these organisms largely support the big-scale fleets because their invoices are larger, which increases the revenues of the Federation. To address the specific issues or concerns of the small-scale fleets, unofficial commissions have been created in some regions under the umbrella of official organisms. One such example is the commission created in association with the regional federation of *cofradías* in the Basque Country. This commission meets periodically to evaluate and clarify the

SSF concerns. The Federation promoted the creation of this body as the heterogeneity, and specific characteristics of the SSF often make it difficult to reach the consensus. The role of the secretary of the Federation is very important for this commission. The holder of this position handles the information from the EU and helps to avoid misinterpretations created by the unofficial word-of-mouth communications.

6.2.2.5 Legitimacy principle

Good practice 7: Empowerment of the SSF identification and visibility under a common-interest framework to increase the legitimacy

- ✓ **Fora for collaboration** within and between fishing sectors and with other actors in public and private realms usually bring good results. When the knowledge is shared, the actions are perceived as legitimate. This allows addressing the problems of heterogeneity of the fleets and pursuing the common interests. The European CCS fora are a good example.
- ✓ **To agree on the definitions to be adopted in specific contexts/proposals.**

6.2.2.6 Resilience principle

Good practice 8: Make the SSF less vulnerable and economically better equipped to face the governance changes (i.e. knowledge transparency, inclusiveness, etc.) needed to assure the resilience of this sector

The SSF governance could be improved by using the opportunities provided by the EMFF. However, the path to this goal is not free of obstacles. There are at least three concerns, described below. Firstly, the Member States usually include the coastal small-scale fishery Action Plans within the EMFF operative programmes; however, various aspects of these plans do not always translate into eligible costs. Secondly, the introduction of costs of innovation in the governance into Action Plans needs reinforcing. Traditionally, the Member States cover (i) investments in fishing vessels and equipment, (ii) diversifications of the activities, (iii) investment in human resources (mainly financing health and safety on board). They also cover (iv) fishery conservation (mainly permanent and temporary cessation of fishing) and (v) collective projects, mainly associated with innovation in fishing, processing or marketing using new or improved processes. However, less attention is paid to other eligible costs related to the cost of governance, such as (i) innovation in fisheries through management and organisation systems, (ii) support of FLAGS or (iii) advisory services (such as professional services on innovation in governance) and (iv) partnerships between scientists and fishermen.

Thirdly, it is necessary to facilitate the access of the SSF representatives to the EMFF. Strong administrative obstacles have to be overcome by some of the SSF representatives, especially those from the SSFs with reduced capacity. The advisory services, including advice on applying for EMFF support, are among the eligible costs. This opportunity is almost unknown to the stakeholders. This is one of the reasons why the information on the EMFF funding should be improved; the stakeholders will not apply for the funds if they are not aware of their existence.

Actions to be implemented could be:

- ✓ To make sure that the **regional operative programmes include eligible costs** related to (and covering) the **coastal SSF Action Plans. Public discussions and open dialogue with the regional administration are needed.**
- ✓ To promote **the innovation in governance as a part of the coastal SSF Action Plans.** Public discussions and open dialogue with the regional administration should be compulsory.
- ✓ To consider obtaining **technical assistance**, mainly in cases of small organisations, to circumvent the bureaucratic obstacles in the access to the EMFF economic resources.
- ✓ To interest the SSF representatives in the **use of EMFF regional and national support to improve the SSF governance.**
- ✓ **To use EMFF advisory services to facilitate obtaining the EMFF support.**
- ✓ To interest the SSF representatives in **accessing the EMFF funds devoted to Community-led Local Development via projects presented to the FLAGs**

6.2.2.7 Several principles at the European decision level

Good practice 9: Enhance the access to the European decision space: more effective consultation processes

The consultative processes promoted by the EC are of high importance for the CCS as they can increase its influence. In general, these processes do not allow effective participation because the EC usually involves CCS at the late stage of the proceedings, when only comments on the specific EC proposals can be submitted. The consultations could be relevant for the already existing Traditional Fishery Working Group (CCS); however, they should be improved to promote a transparent and efficient active participation.

Actions to improve the access of SSF to the European decision space:

- ✓ **The proposals from the EC to the CCS should be anticipated, and advice sought at the early stages of their preparation.** Once the proposals are completed, it is often too late for effective consultation.
- ✓ **The mechanisms of decision processes should be explained to the stakeholders, with all the stages clearly outlined.**
 - All proposals should be accessible online throughout the decision-making process.
- ✓ **The proposals from the EC should reach the CCS within time margin sufficient to translate them** (from English to the three official languages of the CCS) and to prepare and deliver the relevant CCS comments. The CCS has its own budget for translations; however, they can be time-consuming and often delay the delivery of the relevant advice.
- ✓ **The EC should make it clear to what extent the proposals can be affected by the advice from the Traditional Fishery Working Group;** sometimes the process cannot be influenced. The rules should be clearly defined from the very beginning of each new consultation process. The CCS should know the extent of the European consultation space for each case considered.

- ✓ **The EC should provide the proposal text for each new consultation process.**
This should be accompanied by a background overview document describing the context. The description of the technical background and details should also be provided.
- ✓ **The connectivity between the Traditional Fishery Working Group and the scientific and political fora should be strengthened** (identified while defining the European governance structure). **A more systematic dialogue is needed.**
The weaknesses in connectivity reduce the chances of SSF participation in decision-making. It is important to improve the collaboration between the European institutions; the communication between the EC, the European Parliament (Fishery Committee) and the CCS should be reinforced. The EC should request advice from the STECF on the conservation and management of marine resources, including biological, economic, environmental, social and technical considerations. However, the STECF might be connected with the Traditional Fishery Working Group more often. The EC should ask for STECF advice on the SSF-related matters more frequently.
SSF representatives emphasise their limited technical and economic capacity, which makes it difficult to participate in the various fora (such as some ICES working groups). Human and economic resources are limited, but specific actions could be implemented to reinforce the links between these institutions.
 - A list of liaisons with various institutions should be prepared and kept updated for all the SSF actions undertaken by these organisations.
 - Specific programmed CCS meetings, particularly those of the Traditional Fishery Working Groups, should invite representatives of these institutions.

