

Representativeness of the small-scale fisheries: evidence from Atlantic case studies in EU

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1. Introduction

The contribution of artisanal fisheries and, in particular, **small-scale fisheries (SSF)** to the food provision service is generally important. These fisheries are particularly important for the many coastal communities in developing countries, which are dependent on their activity on a social and economic level. SSF are considered of key importance in the Food and Agriculture Organization guidelines for responsible fisheries and the reformed Common Fishery Policy (CFP). Moreover, in the framework of the EU growth strategy for the coming decade (EU2020), the artisanal fisheries have the capacity to generate inclusive growth and to build the economic, social, and territorial cohesion in peripheral areas. Nevertheless, the importance of such fisheries is poorly recognized at the national and European Community levels. This reflects the fact that the artisanal fishers are very often badly organized. Therefore, they are weakly represented in the local, regional, national, and European Community administration, in contrast to well-represented industrial fishermen. This is probably due to the small number of people involved in SSF organizations and bodies, which limits their capacity. As a result, the artisanal fishermen are often ignored in the process of making the management decisions that regulate their fisheries. However, certain management measures might have serious implications at both social and economic levels, not only for the fishermen involved but also for their families and other stakeholders involved. The engagement of the SSF sector in the Blue Growth Strategy (BGS; http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/policy/blue_growth/index_en.htm) might be more difficult than for the other sectors of the economy. According to the European Commission (EC), the BGS relies on three elements: 1. Development of sectors with high potential for sustainable jobs and growth, 2. Essential components to provide knowledge, legal certainty, and security in the blue economy (marine knowledge, marine spatial planning, and integrated maritime surveillance), and 3. Sea basin strategies.

The Report 2012¹ of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) states the importance of the SSF in providing food. However, it also notes a failure to include this sector adequately in the national and regional development policies, a lack of institutional capacity, and a weak governance system. All these factors threaten the potential contribution of SSF to a sustainable economic growth. The report assesses the particular role of the SSF contribution to food and nutrition security. The SSF employ around 52 million people around the world; this number is lower than for large-scale fisheries, but it is expected to increase.

It is worth noting that some EU countries are actively involved in the BGS, and some have even developed their own maritime strategies. However, the socio-economic dimension of the ocean and sea exploitation has been a secondary concern until recently, when the term “blue growth” has been coined. The EC defines the blue growth as “the long-term strategy to support sustainable growth in the marine and maritime sectors as a whole” (COM, 2012).

¹ <http://www.unep.org/yearbook/2012/>

2. Section 1. General methodology framework to assess the representativeness of the SSF

2.1. Understanding of the Action-2 objective

General objective of Action 2 from the technical proposal. The state of the Art (Stage 1 of the overall project will be completed with the input from the Action-2 concerning the identification of the degree of representation and involvement of the SSF in the industry bodies and advisory councils (ACs). For this Action, a case study-based approach has been adopted. The geographic area of South-Western Waters will be covered for the selected cases. Each case study is analyzed according to a set of characteristics, which in some cases are also assessed using indicators, to examine the degree of involvement. Stakeholder consultations allow the project to analyze the complexity of the SSF management responsibility.

The degree of involvement and representation is closely linked to the regionalization concept. The last CFP discusses decentralization (importance of different geographical levels): whom to decentralize (the extent of the stakeholder involvement in the fishery-management process), and what to decentralize (which tasks need to remain at a central level and which can be delegated). In fact, the Article 18 (paragraph 2) requests the involvement of the ACs in the regionalization process. These entities are to be consulted on the regionalization matters. This study will try to provide answers to the questions posed the CFP, that is, choose the most suitable management responsibility model for the SSF across the South-Western Waters. The adopted management model will affect the degree of representativeness of the SSF.

To develop stakeholder consultations on SSF governance issues, the personal contacts with the different organizations and bodies will be beneficial. The project will also examine the existing sources of data and/or literature on governance issues concerning the SSF involvement in the decision-making process, with the final aim of establishing a methodological framework.

In conclusion, the Action-2 will identify the current institutional structure related to the SSF management.

The Action status can be presented using a Traffic Light Matrix approach, a visually pleasing and transparent method of evaluating the degree of involvement.

2.2. The state of the art and general methodology approach

The CFP remains a top-down hierarchical system with the EU Commission, the Council of Ministries, and the EU Parliament formulating and adopting the basic regulations. These are then implemented and enforced, primarily by the Member States under the auspices of the Commission. The introduction of Regional Advisory Councils (RACs) during the reform of the CFP was a major step toward the enhancement of the role of stakeholders in the advisory and decision-making processes. However, the engagement of fishery sector in the decision-making process is not restricted to the communitarian fishery-management apparatus. In fact, the sector is engaged in the decision-making process at various other levels, i.e., local, regional, and national. One should note that in the majority of cases, the fishing sector in the EU plays an advisory role. The degree of participation of the sector in each of the diverse modalities of engagement in the decision-making will be analyzed using the framework described below.

The proposed methodology comprises three steps to describe:

1. The general context in which the analysis will be conducted
2. The structure of the governance model (SSFs and industrial fisheries)
3. The goodness of the governance model

First, it is worth defining the governance. The concept of governance is wider than that of a government. Governance does not just consist of defining rules and regulations; it also includes interactions among many actors in the society outside the government, in the civil society and the private sector (Kooiman et al., 2005). The present study analyzes the current structure of governance, which enables both the artisanal and industrial sectors to take part in the decision-making. We use the diagrams of governance to describe the structure of artisanal and industrial sectors at local, regional, national, and EU level (Figure 1). The framework for participation at the communitarian level is described separately, including the official and non-official fora, in which the small-scale and industrial fishery sectors might participate. Particular attention is paid to the mechanisms deployed to influence decision-making in the industrial sectors. The human capital involved in the industrial sector is reflected in the analysis. We also examine the judiciary nature of the bodies/entities since it determines, at least in the case of “cofradías,” their engagement in the decision-making and their effectiveness in defending and promoting the small-scale interests in the national and EU administrations.

It is also important to analyze the structure of the governance. The governance system described here is framed by the EU fisheries management system, where decisions are made at the level of the EC and implemented by the Member States. Thus, the governance structure incorporates the EU, national, and regional institutions and organizations, all of which have a role in the decision-making. A certain degree of co-management is implied. Sen and Nilsen (1996), and Nilsen et al. (2004) define co-management as an arrangement where the management responsibility is shared between the government and the fishers. It can be viewed as a set of institutional and organizational arrangements; these include the rights and rules defining cooperation between the decision-makers and fishing communities at various stages of the management process, from the design of the system to its implementation and monitoring. The co-management system has emerged to engage the resource users in decisions about their own livelihood. It also improves the efficacy of the management measures by reducing the implementation costs and increasing compliance. Co-management is regarded as a means to enhance democracy by increasing the engagement of resource users. The efficacy should be improved by engaging the concerned parties in a decision-making process. In this process, the interests, rights, insights and, to a lesser extent, the empirical knowledge of the parties, are taken into consideration. The decisions are then seen as legitimate and likely to be respected by all the concerned participants.

To analyze the different cases, we have to identify the categories of co-management to which they correspond. We use a classification of the co-management systems following the typology proposed by McConney et al. (2003), see Figure 1. The typologies of Sen and Nilsen (1996) and Pommeroy (1995) were also considered for use in the analyses. However, we decided that the typology of McConney would be the best for categorizing the different case studies.