Good practice 10: Enhance the active participation of SSF representatives in the European decision-making via the Traditional Fishery Working Group (CCS)

Actions to increase and strengthen the active participation of the traditional working group:

- ✓ **To improve the composition of the group better to reflect the SSF interests (i.e. ensure appropriate representation of the component fleets).**
- ✓ **To define the specific purpose of this group.** The existing manner of representation is not free of problems. In the case of the SSF, there are many definitions due to many geographical areas, fleet structures, targeted species and fishing techniques involved. This makes it difficult to formulate a European definition applicable to all regions. The process of transferring the common definition to the Traditional Fishery Working Group from different levels in the three countries (Spain, France and Portugal) is complex. The group will have to deal with different interests of the participants; a practical solution is needed.
- ✓ **To introduce participatory tools in some of the meetings** of the Traditional Fishery Working Group to increase active participation.
- ✓ **To provide the AC and other fora with scientific and technical support** from their respective administrations.
- ✓ **To encourage the use of economic resources** to facilitate the participation of all representatives in the working groups.
 - To request and use EMFF funding.
 - To access the EMFF funds devoted to Community-led Local Development through projects presented to the FLAGs.

- ✓ **To assess actively the impact of the accepted proposals** promoted by the Traditional Fishery Working Group and evaluate the results of collaboration with the rest of European scientific and political organisms.

6.3 Gap analysis

Having identified a set of good practices in the previous subsection a gap analysis is now conducted **to identify obstacles in the institutional, legal apparatus and SSF organisations** that may impede consecution of the objective of moving towards a broader involvement of SSF in decision process and setting up and/or further strengthening of SSF bodies and organisations. Measures/actions to bridge the gap will be discussed.

Because the SSFs are highly complex and heterogeneous, the solutions—good practices—translated from the real-life experiences often fail due to inappropriate governance models. The previous section reviews good practices specific to the SSF governance, drawing on the conclusions of SWOT analysis and the examples of successful and unsuccessful governance described in the report. It identifies good practices in the governance, with special attention to practices related to the improvements in participatory and/or joint-management processes (moving towards community-based models, at least at local/regional levels). Other good practices can help in the efficient and transparent knowledge transfer to all stakeholders (top-down but also bottom-up). Effective bottom-up information flow (from local to national levels) ensures a fair share of fishing resources and fair application of the MSP, among other objectives. Good practices can increase active participation in decision-making by strengthening the participatory capacity of the representative organisations and the fishers. A set of proposals to empower the SSF organisations and enhance their connectivity is also included in the good practice list. Finally, the resilience should also be assured. Good practices are needed to make the SSF less vulnerable and sufficiently economically equipped to face the governance changes.

However, this section deals with the concept of “solution capacity”. It tries to identify the solution capacity level for each of the already recognised issues or obstacles facing the SSF sector. The report establishes an explicit link between the solution capacity and the capacity to develop and/or implement a set of actions or good practices. Not always it is possible to find a solution (good practice) to face certain issues which represent an important obstacle that may impede consecution of the objective of moving towards a broader involvement of SSF in the decision process and setting up and/or further strengthening of SSF bodies and organisations.

6.3.1 List of issues- obstacles, good practices and actions in governance and its solution capacity degree

The capacity to develop different actions will be assessed (in qualitative terms) according to several criteria (Figure 7). These criteria are used to produce the Table 9.




Figure 7. Criteria for allocating a degree of solution capacity

Table 9. Issues, Actions related to good practices, solution capacity

<i>Issue/obstacle</i>	<i>Good practice</i>	<i>Actions linked to the good practices</i>	<i>Capacity level</i>
Principle: Legitimacy linked to the representativeness			
General lack of institutional definition recognised and accepted by the SSF fleet. This lack of common identity results in weak cohesion and lowers the group awareness. Thus, the unified and effective participation in the decision-making is difficult.	<i>Good practice 7:</i> Empowerment of the SSF identification and visibility under a common-interest framework, to increase legitimacy	Legitimate definitions should be agreed on. Included in Section 3.2.5.1	Low
The heterogeneity of SSF fishing techniques (fishing gears, target species, etc.) hampers the sector representation. In particular, negotiation is difficult because of a large number of rules related to the activity management, regulating various technical measures, distribution of quotas, etc.	Not identified	Not identified	Low
The legal nature of the Spanish cofradías (public legal entities) and their consequent dependence on public administration impede the fair SSF representation in comparison with similar organisations in Portugal and France.	Not identified	Not identified	Low
Principle: Accountability-Inclusiveness			
SSF fishermen show a low level of responsibility towards strict compliance with the rules that regulate their professional activity. Thus, their claims are not fully taken into account in the decision-making processes.	To identify incentives (economic, environmental, etc.)	Action in the Section 3.2.3.1	Medium
SSF representatives show moderate responsibility; they attend the decision-making fora. However, they convey the interests of all the associates of their organisation (SSF and LSF), making it difficult to defend the exclusive interests of the SSF sector. Some stakeholders think it is not necessary to develop special SSF representation.	Not identified	Not identified	Medium
The traditional fishery management model (hierarchical, top-down) limits the potential of the SSF sector to participate in decision-making.	To apply an institutional co-management model	Not identified	Low and medium
	<i>Good practice 1:</i> Move towards community-focused governance as a way to exploit the opportunities to change or influence decision-making.	List of actions in the Section 3.2.1.1 to develop more participatory processes	Low-medium

<i>Issue/obstacle</i>	<i>Good practice</i>	<i>Actions linked to the good practices</i>	<i>Capacity level</i>
	<i>Good practice 2:</i> Empowerment of SSF representatives through co-management	List of actions in the Section 3.2.1.2	Low-medium
A large proportion of SSF fishermen are disappointed and lack confidence in their representatives, their managers and, ultimately, in their participation in the governance system.	Not identified	Not identified	Low
Principle: Transparency			
Limited top-down transfer of European issues. The information on other than every-day issues does not reach the bottom-level institutions.	<i>Good practice 3:</i> Improvement of top-down (from the EC to local levels) information transfer	List of actions in the Section 3.2.2.1	Medium-high
Scarce-to-moderate bottom-up transfer of the information on the SSF activity (landing data, etc.)	<i>Good practice 4:</i> Effective and transparent bottom-up flow of basic information (from local to national level) to ensure a fair share of fishing resources or fair application of MSP, among others	List of actions in the Section 3.2.2.2	Medium-high
Principle: Inclusiveness			
Low level of active participation of fishermen and their representatives due to limited technical/economic capacity	<i>Good practice 5:</i> Improve active participation in decision-making by strengthening the capacity of representative organisations and the fishers	List of actions in the Section 3.2.3.1	Medium-
Principle: Connectivity			
Formal structure is in place. Channels of connectivity exist, but connectivity between cross-border institutions should be improved.	<i>Good practice 6:</i> Empowerment of SSF organisms and enhancing their connectivity	List of actions in the Section 3.2.4.1	Medium
Regions with a large number of multi-level organisations; the representativeness is very atomised (e.g. Galicia). The associations might perceive the federations as non-functional.	Not identified	Not identified	Low
Regions with a small number of multi-level organisations. Lack of equilibrium related to the number of organisations (Portugal)	Good practices in the North of Portugal to create multi-level organisations and to promote comprehensive associationism in the fishing sector	List of actions in Section 3.2.8	Medium

<i>Issue/obstacle</i>	<i>Good practice</i>	<i>Actions linked to the good practices</i>	<i>Capacity level</i>
Conflicts of interest. The interests of the fishing sector are different from those of the administration responsible for compliance with the rules (in theory) protecting the sustainability of the resources. The disparity between these cultural patterns makes the dialogue difficult. This is also true for the dialogue between the fishing sector and other actors in the governance structure of fishery management (NGOs, tourism, sports fishing, etc.).	Not identified	Not identified	Low
Principle: Resilience			
Low funding eligibility and lack of EMFF actions related to innovation in governance. The representatives are badly informed, and their capacity to access the eligible EMFF funds is low.	<i>Good practice 8:</i> Make the SSF less vulnerable and economically better equipped to face the governance changes (knowledge transparency, inclusiveness, etc.) needed to assure the resilience of this sector	List of actions in Section 3.2.6.1	Low-medium
Principle: Inclusiveness at European level (CCS level)			
Limited active participation of representatives in the European decision-making. In particular, consultation processes might be improved by using established protocols.	<i>Good practice 9:</i> Enhance the access to the European decision space: more effective consultation processes	List of actions in Section 3.2.7.1	Medium
Limited participation of Traditional Fishery Working Group (CCS) representatives as active providers of advice in the European decision-making framework.	<i>Good practice 10:</i> Enhance active participation of SSF representatives in the European decision-making via the Traditional Fishery Working Group (CCS)	List of actions in Section 3.2.7.2	Medium

The study presented here has identified four impediments contributing to the gap; being low the capacity of the SSF sector to close that gap. The four impediments/obstacles discussed in the previous section are (1) lack of institutional definition of SSF, (2) legal nature of Spanish *cofradías*, (3) top-down models and (4) equilibrium in the numbers of organisations (multi-level, etc.).

The three first obstacles are of legal nature. The SSF can do little to modify the legal and institutional framework to solve these issues. The actions proposed in the present study (see obstacle tables in Section 4.2) require the involvement of decision-makers at the EU and national levels. The EU and national authorities have the technical and economic resources to launch consultations and outsource technical studies to establish the actual status of the issues in question. These inputs are necessary to launch the debate at the national and regional levels. Such discussions will require the active participation of the stakeholders. Gap determinants 1 and 3 could be addressed through a stepwise process, where the consensus achieved in the dialogue would result in concrete proposals to the EC and the EU Parliament, as a basis for future legislation. Obstacle 2 requires a thorough discussion within the Spanish sector, but no *ad hoc* measures are proposed to solve this issue. To overcome the Obstacle 4, some incentives should be deployed by the management (instead of legislative changes). However, some changes of institutional and legal nature are also likely to be required.

To overcome the Obstacle 1, the problem of formulating the definition of SSFs has to be faced. The SSF activities vary from region to region due to the intrinsic features of their fishing resources. The potential solution is to prepare regional definitions, employing as the basis the current definitions used in different regions. The solution also proposes *ad hoc* definitions for specific purposes and organisations, such as Traditional Fishery Working Group in the CCS or regional fishery management plans. New rules improving access to financial resources or other means to protect the small-scale fishing activities might be opposed by the stakeholders.

Obstacle 2, predicated on the legal nature of *cofradías*, requires an effort on the part of the national and regional administrations; they should address the problem of the lack of independence of the *cofradías*. A thorough discussion of the problems of *cofradías*, the main representatives of the small-scale sector in Spain, should be either launched by the administrations or requested by the SSF sector. It is likely that the issue will meet resistance of the administration representatives. The model of *cofradías* is ancient and widely accepted by the public. During its long history, it has adopted the legal form of public bodies whose role is framed by the Spanish legislation. No changes to the model are expected. However, some means could be found to address the strong dependency of these institutions on the administration, particularly regarding economic resources.