Figure 1. Co-management types (McConney et al. (2003))

Figure 1 illustrates different stages of co-management across the spectrum. There are two extreme situations with no co-management: the first, where decisions are made exclusively by the government and, the second, where the community mostly controls the decisions. Outside these polarized situations, McConney describes “consultative co-management” as a scenario where the decision-maker consults or seeks the opinion of other stakeholders on the decisions to be made. This is probably the most common procedure in the world fisheries. In contrast, a “collaborative co-management” implies a stronger and more equitable partnership. Under this type of management, the decision-makers and stakeholders work together and interact through the channels and platforms expressly created to this end. Some of the decisions are shared among the interested parties. Finally, a “delegated co-management” is a scenario in which the government lets stakeholders make the decisions. Thus, the decisions are decentralized. An example of such situation is a community-based management, where the community makes the decisions in resource management. However, the government is likely to control the important variables of the management such as the setup of total allowable catches (TACs).

The initial hypothesis in this study is that, in a defined/applied decentralized system, the central governments will delegate certain management functions (formal or informal). The key to the efficiency of the current system is not decentralization but a management system based on cooperation. Decentralization should be understood as a mechanism that would need to build new institutions based on cooperative management. The collaborative co-management is the most efficient model to achieve those aims.

To identify the current systems, it is necessary to establish the conditions and parameters of decentralization. In this step, we attempt to describe the current participatory approaches and decide whether the institutional governance framework is ready for further decentralization. This analysis is conducted through interviews with stakeholders at local, regional, national, and EU levels. The main aim is to define the governance structure that allows answering the questions about the conditions and methods of decentralization (whom, how, and where to decentralize).

To obtain this information, we will use the governance structure diagrams reflecting the flow of fishery information/communication (artisan and industrial) from their representative institutions to the institutions representing the administration, autonomous state, central state, or EU (the spaces in which the decisions are taken). This communication system should fulfill the purpose of informing, communicating, influencing, resolving, and negotiating the important decisions. The diagram reflects an ideal situation of linear and hierarchical functioning within the framework of a model of centralized management under a democratic rule of law. Therefore, the analysis also includes a second flow diagram or simply describes how the fishers and their institutions really function (fragmented sector: different fleet segments, different leaderships, etc.) to inform, communicate, influence, and negotiate.

Once the structure of governance is well identified, we can measure the goodness of that governance model. *Good governance analysis* should be seen as a necessary framework for analyzing the effectiveness of the involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process. The objective is to find out whether the necessary governance principles are satisfied. This can be achieved by using the empirical evidence provided by a large number of case studies in the Atlantic Area. Among other types of information, the perceptions of the stakeholders are of vital importance.

The goodness of governance should be analyzed to understand the degree of representation of SSF stakeholders at different decision-making fora. The perception of stakeholders, the objective data, and their experiences should be examined. The quality of the governance affects the degree of SSF stakeholder participation. The institutions in the governance structure should follow certain standards in their interactions with the stakeholders. The main objective of the analysis is to examine the stakeholder perceptions of the governance models in the different case studies and understand the extent of stakeholder involvement in the decision-making processes. With this objective in mind, to build the analytical framework, we studied the literature available in this field. In particular, the good governance principles used in this analysis are based on the study of Turner et al., 2014 (Table 1). Figure 1 illustrates these principles. Other references have also been considered to achieve this general assessment framework as Schumann (2010), Charbonneau (2012), Martín and Berkes (2010), Pérez de Oliveira (2013), Chuenpagdee (2011), Jones, Qui and De Santo (2013), Roldan Ortiz (2013) and, Torreiro and Malvido (2002).

Improved inclusiveness is expected when moving toward a more democratic decision-making mode, employing a community-oriented model.

Table 1. List of good governance principles. Definition and Notes

Principle	Definition	Notes
Legitimacy	Stakeholders must act with integrity and commitment. Legitimacy is related to the processes of representation of an organization or a collective. These processes must be participatory and democratic so that the representativeness of an organization is perceived as legitimate by other actors and institutions.	A part of legitimacy assessment might be the endorsement of managers by the community members; it is important to assess the ability of managers to lead and to promote the representativeness.
Accountability	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The existence of a governance structure that allows stakeholders to participate in decision-making institutions, fora, etc. 2. The representatives are answerable to their constituency. 3. The SSF and its representatives must have a desire for improvement by promoting a sustainable activity, a sense of responsibility, and commitment. 	<p>Accountability is a part of the engagement concept.</p> <p>Are there ways to challenge the rules?</p> <p>Are there a will, commitment, and responsibility for changes?</p>
Inclusiveness	This governance principle is understood as the degree of participation at different decision stages. It is the ability of stakeholders to participate in decisions. Inclusive management should include the marginalized stakeholders. It has to be made clear whether the term refers to the mere presence of stakeholders in the different fora (passive) or to their ability to influence the decision-making by active participation. The active participation should mean taking part in the definition, development, and assessment of new management issues.	(i) Do SSF stakeholders have the opportunity to participate in decision-making?, (ii) are SSF fishers and local organizations willing to be involved in decision-making fora?, (iii) are they obliged to do so?, (iv) which type of participation is being developed (passive/active form)?
Transparency	The level and quality of the information transferred from the top to the bottom levels, in particular from the European level to the local level across the governance structure in place. But also, the information transferred from bottom to up levels.	What is the way of imparting the information (e.g., from the federation to cofradías (Spain))? Does the information reach all the represented stakeholders?
Connectivity	The representative bodies are effectively connecting with other (governing) bodies. The relationship between the private and public organizations that, despite their differences, are aligned and articulated to achieve the same objective (the economic, social, and environmental sustainability of the fisheries).	Does connectivity exist between the stakeholders? There might be competing interests and lack of cooperation between the stakeholders. Such behavior hampers the connectivity, which is important in a good governance system. Poor connectivity affects the rest of the goodness principles.
Fairness	All the stakeholders (artisanal and industrial segments) are treated fairly by the same representing organisms.	Are all the stakeholders in the same representation system treated fairly? It is recognized that artisanal and industrial actors do not possess the same economic and technical resources; this makes a difference in pursuing their respective goals. The industrial sector has the human capital to pressurize the government to adopt the norms that are aligned with their interests and objectives. The cofradías, however, have limited human capital although they have a huge social capacity, which is sometimes exploited by the politicians.
Resilience	Resilience is the ultimate goal of the governance. It is the capacity to withstand	Does the system have enough resilience to withstand the future changes represented by the SSF? Are there any

Principle	Definition	Notes
	pressure and adapt to changes in the management environment. It means that the organizations are flexible, can learn, and respond efficiently to the challenges of the socio-economic, political, and environmental character.	plans in place?
Engagement	Engagement includes the accountability and inclusiveness principles. It is the ability to participate in decisions and use the opportunities to challenge the rules.	
Others: legal nature of the organisms	The legal nature of an organization (e.g., definition of its nature, scope, funding, structure, etc.) plays a key role in participation. The organisms with strong links with the government or dependent on its aid might have limited autonomy to carry out their own initiatives or express their opposition. As a result, a client relationship might emerge.	What is the role of the legal nature of the organisms?
Others: perceptions of the stakeholders	The perceptions of stakeholders.	Perceptions might carry an implication of willingness to engage in the decision-making fora.



Figure 2. Good governance principles and links between them

3. Section 2. Case study identification. General context.

This project performs the analysis across the selected geographical area. The culture or philosophy of developing a strong participation (including all the stakeholders) in the decision-making process might lead to a new-style governance of the *South-Western Waters area* (ICES zones VIII, IX, and X (*waters around the Azores*)) and CECAF zones 34.1.1, 34.1.2, and 34.2.0 (*waters around Madeira and Canary Islands*), which is especially relevant to the case of the SSF.