The problems of top-down management of fishery resources, identified as Obstacle 3, have been widely recognised by the scientific community. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that this dominant form of management is resisted by the fishermen, reducing the legitimacy of the management process. Moreover, this type of management prioritises the conservation point of view, paying little attention to the human dimension of the activity. Changing the model is a task that demands a deep reflection from all stakeholders. Legal and institutional framework changes

will be needed at the EU, national and regional level. At the regional level, such changes are likely to be achieved; some relevant experiences in the implementation of bottom-up approach have been reported. As for the other obstacles, a process of consultation and debate should take place to gather the insights of the interested parties. A gradual implementation in the fisheries in which co-management is most needed would supply new data, allowing extending the process to other fisheries. This study includes a list of tools (good practices) based on the lessons learnt, which might help to move towards a co-management model.

Unlike the other gap determinants, the proposed solution for the Obstacle 4 is not related to legal changes; the legal apparatus in force does not restrict associationism. However, there is no multi-level governance structure in continental Portugal. The causes of the low level of associationism should be first analysed, in a process led by the national administration. Different regional stakeholders should be able to identify the type of multi-level organisation that fits best the needs of their regions. As the process of associationism is voluntary by nature, the national and regional administrations should provide incentives to motivate active stakeholder engagement in the creation of the missing governance structures.





Figure 8. The potential gaps in the process of broader involvement of SSF in decision-making: identification of gap determinants with special emphasis on those linked to institutional and legal apparatus (a). Obstacles that are not gap determinants (b)



(b)

Figure 9 (continued). The potential gaps in the process of broader involvement of SSF in decision-making: identification of gap determinants with special emphasis on those linked to institutional and legal apparatus (a). Obstacles that are not gap determinants (b).

7 SCENARIOS FOR IMPROVING THE IMPACT OF SSF ON DECISION-MAKING

This section summarises the scenarios that might guide the future SSF activity in South-Western Waters. These scenarios were prepared on the basis of project reports and consultations with stakeholders. Table 10 presents the main scenarios, categorised into three groups of high-level topics.

Table 10. Summary of scenarios governing the SSF activity

High-level topic 1	EMFF – financial opportunities to enhance the resilience of SSF	
Scenario 1.1 Scenario 1.2	Scenario 1.1. No changes–limited use of the EMFF resources–the SSF remains vulnerable, the sector resilience does not improve	Scenario 1.2. SSF stakeholders introduce governance-related innovation costs into Action Plans, making the SSF less vulnerable and economically better equipped
High-level topic 2	The SSF management system and models for the future	
Scenario 2.1 Scenario 2.2.	Scenario 2.1. No changes in SSF management. CFP unchanged	Scenario 2.2. CFP unchanged. However, regionalisation is introduced to adapt the EU rules to the regional needs
Scenario 2.3	Scenario 2.3. Specific regulations for SSF are needed	
High-level topic 3	Organisational framework – accountability principle. Partnerships at local, national and European levels conditioning the SSF participation and influence in decision-making processes	
Scenario 3.1 Scenario 3.2	Scenario 3.1. Good structure in place, no more SSF organisations or fora needed in a long-term. However, involvement in decision-making is not improved	Scenario 3.2. Good structure in place, no more SSF organisations or fora needed in a long-term. Strengthened partnerships

7.1 EMFF – financial opportunities to enhance the resilience of SSF

Using the EMFF support is a good opportunity for the SSF. The EMFF can help the SSF (fishing vessels less than 12 m in length, with no towed gear) to improve the fishing practices, add value to the catches, etc. Preferential access and higher rates of public support are applied. In this general context, two scenarios are presented:

Scenario 1.1. No changes–poor use of the EMFF resources–the SSF remains vulnerable, the resilience of the sector does not improve.

If nothing changes, the use of EMFF by SSF stakeholders will remain at very low levels. The SSF governance aspects might be improved by using the opportunities provided by the EMFF. This scenario is important for the stakeholders; the future EU fishing and aquaculture policy might cease to support or reduce the funding that is currently little used by the EMFF.

However, the path to this goal is not free of obstacles, which makes its implementation difficult. Some of the problems are described below.

a) The SSF operative programmes developed by the EU Member States (MS) are not always included in the financial programmes. There are several concerns. The MS usually include the coastal SSF Action Plans in the EMFF operative programmes. However, some aspects of these plans do not easily translate into eligible costs. As the programmes are financed jointly by the EU and the MS, the SSF representatives should be in touch with national and regional EMFF managing authorities. Only then, they could make sure that the SSF operative programmes are considered for being financed. In real life, this rarely happens.

b) Opinions obtained from the digital survey and some focus groups with representatives **from ES, Spain, FR, France, and PT, Portugal** are summarised in Figure 10.

b.1. Among the interviewed stakeholders, 78.5% think that their organisation uses less than 20% of the EMFF funds allocated to SSF.

b.2. A large proportion (78.5%) of the interviewed stakeholders consider that the main obstacles to the SSF accessing the EMFF funding are the administrative problems. The other important factor is lack of information on the funding opportunities.




Figure 10. Interview with the Atlantic Area SSF stakeholders on the use of EMFF funding

Scenario 1.2. SSF stakeholders introduce governance-related innovation costs into Action Plans, making the SSF less vulnerable and economically better equipped

Several specific actions might be implemented by the stakeholders to manage the SSF under this scenario:

- ✓ To make sure that the **regional operative programmes include eligible costs** related to (and covering) the **coastal SSF Action Plans. Public discussions and open dialogue with the regional administration are needed.**
- ✓ To promote **the innovation in governance as a part of the coastal SSF Action Plans. Public discussions and open dialogue with the regional administration should be compulsory.**
 - ✓ Traditionally, the Member States cover (i) investments in fishing vessels and equipment, (ii) diversifications of the activities and (iii) investment in human resources (mainly financing health and safety on board). They also cover (iv) fishery conservation (mainly permanent and temporary cessation of fishing) and (v) collective projects, mainly associated with innovation in fishing and processing or marketing using new or improved processes. **However, less attention is paid to other eligible costs related to the cost of governance, such as (i) innovation in fisheries through management and organisation systems, (ii) support of FLAGS or (iii) advisory services (such as professional services on innovation in governance) and (iv) partnerships between scientists and fishermen.**
- ✓ To consider obtaining **technical assistance**, mainly in cases of small organisations, to circumvent the bureaucratic obstacles to accessing the EMFF economic resources.
- ✓ To interest the SSF representatives in the **use of EMFF regional and national support to improve the SSF governance.**
- ✓ **To use the already existing EMFF advisory services to facilitate obtaining the EMFF support (to develop marketing and business strategies, undertake studies and receive professional advice on applying for EMFF funds).** Source: EC, Directorate General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. ISBN: 978-92-79-66095-5. doi: 10.2771/230641
- ✓ To interest the SSF representatives in **accessing the EMFF funds devoted to community-led local development via projects presented to the FLAGS**

According to the stakeholders, the economic support to the SSF organisations might be improved by following some of the good practices, with special attention to obtaining technical assistance. They also mentioned the introduction of economic compensation for the fishing days lost when attending the meetings (e.g. the CCS meetings). These results are shown in Figure 11.




Figure 11. Economic support demanded by the stakeholders

7.2 The SSF management system and future models.

Two focus groups (Bilbao, July 2017 and A Coruña, October 2017) and a digital survey were organised to discuss future scenarios for the SSF management. Stakeholders considered the option of maintaining the current management with no specific regulations for the SSF, except for the introduction of certain preferential conditions while adopting the rules issued by the CFP and EMFF. The current regulations are strongly linked to the quota management. The alternative, i.e. specific regulations to be applied to the artisanal fisheries and linked fleets, was also discussed. Under this last scenario, other measures, such as effort management and spatial management would be needed. Note that the opinions differed depending on the stakeholder country of origin (Figure 12).




Figure 12. Current management versus specific management for SSF

Scenario 2.1. No changes in SSF management. CFP remains the same

The current CFP does not encourage good SSF governance, as already shown in the State of the Art and Diagnostics sections of this report.

Scenario 2.2. No changes in CFP. However, regionalisation is introduced to adapt the EU rules to the regional needs
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In some respects, maintaining the current way of managing the SSF and the resource exploitation (CFP) seems to suit the stakeholders, for example in the case of landing obligation (CFP, Art. 15), among others. Portuguese stakeholders, in particular, are inclined to preserve the current management of SSF. However, regionalisation is certainly needed. Local stakeholders know best how to apply the EU rules in their areas. The main objective of this scenario is to be able to implement the proposals regionally even when they originate from European legislation. However, our results show that this approach results in good governance only if a community-focused model is implemented (or at least when moving towards such a model). Good detailed examples were provided by the project (for more details, see Deliverable 3.1., <http://mare.azti.es/action-3/>). Some of the examples are the regionalisation of technical measures for the clam stock, self-management at the local level in Aquitaine (France) and the local self-management of an SSF mackerel fishery in the Basque Country (Spain). This study clearly identified the practices that should be followed to advance the system towards the community-focused governance. These are listed below.

This scenario will be especially relevant from 2019 onwards, for certain specific topics.

1. The implementation of Landing Obligation (CFP, Art. 15) in the artisanal fisheries. The future of this implementation will depend on the capacity to work at the regional level, using the local knowledge to find the best way of adopting this regulation.
2. In Spain, the national administration is analysing the way of sharing the national quotas managed through TACs among the regions. The stakeholders recognise that this quota allocation system might not be appropriate for artisanal fisheries, and, therefore, other regional regulations should be introduced. However, the quota system and the quota allocation offer some future opportunities for SSF by the application of the CFP Art. 17 (criteria for the allocation of fishing opportunities by MS). This article is not yet implemented, but the SSF stakeholders consider it a potential opportunity to improve the quota allocation of certain species.

Art 17. CFP. When allocating the fishing opportunities available to them, as referred to in Article 16, Member States shall use transparent and objective criteria including those of an environmental, social and economic nature. The criteria to be used may include, inter alia, the impact of fishing on the environment, the history of compliance, the contribution to the local economy and historic catch levels. Within the fishing opportunities allocated to them, Member States shall endeavour to provide incentives to fishing vessels deploying selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced environmental impact, such as reduced energy consumption or habitat damage.

Implementation of social criteria for the distribution of TACs in the SSF fleet

Currently, the allocation of the national quota to the different fleet segments is mainly based on the historical catches. This criterion benefits the vessels with large production capacity and penalises vessels working on a smaller scale. CFP Art. 17 encourages incorporation of other criteria (social, environmental or economic). The SSF is the most socially important sector in the EU. For many fishing villages, their main or only source of income is the artisanal fishing. The SSF fleets are believed to produce low environmental impact due to the small scale of production and the fishing techniques used. Traditionally, the environmental criterion has been ignored by the managers when sharing the national quota. Moreover, the SSF has a low economic capacity. However, these criteria have not been used at any time as valid arguments for changes in the allocation of fishing opportunities. The use of selective fishing gear or greater compliance with the regulations has not constituted incentives for the distribution OF TACs. The historical ties of the SSF fleets to their communities have not been valued either.

Scenario 2.3. Specific regulations are needed for the SSF.

Spanish and French stakeholders clearly prefer this third scenario (Figure 12), which implies the introduction of specific regulations for SSF. The stakeholders requested that the regional spatial management be implemented within the framework of the Marine Spatial Planning EU directive (MSP). In similarity to Scenario 2.2., this scenario should be implemented in a regional context and in community-based systems.

Specific actions should be considered to reach the objectives of the two last scenarios; in both cases, changes leading towards community-focused governance are needed.