The social, economic, environmental, and traditional importance of SSF has been accepted worldwide. However, there is no single internationally accepted definition of this activity since its characteristics differ depending on the location. This is also the case within the South-Western Waters area; it is also generally accepted that the artisanal and industrial fishing activities have clearly different characteristics.

In some regions, specific definitions of SSF have been adopted. These definitions differ from the current legal definition accepted by the EC, which is based exclusively on the vessel length (< 12 m).

- The Autonomous Government of Galicia (Xunta de Galicia) uses in their definition of the minor fishing gears some formal criteria different from those employed by the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) for artisanal fishing. The Decree 15/2011 (Xunta de Galicia), Article 6.3, states that the "maximum length of vessels using minor gear cannot exceed 15 meters between perpendiculars or 18 meters in length overall (LOA)". In the Article 6.4 of the same Decree, it is stated, "the maximum power (CV) to exercise the minor fishing-gear activities is 270 CV."
- In the Basque Country, the "fleet with traditional fishing gear" has been considered an artisanal fleet. The gear is handcrafted in keeping with the tradition of the local cultural area. The craft fleet works throughout the year using the so-called "minor fishing gear," mostly along the shorelines close to the coast, making short trips. Most of the boats are of a small or medium size, with very few fishermen on board.
- In the Canary Islands, 87% of the boats are less than 12 m in length. The order AAA/2536/2015 regulates the use of minor fishing gear in the fishing grounds of the Canary Islands. It states that vessels utilizing minor fishing gear can have a maximum length of 15 m. It means that boats above twelve meters using traps or poles and lines are not artisanal from the point of view of the EU.
- In France, the definition of artisanal fishing is not related to the length of the boat but to a social concern; it is considered artisanal fisherman the owner who is also crew on the one or both of these artisanal boats, but at least 6 months of the year. Therefore, in France, it is possible to have artisanal vessels with a length greater than twelve meters, although most of them are above twenty five meters.
- In Portugal, the criteria are related to the type of fishing. The fleet is classified into three large groups: small-scale fleet, large-scale fleet, and distant-water fleet (AER 2016, STECF). The concept of artisanal fishing applies to the first two groups, with the additional criterion of the traditional fishing gear. Another criterion is the landing and sale of fresh fish, which should happen within less than a day from their capture. In almost all Portuguese regions, the segment of vessels with a length of less than 9 m (local fishing) constitutes a very large proportion of the fleet (data from The Community Fishing Fleet

Register). This definition is not very different from the one using the criterion of 12-m length, as far as the EMFF definition of artisanal coastal vessels is concerned.

This is a case study-based analysis, in the sense that specific geographical areas are examined. However, the outcomes are not solely associated with these geographical regions. As we will discuss later, some of the conclusions might be extrapolated to other Western Waters regions. The identification of the case studies was conducted (i) to provide sufficient geographical coverage, (ii) to examine the regions most relevant to SSF in terms of the number of vessels and the related economic activity, and (iii) to observe the participatory processes at different levels (local, regional, and European). In particular, the French and Portuguese case studies (Aquitaine and North of Portugal) are good examples of a management system more centralized than the Spanish cases, which use regionalized/decentralized models. The Galician case study introduces a more detailed description of the fairness principle. The study examines the capacities of the artisanal and industrial fleets to influence the decisions at different levels (local, regional, national, and European). The Portuguese fishing fleet of the north region is one of the largest in number, with some of the largest total tonnages and engine power (data from The Community Fishing Fleet Register). Table 2 lists the selected case studies, also shown in Figure 3.

Table 2. Western Waters area: case studies selected

	Case study	Area	Country	NUTS*
1	Aquitaine	ICES zone	France	FR61
2	Basque Country	ICES zone	Spain	ES21
3	Canary Islands	CECAF zone	Spain	ES70
4	Galicia	ICES zone	Spain	ES11
5	North of Portugal (continental Portugal)	ICES zone	Portugal	PT11
6	European decision level Special focus on the CCS Advisory Council	European level, ICES and CECAF zones	Spain, France, and Portugal	---

(*) Nomenclature of Territorial Units of Statistics




Figure 3. Western Waters area: case studies selected (in red)

Before going into the analysis of the specific cases, general governance issues at a country level are identified, showing the differences between the three countries. These issues make up the framework under which the different regions develop their governance.

3.1. Spain: general context

- The fishing sector identifies the artisanal fleet as the fleet with “minor fishing gears.”
- The minor fishing-gear fleet is characterized by the fishing diversification strategies in multi-gear and multi-species fisheries.
- From an organizational point of view, the fishing *cofradías* are the organizations with which the owners and crew of the minor fishing-gear fleet are associated. Spanish legislation defines the *cofradías* as non-profit-making public corporations representing the economic interests of their members. These organizations act as consultation and collaboration bodies of the competent authorities in matters of sea fishing and management of the fishing sector. They are juridical entities with the capacity to act for the fulfillment of their purposes (Law 3/2001, of March 26 of Maritime Fishing of the State).
- At the second level of organization, the fishermen *cofradías* are grouped into provincial federations. For example, in the selected case studies, there are three provincial federations, Lugo, A Coruña, and Pontevedra, with a provincial scope of action in Galicia. In the Basque Country, there are two provincial federations, one for Bizkaia and one for Gipuzkoa. Both the *cofradías* and the federations act mainly as consultation and collaboration bodies, working with the administration to protect the interests of the sector. Finally, the Canary Islands have two provincial federations.
- On the third, regional organizational level, the three Galician federations are grouped together in the Galician Federation, which operates on an autonomous principle. A similar, recently created regional federation also exists in the Canary Islands. This third level does not exist in the Basque Country.
- A fourth organizational level is the National Federation of *Cofradías*, which represents all the *cofradías* in Spain. However, its degree of influence and representativeness is lower than at the federation level.
- The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Food and Environment (MAPAMA) of the Government of Spain has the competence over fishing resources in external waters.² Its areas of competence include the regulation of fishery resources, management, marketing, research, surveillance, infractions, etc. The General Secretariat for Fisheries is the body responsible for implementing the competencies and the interlocutor transferring the demands of the fishing sector to Brussels.
- It should be added that the juridical nature of the *cofradías* (corporations of public law), organizations supervised by the administration, results in a particular relationship between the parties, not exempt from certain constraints and dependencies. This limits their range and effectiveness

² The so-called “internal waters” (“aguas interiores” in Spanish) correspond to the areas between the coast and an imaginary straight line drawn between the main coasts of the particular region (Basque Country, Galicia, etc.). Thus, the “external waters” comprise the sea areas outside this line, up to 12 miles from the territorial sea (area known as “aguas exteriores” in Spanish).

3.2. France: general context

(Source: <http://www.comite-peches.fr/en/about-us/the-cnpmem/>)

- The governance in France is organized around the Committees for Maritime Fisheries and Fish Farming.
- The Committees for Fisheries, closely collaborating with the government, have an important role in the fishing sector representation. The French model is more community-oriented than the Spanish and Portuguese models (government-oriented). This is a result of the composition of the Committees for Fisheries, in which the SSF fishermen take part as elected members. This system helps to assure the engagement of SSF fishermen and improves their representation across the different decision-making fora. The election system is described in <http://www.comite-peches.fr/organisation-professionnelle/comment-devenir-un-elu-des-comites-des-peches/>.
- The committees are distributed as follows: a National Committee (CNPMM in French), 14 Regional Committees (CRPMEM), and 12 Local and Interdepartmental Committees (CDPMEM or DIDPMEM).
- The CNPMM, located in Paris, is in charge of the management of the fisheries. It actively contributes to the definition and development of French, European, and international regulations. It is composed of representatives of CRPMEM, fisheries, the owners of marine fish farming businesses, Producer Organizations (POs), and maritime cooperatives. Its main interlocutors are the state services, national advisory bodies, French parliament, and the European institutions.
- The Regional Committees have similar competencies to the CNPMM but at a regional level. Its main interlocutors are decentralized administrations (Interregional Management of the Sea, DIRM in French) and local authorities. They are composed of elected professionals such as business owners or employees and representatives of the CIDPMEM, POs, and maritime cooperatives.
- Finally, there are the Local and Interdepartmental Committees, whose main aim is providing the information and advice to fishing companies.
- Thus, the Committees for Fisheries have, in partnership with the government, an essential role to play in the representation and co-management of maritime fisheries and marine fish farming industries.

3.3. Portugal: general context

- The main institutions responsible for fishery management in the continental Portugal are the Directorate-General of Fisheries and Aquaculture (DGPA), the Assistant-Secretariat of State, and the Ministry of Sea. The Portuguese Institute for Sea and Atmosphere, I. P. (IPMA I.P.), is a public institution. It is a part of the indirect administration of the state, endowed with administrative and financial autonomy and its own assets. IPMA I. P. is the responsibility of the Ministry of Sea, under supervision and guardianship of the minister, in charge of the scientific issues.
- The fishing sector in Portugal is organized in associations of ship-owners, private entities defending their interests, usually linked to a locality or a segment of the fleet. In some cases, these associations obtain the status of POs. In accordance with the community regulations, this gives them some advantages and benefits recognized by the EU.

However, in 2015, only 41% of licensed fishing vessels in Portugal were associated with one of the 15 POs recognized in the country (12 on the continent).

- In terms of governance, these organizations represent only the fishing entrepreneur, and not the crew employed. In the case of small vessels (the majority of the Portuguese fleet), the ship-owner is an employer, skipper, and crewmember of the vessel, which defines his work activity and his livelihood.

3.4. General context variables in Spain, France, and Portugal

The general governance issues can be illustrated by giving a general overview of the main socio-economic variables of the fishing sector in the three countries (Table 3). The data shown here help to understand the context of the current developments in the SSF representativeness.

Table 3. General context, socio-economic variables (2015)

Variables/case study	Spain			France	Portugal
	Basque Country	Canary Islands	Galicia	Aquitaine	North
Coastal extension (km)	240	1,583	1,300	456	115
Number of base ports with SSF activity	14	40	72	2	8
Number of SSF vessels. Def. < 12 m (% of SSF vessels)	48 (24)	744 (65)	3783 (85.32)	422	532 (72.18)
Number of SSF vessels. Def. < 15 m between perpendiculars (% of SSF vessels)	64 (32)	--	--	330	--
Total number of vessels (active): industrial and artisanal vessels	159	856	4434	968	737
Number of SSF fishermen. Def. < 12 m	82	1,150	6,136	799	2,809
Number of SSF fishermen. Def. < 15 m between perpendiculars	146	--	--	--	--
Total annual production (all vessels). T/million €, in Western Waters	43,020/ 64	11,615/ 25	16,265/ 83,173 *	8,100/33	19,537/ 34,4
Co-management type (Figure 1)	Consultative	Consultative	Consultative	Consultative	
Existence of regional competences	Yes ⁽¹⁾	Yes ⁽²⁾	Yes ⁽³⁾	---	No
Number of organisms representing SSF at local, regional, national, and European level	19	34	166	4	16

Sources: Basque Country (AZTI 2016 data, Eustat 2015 data), Canary Islands (Vice-consejería de Agricultura, Ganadería y Pesca), Galicia (Xunta de Galicia), Portugal (Fleet Register, INE, and DGRM), Aquitaine (FranceAgriMer, 2015 and Ministère de l'Écologie, du Développement et de l'Énergie, 2014).

^(*)Includes only minor fishing gears. Source: MAPAMA 2015

⁽¹⁾ Artisanal coastal fishing in the Basque Country is governed by regulations with a different scope. According to the Spanish autonomous system, fishery management of territorial waters is shared between the administrations of the Spanish state and the autonomous communities. Thus, the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country has competence over fishery management in the so-called "internal waters" that correspond to the areas between the coast and an imaginary straight line drawn between the main coasts of the Basque Country. From east to west, these are Cabo Higuer, C. San

Antón, C. Machichaco, C. Villano, and Punta Cobarón. Outside this imaginary line, up to 12 miles from the territorial sea (an area known as "aguas exteriores"), the competence over the fishery management corresponds to the Spanish state. In addition, the European Union legislation on fisheries is of a higher rank than the others. Therefore, the state and autonomous legislations have to adapt their provisions to those of the community legislation.

(2) The Canary Islands is an autonomous community with a competence only over the internal waters and aquaculture. External waters are under the competence of the Spanish state.

(3) Galicia is an autonomous community that has competence over the fishing activity in the so-called "internal waters," shellfish, and aquaculture (Royal Decree 3318/1982, of July 24). The Consellería do Mar (Xunta de Galicia) is the Galician administration responsible. Internal waters are all bodies of water corresponding to the areas delimited by the coast and an imaginary straight line drawn between the main coasts of the Galicia. The sinuous coastline contour is more than 1,300-km long, with many geographical features such as bays, estuaries, gulfs, cables, etc. It has a certain morphological singularity that makes the important extensions of sea areas remain under the administration of the Xunta de Galicia.

The fleets operating off the Galician coast are categorized into artisanal-gear and industrial fleets, characterized by the specialized use of fishing gear, which we would like to set apart; we will call them a fleet of contingent fishing gears. The fleet of contingent fishing gears is highly specialized. There are 328 boats that operate in the Northwest Cantabrian Waters, usually in the offshore areas and employ 3,076 crewmembers. They work all year long with the same fishing gear; they use trawling, bottom and surface longlining, gillnets ("volanta"), and purse seining. Occasionally, they share space with the smaller gear fleet. The Galician contingent fishing-gear fleet represents one of the most important industrial segments in Spain (reason for its inclusion in this report). Here, we present a brief description of the main differences between industrial and artisanal representativeness. This is of special relevance in the Galician (Spain) and French case studies.

Associationism movement is much more active and strategic in the contingent fishing-gear fleets than among the minor fishing-gear groups belonging to *cofradías*. In Spain, the owners of the contingent fishing-gear boats belong to the associations such as CEPESCA, which includes other provincial or autonomous associations. The Spanish CEPESCA partners are 12 associations from Andalucía, 9 from Galicia, 5 from Cataluña, 3 from Valencia, 2 from the Basque Country, 1 from Balears Islands, 1 from the Canary Islands, and 2 from Madrid.

This organization is a part of EUROPÊCHE, a supranational European organization, composed of many sectorial associations from different countries. Its purpose is to defend the interests of its partners in Brussels or Strasbourg, both at the technical/administrative (DG_MARE) and political levels (European Parliament). France also takes part in EUROPÊCHE through the Union des Armateurs à la Pêche de France (UAPF).

These more industrial fishing organizations, due to the entrepreneurial profile of the associates, are economically endowed with more resources than the organisms representing the SSF. They have the greater economic capacity to influence the public decision-makers. They can position and use groups of expert professionals, whose main function is to generate political pressure and influence the public legislators (lobbies).