- ✓ **To promote participatory processes by creating working groups** for specific topics or initiatives, engaging a wide range of stakeholders, i.e. fishing sector, public sectors, NGOs, research institutes and social communities. These groups should be involved in the governance procedures already existing in each region. They should participate in the preparation of the final proposals (annual management plans and general proposals for technical changes, minimum size changes for certain species, etc.).
- ✓ **To promote participatory processes** by organising workshops, focus groups and meetings with a large number of stakeholders. During these sessions, the problems, challenges and strategies can be shared. Most importantly, lasting bonds can be created between the professionals who have no close partners or colleagues.
- ✓ **To create local-sector working groups**, allowing the introduction of internal improvements and facilitating the activity of small organisms, such as the *cofradías*.
- ✓ **To identify fishing groups of reference**, including the fishers with the highest levels of responsibility towards the SSF governance. In the Basque Country, there are a few fishers in each port, serving as a group of reference. These groups do not need to be official, but their members normally belong to the official organisations.
- ✓ **To identify the well-known and reliable external agents to dynamise** these participatory processes and **to use the available economic resources to support them. The civil society should be considered an appropriate agent** for this action, e.g. NGOs and trade union organisations. Such organisations can

even achieve some binding agreements. Other third parties should also be considered (such as scientific research institutes). These agents are usually well known to the governance stakeholders (fishermen, administration, etc.) and often play a key role in support of the management initiatives, even promoting new management models in the area. They are especially useful as leaders in very large, atomised regions and in the cases where lack of confidence among the stakeholders is apparent.

- ✓ **An online database identifying these external agents** is a helpful tool; it should improve and complement the existing internal capabilities of the SSF organisations. This project contributes to such online database; it is publically available, and it should be carefully maintained and updated.
- ✓ **To promote the introduction of co-management tools by the creation of co-management committees at local and regional levels.** Even if the proposals are introduced under top-down management of the national and/or European administration, these tools may be implemented to break down that model, advancing decentralisation.
- ✓ **To promote self-management at local/regional levels even when national and/or European legislation is in place.** Certain topics are no longer handled exclusively at the European or national level. They could be managed at the local or regional levels (e.g. the allocation of fishing possibilities, the introduction of certain technical measures, etc.). To this end, it is important to introduce additional actions:
 - To organise meetings and workshops to identify the topics that could be managed at the local or regional levels.
 - To improve the motivation of stakeholders, to increase their involvement and degree of responsibility.

7.3 Organisational framework. Partnerships at local, national and European level conditioning the SSF participation and influence in decision-making processes

Scenario 3.1. Good structure is in place, no more SSF organisations or fora are needed in a long-term engagement. However, there is no sufficient involvement in decision-making.

In general, the structure provided by the many (342) stakeholders involved in SSF representativeness seems to be sufficient, according to the view of the stakeholders. Only around 18% of the fishing sector organisations represent the SSF exclusively, but the stakeholders are not interested in increasing the number of these organisations. The communication channels are in place, and the system is stable although it needs strengthening. In the regions where SSF is not exclusively represented, good practices could be implemented to reinforce the internal organisation without increasing the complexity of the system. However, to form a good base for the representativeness, all SSF vessels should belong to these organisations. This is not true in Portugal, but good practices designed to achieve it have been identified.

Stakeholders admit that the creation of new organisations at the different levels would increase the complexity of the system and the “fatigue” of the SSF representatives. Stakeholder involvement is restricted by several factors, mostly by lack of time. It should be noted that the number of SSF representatives in each organisation is usually low (in many cases, just one person). These individuals are often involved in many fora, which creates an overcommitment problem. For the fishers, this adds up to more than a full-time job (fishing and attending meetings).

In this scenario, the stakeholders do not envisage a specific SSF-related advisory council at the European level. The Traditional Fishery Working Group under the umbrella of the CCS is a good forum to discuss SSF topics at the European level. However, most of the participants admit the necessity of introducing changes in its structure and management. They complain of its limited impact, even though the CCS has issued several proposals since its creation.

In the peripheral regions, i.e. Canarias, Azores and Madeira, the stakeholders consider the creation of a specific advisory council for these areas, which would imply no long-term engagement in the CCS.

Thus, in general, there are good organisational structures, with a large number of representatives. However, the influence in decision-making processes is not satisfactory. Reinforcing the current structure of the organisation should be compulsory; this is described in the next scenario.

<i>Scenario 3.2. Good structure in place, no more SSF organisations or fora needed in a long-term engagement. Strengthening of partnerships.</i>

The structure in place (Scenario 3.1) might be improved. In general, stakeholders comment on several aspects concerning potential partnerships to strengthen the current structure:

- Knowledge integration through partnerships. It is necessary to integrate the scientific data and the practical experience of the fishers. The accumulated and newly acquired knowledge should be highly valued; resistance to or avoidance of data sharing should be mistrusted. However, **science is slow and strongly dependent on the research funding. The EMFF should provide a good solution to this problem by covering some costs such as (i) innovation in fisheries through management and organisation systems, (ii) support of FLAGs and (iii) partnerships between scientists and fishermen.**
- **The collaboration of stakeholders is important;** however, the results presented here show that there are almost no networks of SSF representatives. Regional networks would not increase the complexity of the already existing system. They could benefit stakeholders by forming more stable relationships, not dependent on specific funded projects. Such networks could also be funded by the EMFF.

A set of good practices to reinforce the structure of the CCS, and specifically its Traditional Fishery Working Group, have been already identified:

- ✓ To improve the poor design or composition of the group better to reflect the SSF interests (i.e. ensure appropriate representation of the component fleets).
 - The Traditional Fishery Working Group should decide who should be involved in this partnership or group. According to many stakeholders, the current identification of partners is not adequate. Many regions are missing (missing organisations), and it is not clear which part of the group should be analysed.
- ✓ To introduce participatory tools in some of the meetings of the Traditional Fishery Working Group to increase active participation.
 - Discussions: dominant partners are clearly identified. The opinions of the other partners are also needed to distribute the commitment among the working-group partners.
- ✓ To provide the AC and other fora with scientific and technical support from their respective administrations.
- ✓ To encourage the use of economic resources to facilitate the participation of all representatives in the working groups.
 - To request and use EMFF funding.
 - To access the EMFF funds devoted to community-led local development through projects presented to the FLAGs.