3.5. Case study methodology

This analysis has been developed based on a qualitative assessment in which semi-structured face-to-face interviews with Non-Governmental Organizations, NGO, and European level representatives were conducted to examine the SSF governance issues. In addition, focus groups were organized involving scientists, fishermen, and the partners of the *traditional fisheries working group* under the umbrella of the South West Waters Advisory Council (CCS). A review of relevant literature was also conducted.

4. Section 3. General framework application to the selected case studies

This section introduces the assessment of the governance principles for each of the selected case studies.

4.1. Aquitaine region

4.1.1. *The governance structure*

The governance structure diagram shows the following key relationships (Figure 4):

- In France, all fishermen are part of the Fishery Committees. That means that each fishing company pays a mandatory contribution and that all fishermen may participate in the voting processes. This system increases the engagement of the fishermen in decision-making. In particular:
 - In Aquitaine, there are three Fishing Committees composing part of the professional organization: one Inter-Departmental Committee for Pyrénées Atlantique and Land, one Departmental Committee for Gironde, and one Regional Committee.
 - Moreover, a National Committee for Fish and Aquaculture (CNPMEM) is at the summit of the professional organization. It is based in Paris.
 - The red line in Figure 4 indicates the membership in different organizations. The fishermen can also participate in the design of administrative boards.
- A purple line represents the membership. These committees are all part of the CCS. Thus, the Aquitaine fishery groups are the members of the CCS and regularly participate in its work; they have two seats on the CCS Executive Committee.
- A yellow line indicates a dialogue. The Aquitaine Region cannot affect the decision processes, but dialogue is established between this organization and the fishing committees.
- An orange line represents membership in the different organisms; the members can participate in the designation of representatives.
- A blue line indicates that the organism could adopt decisions; a dotted blue line signifies initiative right.
- A green line indicates a membership.
- Grey lines show an existence of dialogue. Moreover, when a consultation between managers and different stakeholders is established, it might be followed by the submission of proposals from stakeholders.
- Fishermen may also belong to POs. The membership is voluntary, but the PO board has to agree with each new membership.
- This governance structure shows the legal connections. Nowadays, of course, everybody can connect with everyone else. For instance, the Interregional Management of the Sea (DIRM) is a decentralized, representative structure of the state with maritime competence. It can adopt management measures in the band of 12 miles. This is the so-called Aquitania State Representation.
- The fishermen may be members of trade unions, understood as professional political organizations. During the elections, the unions present several different lists, and the

fishermen vote on each list to form the new boards of administration of the fishery committees (for the departmental, interdepartmental, and regional levels). This is very relevant to the future SSF representation; however, the SSF fishermen have to be willing to participate in this election process.

- No lobby connections are shown in the governance structure (they have been mentioned in the subsection 4.4).
- Decisions adopted through regionalization are not reflected in this governance structure.




Figure 4. Governance structure diagram in the Aquitaine Region

4.1.2. The analysis of governance goodness

This case study is for the territory of the former Aquitaine region. As a result of reductions in the fleet, many fishing ports have disappeared; the main ports today are Saint Jean de Luz and Arcachon. Many types of fishing and equipment are examined in this case study, from estuarine boats to fishing offshore.

At the regional level, the sector is structured by a CIDPMEM (Landes and PA), a CDPMEM (Gironde), a CRPMEM, and a Producer Organization.

- **Legitimacy:** The Committees for Maritime Fisheries and Marine Fish Farming are private entities composed of elected professionals. The legitimate fishing committees in France are the representative organizations of the fishing sector whose representatives are elected in a free, voluntary, and democratic manner every five years (<http://www.comite-peches.fr/organisation-professionnelle/comment-devenir-un-elu-des-comites-des-peches/>). The CRPMEM and the CIDPMEM are composed of elected professionals such as fishery business owners, fish farm or fishery employees, members of maritime cooperatives, and representatives of the CIDPMEM. The fishermen might be the members

of trade unions. During the elections, the trade unions make several different lists, and the fishermen choose from each list the potential members of the administration boards of the fishery committees (for the departmental, interdepartmental, and regional levels).

- **Accountability:** The structure of the professional organizations in France supports the stakeholder participation in the decision-making process. Right down to the regional level, this is ensured by direct announcements, consultations, and exchanges between the regional committee and the administration bodies.

In spite of this favorable structure, the process is hampered by the lack of motivation of some SSF fishermen, who are reluctant to join the trade unions and are not ready to be elected. This small group of fishermen, unwilling to participate in the election processes, usually complain of weak SSF representativeness. Responsibility should be required for a good appraisal of this principle. This apparent problem of responsibility is in part due to the problems introduced under the inclusiveness principle, concerning both the SSF fishermen active and passive participation in decision-making.

- **Connectivity:** The connectivity between the professionals at the different levels is good. The human resources within the existing structures support the information transfer and consultations with the fishermen when their opinion is required. It is recognized that these structures work well together. Therefore, new structures dedicated to small-scale fishing are not considered necessary by the Fishery Committees representatives. In fact, there is no specific structure devoted to the SSF. The appropriate processes are all integrated into the Fisheries Committee, and in some cases, also in the OP. Many SSF fishermen sit on the Boards of Directors of these organizations. However, outside of this official governance model a SSF platform exists due to the necessity of reinforcing the SSF participation in decision-making according to the point of view of specific SSF fishermen.

The National Committee has different interlocutors, the state services. In particular, the dialogue of the regional administration with the Aquitaine state representation (DIRM) is considered relatively satisfactory. This is reflected by frequent meetings between representatives of fisheries and, representatives of these state institutions, who may also attend meetings organized by the sector. The National Committee also has connections with the French Parliament and the European institutions.

Its main interlocutors are the decentralized administration bodies (DIRM) and local authorities.

However, it is also important to consider the human factor. For example, personal relationships between the stakeholders might significantly affect the type of dialogue.

- **Transparency:** All official documents are widely available to those who wish to read them. This is especially important as the opinion of the stakeholders is compulsory for the adoption of certain decisions at the regional or national level. Nevertheless, at least in some cases, not all analytical or context documents are transmitted or, sometimes, they do not exist. The latter is also true at the European level. For some procedures, e.g., the adoption of TACs and quotas, little information is available.

Finally, it is important to mention the weakness of transparency. The baseline information on SSF is scarce, in contrast with data on industrial fisheries, which hampers the SSF representation. The lack of the bottom-up information flow on landings might explain the adoption of low quotas. However, some steps have been taken to alleviate this shortcoming by recording the SSF data.

- **Inclusiveness:** For the Aquitaine region, the Fishery Committees representatives state the inclusiveness is fully verified at the regional level, very often at the national level, and, only in few cases, at the European level. Aquitaine fishermen regularly participate in work

carried out at the national level. Thus, decision-making, at least at the regional level, involves the fishermen directly. Beyond that level, their representatives are in charge of the negotiations.

At the national level, the CNPMM actively contributes to the drafts of French, European, and international regulations.

At the national level, the fishers can sit on working groups that analyze and decide on the best strategic choices. This happens before the validation of such choices by the board of directors, which includes representatives from Aquitaine, among others. There are twelve working groups in the National Committee. The meetings are not very time-consuming; only two or three meetings a year in each group are attended by the fishermen. The participants can also be rotated. This is one of the main differences between the French and Spanish governance models. It seems to be truth that in France the governance model allows fishermen to be part across the different decision levels together with other representatives, while in Spain fishermen remain at port level, being the *cofradías* and Federation representatives who attend other levels meetings and decision-level processes. But, at the same time the centralized France governance model produces a strong reduction of the port level/local level. This situation makes difficult for several SSF fishermen to agree with the current governance model in France. Thus, some SSF fishermen do not perceive the active participation of SSF at local levels as completely good. Thus, even if, officially, the co-management model is consultative up to the regional and national levels, in practice it works as a collaborative co-management system. But again, it is necessary to state that the final decision is adopted at the national level, although trying to reach that collaborative co-management system.

However, in terms of the quota allocation and management, the system follows a self-management model.

For example, in France, between 4 and 6 meetings per month are organized by the National Committee, with the participation of the sector, the central administration, and the French Research Institute for Exploitation of the Sea, IFREMER. Such close collaboration results in a mutual trust and achieves the technical process quality that far surpasses that of the political interventions.

However, this apparent good governance model should be detailed. According to the previous paragraph a passive participation of SSF fishermen seems to be in place (good or regular according to the different points of view). But, analysing the SSF fishermen active participation, it is important to consider the lack of fishermen capacity to understand, discuss, and finally adopt decisions about technical issues, in the context of the meetings together with the rest of the stakeholders, which introduces an important weakness of the model. In addition, the financial system to cover the SSF fishermen participation in the meetings is not completely robust which also creates specific problems with this governance model.

At the European level. At this level, the dialogue and technical exchanges are not considered sufficient, in particular by the EC. Moreover, decision-making is sometimes based on political issues; the opinion of the stakeholders is not considered directly. The scarce participation of the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) with the CCS issues and the lack of identification of the actors and responsibilities prevent the effective assessment of the inclusiveness principle.

However, the community-based model results in improved governance goodness in comparison with traditional government-based models presented in the other case studies.

- ***Fairness:*** The representatives, by virtue of their legal obligations or mandates, are obliged to defend and represent all their members on an equal basis. These representatives have reported that this is, in fact, their *modus operandi*. This is generally truth, but the problem in relation with the SSF arises in relation to the more higher power of the POs representing the industrial fleets against the SSF.
- ***Community perception:*** The artisanal fishermen usually demand an improvement in the integration of the SSF in the decision-making process. However, what they really have in mind is a modification in the distribution of the quotas, so they can fish more. This perception of the fishermen is important because it introduces an obstacle to the good governance of the SSF (accountability). However, it is also important not to confuse the degree of representativeness with the obtained quota levels, which might depend on many other, even political, issues. This perception is generally truth across the three countries, however, as it has already explained there are also other problems, already mentioned. The different perception of some SSF fishermen in relation to both their active and passive participation in the different decision levels. These differences coming from the inclusiveness principles are affecting their degree of responsibility towards the governance model (accountability).

4.2. Bay of Biscay

4.2.1. *The governance structure*

The governance structure diagram shows the following key findings (Figure 5):

- Historically, both territories (Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa) had a very large number of vessels, with very different interests. This is reflected in the adoption of the current governance structure, with two inshore federations in the Basque Country, in Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. However, this structure implies a duplication of many resources to develop vessel representation. Among the 13 ports, along only 150 km of the coast, the most important landing ports are Hondarribia, Pasaia, Donostia, Ondarroa, Mutriku, Getaria, Lekeitio, Santurce, Armintza, Mundaka, Zierbena, Plentzia, and Bermeo. It is worth pointing out that the number of vessels has been decreasing over time. In this context, the local stakeholders (administration, federations) consider that it is not necessary to create a new organism to represent the SSF.
- No specific organization at the local level is devoted to the representation of the SSF. The SSF are integrated into the different *cofradías*, which are represented by the two existing federations (one in Bizkaia and one in Gipuzkoa). However, there is a specific commission in the Gipuzkoa Federation devoted exclusively to the SSF representation. The creation of this commission has been justified by the complexity of the SSF activity in that province and the interest in providing specific fora to discuss the SSF management issues.
- It is worth pointing out that the SSF activity in these two areas is not organized in associations as in other autonomous communities (Asturias and Galicia).
- The representation by the federations is not exclusive; the specific issues concerning particular *cofradías* are usually resolved directly, for instance by negotiations between the *cofradía* and the regional (Basque) government (see Figure 5). However, for very small *cofradías*, this direct link with the regional administration or other national bodies is weak

due to the scarcity of financial and human resources. It is stated absence of clear rules of participation between the organization and bodies.

- In some cases, in the absence of clear rules of participation between the fishermen organizations and administration bodies, different forms of participation are generated. The direct link between the *cofradías* and the Basque Government, mentioned above, is one such example. Under some circumstances, the federations use a new unofficial channel to communicate with the SSF, the Basque scientific institute AZTI. Bypassing the intermediary organizations might increase the effectiveness of response (from the point of view of the representatives).
- The SSF representation in the EU institutions is currently advanced through participation in the ACs. As can be seen in Figure 5, the two Basque federations take part in the specific *traditional-fisheries working group* of the CCS. They also participate in other ACs.
- The decision-making stages in which SSF take part, both directly or through their representatives (*cofradías*, federations, regional government, etc.), are different from the methods currently used by the Basque offshore and tuna fisheries. The offshore and tuna fleets are associated under the POs, which directly participate in the local, national, and European decision processes. For example, the offshore fleet belongs to the North-Western Waters AC, while the tuna POs take part in the Distant Waters AC. These two organizations are, in turn, under the umbrella of CEPESCA, which represents the industrial sector in the EU (Figure 5).
- The prevailing governance model is clearly a government-based management. The European and national governments interact and often make most of the decisions, except for some minor decisions adopted at a local, regional level.




Figure 5. Governance structure diagram for the Basque Country

4.2.2. The analysis of governance goodness

The analysis of the governance structure can be now completed with its goodness analysis, examining one by one the goodness-of-governance principles adopted under the methodological framework:

- **Legitimacy:** The structure of the governance system is based on the *cofradías*, the ancient institutions in which the representatives are elected in a democratic process. Thus, the representatives of *cofradías* are elected by the associates. The internal processes of a *cofradía*, designed to elect its decision-making bodies and their representatives, are supported by the free, voluntary, and democratic election of its partners. Both the representatives of the decision-making bodies of the *cofradías* and the major elected officials are strongly legitimated before the society and the administration. The internal authority of the *cofradías* is recognized by all, as is their authority to represent the interests of the *cofradía* before other sectorial and non-sectorial organizations and public institutions. The legitimacy of the fishermen *cofradías* is also based on the fact that their extractive activity is closely linked to a community of fishermen and generates mixed effects on other economic activities. Consequently, the preservation of the fishing community is linked to the conservation of the resources, so that common interest fosters cooperation strategies instead of individual advantages.

Federation representatives are elected among the *cofradías*. Thus, the election of the representatives at all levels is a decision legitimated by the participation of interested parties. The decisions made at various other levels have different levels of legitimacy that depend on the engagement of the parties in the process. This is not always possible due to economic and technical constraints or lack of willingness to participate in the decision-making process. This is particularly noticeable at the level of the *cofradías*, where some of the fishermen do not attend the meetings.

- **Accountability:** This is a mechanism put in place to challenge the existing rules, which should be clearly discernible in the governance structure (Figure 5).

However, in practice, there are few opportunities to challenge the rules in the government-oriented model. This *modus operandi* is overwhelmingly followed, except at the local level, where the SSF organizations are moving toward a community-oriented model. The federations, *cofradías*, and even the Basque Government are not able to provide solutions to all the problems and requirements. Certain issues strongly depend on the national and European administrations, with hardly any way to challenge the adopted rules.