The stakeholders who belong to the Fishery Working Group (CCS) provided the following data: Half of the stakeholders think that the missing organisations do not participate in the group due to the lack of economic resources. The participation is voluntary, but it would be a good idea to identify the exact reasons for low levels of involvement. Figure 13 shows other potential reasons for this phenomenon. These are lack of interest, lack of information or lack of interest in the aspects covered by the group, among others. The results for the stakeholders from different countries are shown.




Figure 13. Reasons for the organisations missing in the CCS Traditional Fishery Working Group

Most (94%) stakeholders state that the CCS has the responsibility of assuring representation of all the regions and fleet segments in the working group (Figure 14 shows the results by country of origin).




Figure 14. The responsibility of the CCS to assure a good representation of the CCS partners

The opinion of 87.5% of the reviewed stakeholders is that an official list of criteria should be established for the organisations wishing to become partners in the Traditional Fishery Working Group. Figure 15 shows opinions of stakeholders from different countries.




Figure 15. Stakeholder opinions on establishing (by the CSS) official criteria for joining the Traditional Fishery Working Group

Finally, Figure 16 illustrates the opinion of the stakeholders on the representation by the CCS. Most of the stakeholders from Spain and Portugal think that the Traditional Fishery Working Group represents the SSF interests although some problems (described above) should be attended to as soon as possible. The French stakeholders disagree with this view.




Figure 16. Stakeholder view on the representation of the SSF interests by the Traditional Fishery Working Group

8 CONCLUSIONS AND GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Organisations representing the SSF

While there are organisations of industrial fishermen representing the fleet at the local, regional, national and European level, the same is not true for the SSF fishers.

In general, the number of professional SSF organisations exclusively representing this fleet segment is very low at the European, national and regional levels (in the studied countries). One of the reasons is that the different regions and states of the EU do not share a common definition of the SSF. In the absence of consensus, the possibility of creating a common identity is weak. At the national and regional levels, terms such as minor arts, small-scale, small fishing, etc. are used to identify SSF. The most widely used concept has been defined by the EMFF.

In recent years, some organisations with a regional and national scope have been created with the purpose of representing SSF. However, these organisations have not been consolidated. Only recently (2015), a private-initiative civil organisation was created at the European level, the LIFE platform (Low Impact Fishers of Europe), located in Brussels. Its aim is bringing together representatives of low impact fishing (synonymous with artisanal fishing) from each of the EU Member States. This platform is not free of problems; however, the analysis of these is out the scope of this project.

Among the EU institutions, the South-Western Waters Advisory Council (SWWAC) has been implemented by the EC itself. Two-thirds of its representatives are from different fleet segments, SSF and industrial, and the remaining third comes from the civil sector (NGOs, associations, etc.). It is a consultation body of the EU, created to deliver opinions on issues related to fisheries, on the basis of dialogues between the parties.

Representatives of SSF and of industrial fleet segments are included in the SWWAC, in the Traditional Fishing Working Group, contrary to what might be expected. This can generate a conflict of interests between the fleet segments when their requests are presented to the EC. This system does not recognise the uniqueness of the SSF, equating the SSF with the industrial fishing sector.

8.2 Characteristics of SSF organisations and governance

The associative models of artisanal fishing representation and the governance mechanisms are different in each of the countries analysed. In all three countries, there are organisational structures that the artisanal fishermen can use to issue their demands or convey the problems of that sector to decision-makers.

In France, there are representation committees at the local, regional and national levels, in which artisanal fishers may share representation with representatives of industrial fleets. The National Committee must be consulted on any national or community measures related to the management of fisheries. The National Committee and the regional committees can

grant licenses, approved by the government, for certain fishing modalities. The regional and local committees also provide technical assistance and information to the sector and actively participate in the implementation of certain measures at the national level.

In Spain, the governance mechanism of the *cofradías* is multi-level and hierarchical. The local *cofradías* of fishermen and their provincial, regional and national federations are the organisations recognised by the public administration as the entities engaging with public decision-makers. The public administration must consult them in the matters of fishing. In fact, the administration protects *cofradías* of fishermen as they are the public-law organisations.

In Portugal (without considering the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira), there are no multi-level organisations. Therefore, the communication with decision-makers at the national level is direct. The SSF fleet is, in general, nested in the organisation including the industrial fleet.

8.3 Participation of the SSF representatives in decision-making

Within the scope of CFP, and regarding institutional responsibility, the decision-making in the three countries is centralised at the level of the state. Thus, it is up to the government to ensure compliance with the CFP, with a limited margin of autonomy for the fishers.

Portugal is the country with the most centralised governance model. There is no regional administrative division with delegated powers in the fishing sector and no representation of the fishing sector defending the regional or national interests of fishermen. The only exceptions are the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira. In France, although the regions do not have legislative competence, there are local and regional committees and a national committee of inter-professional representation (fishermen, traders and processors); these are supervised by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Directorate of Maritime Fishing and Aquaculture. These committees provide the fishers with opportunities for dialogue with the administration. The case of Spain is more complex and the system there is the most decentralised of the three. There are autonomous regions, which have competence over fishery resources in the coastal waters (internal waters), and the management of these resources belongs to the regional autonomous administrations. The state, through the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food and Environment, exercises its competence in external waters (outside the straight baselines). The Spanish case is more complex in terms of governance since the central government must also "negotiate" with the autonomous regional governments with responsibilities in fisheries and is accountable to Brussels.