In addition, the lack of motivation and responsibility among the SSF fishermen is moderate-to-high, making it difficult to reach a good representation level. The fishermen consider that, under a government-based model, their degree of influence is low. This conviction reduces their motivation for active participation in the decision-making fora. This model affects the willingness of SSF fishermen to take part in the organized fora, except when the discussion is directly related to the quota availability and share, the fishery closures, or other activity-related issues.

- **Inclusiveness:** The representatives take part in a governance structure and therefore, they participate in the local, national, and European level decisions, as can be seen following the links shown in Figure 5. However, most of the decision-making fora are consultative; it is possible to provide advice, to receive information, and to propose changes, rules, etc., but there is little opportunity to participate in decisions. The inclusiveness principle is very well represented in terms of participation and involvement of the representatives in different institutions. However, they have little influence in the decision-making process due to the government-oriented model applied at the national and European level. The true representativeness is more than the mere physical attendance

in the different fora; it should be firmly rooted in a consultation-based representativeness model. However, a transition towards a community-oriented model is now apparent at the local level, where the federation representativeness is very good. A community-oriented model is being promoted, with some specific issues discussed, such as the allocation of the fishing possibilities among the vessels or the establishment of daily limits for certain species.

- **Transparency:** The information is transferred across the governance structure in a very different way depending on the historical territory (Bizkaia or Gipuzkoa) and the internal organization of the *cofradías* and federations. The federations organize very few meetings with *cofradías* as it is difficult to get together the people from different ports. However, the information is transferred by e-mail; it is mainly the information concerning the issues directly affecting the SSF activity (e.g., quotas, allocation to sectors, technical measures, etc.). Thus, in general, the people at the local level are informed about the most important issues related to the fishing activity (mainly about the fishing possibilities and the allocation rules for the different fishing technologies and vessels). All administrative problems are also very well managed by the federations and *cofradías*.

However, commonly, the European-level information does not reach the Basque institutions immediately, and then a bottleneck is produced at the different levels. To provide an example, more than 90% of the local SSF fishermen claim that they have never heard of ACs. In particular, they are not aware of the existence of the CCS in which both Basque federations take part. Federations do not pass on the information from the high-level meetings, such as the CCS meetings. The documents produced by the CCS are long and very technical. These documents are not suitable for the *cofradía* members, and there are no human resources available to produce the adequate summaries.

This weakness should not be exclusively blamed on the lack of representativeness. It is also due, to a large extent, to the lack of interest among the fishermen in the European or even national or regional issues. When federations organize the face-to-face meeting, the *cofradía* representatives usually attend those meetings. However, even when the appropriate information (on the issues directly affecting the SSF) is disseminated by e-mail, there is often no response. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the information transfer. This problem is more serious in the small *cofradías* whose secretaries are not employed full-time. The level of motivation among the SSF fishermen is low; this also strongly affects the representativeness.

Finally, it is important to mention the weakness of the transparency principle in the bottom-up knowledge transfer; the baseline information on SSF is very scarce (in contrast with industrial fisheries). To alleviate this weakness, the appropriate data on the SSF fishing activity should be gathered in a fast and reliable manner. The incorporation of the missing data into the decision system will solve the data-flow problem. It will improve the SSF representation and therefore its management, including the new social and economic issues. Thus, the degree of representation strongly depends on this data flow. However, we must note that the availability of the SSF data has been gradually improving during the last decade.

- **Connectivity:** The connectivity between stakeholders is strong, as can be seen in the governance diagram. However, some of the connections only imply mere presence in the different meetings. The relationship between the national administration (Secretaría General del Mar) and the federations is direct. A federation does not need to take part in the decision process through the regional administration (Basque Government); it can

establish a direct relationship with the national administration. However, the regional administration could help the federations in their contacts with the national administration. Thus, in some cases, the mediation of the Basque Government might be very useful due to the hierarchical management process. The main problem is that this connectivity is given in the context of a government-oriented model. It is also necessary to reinforce the “return flow.” When a federation is proactive, it is important to reinforce the response of *cofradías* and fishermen or even the reaction of the national and regional administration.

Finally, there are few local-level fora, in which the fishermen could exchange experiences, problems, or proposals. This affects not only the connectivity principle but also the inclusiveness; an increase in the proactivity of SSF sector can be only started at the local level.

- ***Fairness:*** Representatives means a fair representation of all the stakeholders. Here, no differences between the representativeness levels of artisanal vessels and other vessels are observed. In fact, the involvement of the federations in the decision processes is stronger in the case of the artisanal vessels due to the special protection rules in place. In Bizkaia, there are few vessel types, which makes it easier to reach a good representation level. However, in Gipuzkoa, the federation represents very different fleet segments (artisanal and purse-seiners).

Differences in representativeness are not caused by the existence of vessels with different lengths but by the management problems, mostly related to the conflicting objectives. A set of management measures to achieve an agreed, optimal balance of objectives should be implemented. All the objectives of the full set of stakeholders should be recognized and recorded first. This is relatively easy to achieve for a group of vessels of the same type. However, this is a complex task in the case of the SSF, whose vessels use many different technologies. Such heterogeneity creates management problems and difficulties in promoting an appropriate representativeness. The scarcity of economic and human resources inherent to this type of fleet further complicates the management processes. In the previously discussed French case study, we did not observe such lack of resources; the professional fishing committees did not suffer from these shortcomings.

Moreover, the important obstacle in the development of an appropriate representativeness is the lack of data on the SSF activity. The level of representativeness might not be as relevant for the SSF as for other fleet segments because of the usual assumptions about the SSF activity. However, the accuracy of such assumptions diminishes with the decreasing SSF vessel size.

- ***Resilience:*** The ability of the SSF stakeholders to put forward new proposals or to participate in decision-making is poor. This is due to several different issues, in part already analyzed as weak points of the other principles. However, we should emphasize one important key aspect. The small *cofradías*, such as *Cofradía de Pescadores Pasajes San Pedro*, the most important example of a small *cofradía* representing only SSF, could face economic viability problems. The representativeness activities of these *cofradías* are largely commercial actions to obtain the economic resources rather than the efforts to develop an active representation. In the particular case of the *Pasajes cofradía*, the way of solving their problems might be attracting the boats from other autonomous communities

(SSF and others) to accomplish their first sales through this *cofradía*. However, this effort usually reduces time for other activities such as the SSF representation. This is the main reason why some of the *cofradías* disappeared during the last decade, and why it is not feasible to maintain the organizations exclusively devoted to the SSF (unless the members plan to increase the individual quota assigned to these groups).

However, the larger *cofradías* and federations might be now prepared to learn and respond efficiently to the challenges. There are cases of successful collaborations of these organizations with AZTI in search of practical solutions. Some of the examples are the recent application of the landing obligation (CFP), technology improvements to control the oil cost, and the introduction of several vessel-monitoring systems. However, as the representatives themselves recognize, they should be more active in putting forward new proposals, for instance, specific plans for minor gears. Most of the proposals are currently coming from other fishing subsectors.

- **Engagement:** The engagement level of the representative SSF organisms depends on the accountability and inclusiveness. The better the goodness of these two principles, the stronger will be the engagement of the SSF.
- **Community perception:** The fishermen community perception is an important element, representing the major obstacle to the introduction of a community-oriented model. The fishermen are unwilling to propose rules or to participate actively in the different fora in the government-oriented model. They believe that all the decisions are taken without giving them an opportunity to influence the decision processes. Moreover, they often disagree with their representation because their problems or proposals (mainly concerning the quota) are not always taken into account. For instance, in some cases, the representatives might not be able to influence the outcome because some decisions are already adopted by the EC. The fishermen should not identify the degree of representativeness with the number of problems solved or requirements fulfilled. However, the perception of the representatives is that the degree of representation is good in the existing context, that is, the CFP framework, the government-based model, and the current knowledge of the SSF sector.