8.4 Barriers to strengthening the influence in decision-making

In general, both SSF and industrial fishermen can influence the decision-makers effectively through the representatives of their organisations or representatives in local, regional and national committees. The question is whether the SSF fishing organisations can influence the decision-makers (regional, national and European) at the same level of effectiveness as the representatives of industrial fisheries.

Both in Spain and Portugal, the part of the industrial fleet that shares certain fishing grounds with the SSF fleet (besides having their specific organisations) is also associated with the representative organisations of the SSF sector. This means that they can take

advantage of the system if a conflict of interest arises, the strategy not used by the SSF fleet.

In the three countries and in the CCS, the communications established between the SSF organisations and the public administration are of advisory nature. These processes do not guarantee a response from the administration. There are several reasons for lack of response:

- Political interests may override the interests of fishermen.
- Mutual distrust between the sector and the administration.
- Consultative processes do not make everyone comply with the norm because they can reflect the opinions of just one part of the sector; the fishermen do not feel responsible for the final decisions.
- Not all the SSF sector is represented in the CSS. In addition, the CCS is an instrument created by the administration, with all the prejudices that this generates.

In Spain, despite the existence of representative multi-level organisations (mostly of SSF) some local organisations may try to influence the decision-makers directly at the regional level or indirectly through political parties in the opposition, mainly when they disagree with the position of *cofradías*.

In Portugal, the organisations are independent of each other. They compete for the influence on the governmental decision-makers in cases when their opinions differ.

Both in Spain and in Portugal, there are local organisations including the SSF and industrial fishermen. In some of these cases, the opinions of industrial fishermen carry greater weight. As a result, the interests of the SSF might be neglected.

In both of these countries, organisations of SSF fishermen with strong economic capacity are best positioned to access the public decision-makers. They can exert greater pressure to influence decision-makers but, at times, the SSF fleets have some difficulties in making their demands known and defending their position.

The impact of such influence depends not only on organisational capacity but also on the political, economic, legal and lobbying capacity of the organisations.

The influence of the SSF representatives is much weaker than the impact of industrial sector; several factors are responsible for this phenomenon:

- Lack of a common identity at the European, national and regional levels.
- Very heterogeneous fleet, in terms of techniques and the size of vessels. Different subsections might have different interests and problems. This makes it difficult to present a united front as a sector.
- Low technical, financial and legal capacity to develop well-founded proposals, which places the sector in a poor negotiating position.
- Confidence gap between representatives of the artisanal sector and public administration.

8.5 The SSF representation through CCS

The SSF is represented in the CCS via the group of traditional fisheries but shares this space with industrial fleets. This creates an awkward situation, where the traditional fishing and industrial sectors (such as trawlers or purse seiners) are regarded in the same way. Placing those very different fleet segments and production systems in the same group further dilutes the SSF influence and diminishes the visibility of this sector at the EU level.

The representativeness of SSF in the CCS is limited to the SSF organisations with good funding since the participation entails expenses that some small groups cannot afford. The economic barrier is a serious impediment to many of the SSF groups wishing to join the CSS.

Moreover, the perception of representatives of artisanal fisheries (as shown by the surveys and interviews within the SWWAC) is that the utility of this consultative instrument could be improved.

8.6 Examples of successful SSF representation

Despite the difficulties in efficient transfer of SSF demands, there are several examples of initiatives designed to strengthen its influence, in which the SSF sector has actively participated. The success of these initiatives was strongly correlated with the application of several of the good governance principles presented in this project. This outcome reinforces the initial assumption of the project, i.e. the need to implement, within the framework of SSF organisations and representatives, the principles of good governance. It is also relevant to the public managers since the blame for governance failure cannot always be apportioned to only one party or system.

It is important to point out that the success of moving towards good governance depends not only on the dynamics of the fishing sector and its socio-cultural characteristics but also on the educational, all-inclusive effort of the administration.

Administrations are also resistant to change. They are reluctant to modify their attitudes and apply relational methodologies that reduce the trust gap and encourage quality participation in the SSF. Notably, the analysis of successful cases shows that administrations should create mechanisms to move towards more participatory models in their relationships with SSF organisations.

In the successful examples, the most strongly associated governance principles were accountability, inclusive participation and transparency. The main factor contributing to failure was the difficulty experienced by the SSF sector in setting up large sectoral agreements.

All the successful cases, which were not many, were those where some principles of good governance were implemented with considerable zeal. Application of these principles helped to guide the participants through the necessary processes and contributed to an improvement in associative strengthening. In some of these examples, the intervention of external agents (NGOs, for example) encouraged these processes with the aim of improving the fishery management, commercialisation of their products, etc., in short, to boost the resilience of their organisations.

The main conclusion to be drawn from the analysed cases is that good governance can be achieved, above all, by supporting the processes associated with local communities.

Notable examples are the case of regionalisation of technical measures for clam exploitation and self-management at the local level in Aquitaine (France), the local self-management of the artisanal mackerel fishery in the Basque Country (France) and the marine reserve co-managed by Os Miñarzos in Galicia (Spain).

8.7 Final remarks

It is indisputable that the governance of the SSF fleet needs essential improvements to reinforce the representation of this fleet in the decision-making processes.

The lessons learnt in this project, summarised in the Good Practice Guide, gave rise to the recommendations proposing the necessary actions, in terms of participation of the SSF sector in the framework of community fishery management.

The participation of stakeholders in decision-making in European fishery management (established as a principle of good governance in the CFP) needs to be strengthened, especially in the case of SSF.

The consultation systems established by the administration are asymmetric and, thus, do not lend themselves to adequate and efficient communication with the stakeholders.

It is also important to improve the information transparency (another of the principles of good governance included in the CFP), both top-down and bottom-up. Implementation of this principle is a necessary condition for laying down the foundations for good governance in the European fishery management, at all levels.

The European SSFs, the most important sector from a social point of view, are clearly in crisis. To remedy this situation, it is essential to encourage their participation in decision-making, using appropriate EMFF support and reinforcing some of the existing management measures.

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