4.3. Galicia

4.3.1. *The governance structure*

- The Xunta de Galicia (autonomous government), through the Consellería do Mar, conducts the fishing activities in the so-called “internal waters” and shellfish areas. These competencies concern the management and conservation of resources, marketing, fisheries management, surveillance, fleet regulation, and organizations representing the fishing sector.
- There are mechanisms for communication and dialogue between the Consellería do Mar and the different representatives of the fishing sector.
- The majority of SSF fishermen (minor fishing gears) in Galicia are organized in *cofradías* at three levels. At the local level, there are 63 guilds, at the provincial level, 3 provincial federations, and at the regional level, 1 regional federation.
- There is a fourth level, the National Federation of *Cofradías*, but with very little functionality or usefulness for the SSF.

- There is also the Association of Ship-owners of Minor Fishing Gears (Asociación de Armadores de Artes Menores en Galicia, ASOAR-ARMEGA in Spanish) with a hundred members. The president of this association is the national representative of SSF for the LIFE Platform (Low Impact Fishers of Europe). The LIFE Platform, based in the United Kingdom and Brussels, works with DG MARE and the members of the European Parliament to solve or minimize the problems that affect the SSF at the European level.
- Fishermen guilds have not been yet incorporated into the LIFE Platform.
- There are some mechanisms of communication between the *cofradías* and their respective federations. However, many *cofradías*, especially the small ones, do not feel that the federations are concerned about their problems.
- The most industrial (contingent fishing gears) fleet is organized in associations, usually by fishing gears and fisheries, at three levels: the provincial or regional level, national level, and the European level.
- The MAPAMA (government of Spain) has the competence over the fleet and resources in the so-called “external waters.” This competence affects the conservation, management, and marketing of the fleet and fishery resources.
- When there is a problem affecting the area of responsibility of the MAPAMA, the Consellería do Mar can legitimate and support the federations before the General Secretary of Fisheries.
- Industrial fleet-related organizations and federations also belong to the CCS, but the effectiveness of this consultative space is not clear. For the federations of *cofradías*, as representatives of the Galician SSF in the CCS, the usefulness of the CCS is very low.
- Ideally, the flow of communication between representative organizations of the artisanal sector and industrial fishery organizations with the Consellería do Mar, MAPAMA, or DG MARE should correspond to a pattern shown in the flow chart of Figure 6. This diagram describes an ideal, linear, multilevel interaction of a hierarchical character, typical of a centralized management model. However, in practice, this linear upward interaction is broken (the red lines in the flow diagram). Here are some of the reasons.
 - In the absence of clear rules of interaction between the different organizations of fishermen and the administration, different forms of participation are generated to influence the decision-making process.
 - The excessive atomization of the artisanal fishing sector (63 *cofradías*) tends to generate local perceptions of sectorial problems. Some *cofradía* leaders are antagonistic toward their representatives in the federations. There are also natural tensions between the artisanal fishers and some of the contingent fishing-gear vessels (mostly trawlers but also purse-seiners and netters). These tensions, combined with the negative attitudes of the *cofradía* leaders, hamper the dialogue between confraternities and their representatives in the federations.
 - This is the usual scenario, where in spite of the established mechanisms of hierarchical multilevel interaction, the representatives of local confederations with a certain capacity for leadership might interact with the administration, bypassing the intermediary organizations (red lines).




Figure 6. Governance structure diagram in Galicia

4.3.2. The analysis of governance goodness

- **Legitimacy:** (i) The cofradías are the representative organizations of the SSF. The internal processes of a cofradía, allowing the election of its decision-making bodies and their representatives, are supported by the free, voluntary and democratic election of its partners. Both the representatives of the decision-making bodies of the cofradías and the major elected officials are strongly legitimated before the society and the administration organizations. (ii) This legitimacy of the cofradías is recognized by the public institutions. The cofradía internal authority is recognized by all, as is its authority to represent its interests before other sectorial and non-sectorial organizations and public institutions. (iii) The legitimacy of the cofradías is also based on the fact that their extractive activity is closely linked to a community of fishermen and generates mixed effects on other economic activities. Consequently, the preservation of the fishing community is linked to the conservation of the resource, in such a way that common interest fosters cooperation strategies in the face of individual interests. (iv) This is similar to the situation in France, where the legitimated fishing committees are the representative organizations of the fishing sector, with democratically elected representatives.
- **Accountability:** (i) There are some formal structures and mechanisms for the accountability of the regional and national public institutions responsible for the fishery management (parliaments). Cofradías and federations are accountable to their members for their activity. However, this mostly applies to the economic issues, and not so much to other actions or the achievement of objectives. (ii) An indeterminate but significant part of

the fishing sector does not declare their true catches in their fishing logbooks and first-sale notes. This behavior has been traditionally permitted and even socially and culturally sanctioned. The fear of sanctions is the only and inadequate control mechanism used to enforce the rules. (iii) Complying with the rules is the minimum condition for achieving an objective of a fishery policy, but it is insufficient to achieve sustainability. It is necessary to go beyond the rules to improve the management of resources. (iv) In general, the levels of commitment of the fishing sector are low. Many of the decisions and actions taken by the Consellería do Mar and MAPAMA are of a political character (electoral/lobbying pressure) rather than intended to improve the management.

- **Inclusiveness:** Fishermen *cofradías* are very heterogeneous, as much by the composition of the fleet as by the number of boats. There are some important differences in terms of economic capacity, the number of partners, and fleet. These differences affect the degree of visibility and participation of these groups, and their influence in other *cofradías* and in the public administration bodies. There is a correlation between the number of *cofradía* members and its economic potential and influence. The confraternities with weak influence have low levels of participation in decision-making and lack commitment. The consultations and dialogues between the representatives of the provincial federations and the Galician Federation of *Cofradías* take place to deal with the issues affecting a part of or the entire Galician artisan sector. There are usually some differences between the opinions of various representatives. These differences are occasionally manifested as the absence of one of the federations. Some of the representatives of a federation might also try to prevent the participation of the confraternities over which they have some influence.

The administrations often lack effective mechanisms for monitoring governance. A consultation with the given sector is one such mechanism. However, the participation and representation during these consultations are not always sufficient, which affects the goodness of inclusiveness.

- **Transparency:** (i) The transfer of information from top to bottom: it is an obligation of the Consellería do Mar to communicate to the *cofradías* all the issues that directly affect the artisanal fishermen in their daily professional practice. These issues are diverse; there might be a publication of orders, notices of closures, changes in regulations, or publication of decrees, among others. In general, it is the information that affects the work of a fisherman (management of artisanal fleet and fishing resources) and the management of the *cofradía* as an institution. Part of this information is posted by the Consellería do Mar on its website and on the transparency website. However, due to the low profile of most small-scale fishermen, their low activity in these spaces and a weak digital culture, this information goes unnoticed. (ii) The direct transfer of information from the Consellería do Mar to the *cofradías*: the most relevant information is sent by the Consellería do Mar directly to the *cofradías* by digital means, fax, or post. Occasionally, the information is reinforced by direct telephone communication, depending on the urgency. Once the information arrives, the “Patrón Mayor” can call an information meeting with its associates. These calls are made a few days in advance using SMS on mobile phones, post, e-mail, bulletin boards of the *cofradía*, word of mouth, etc. In this sense, the transparency of the *cofradías* in the communication of all the affairs to the associated fishermen is high. This is usually verbal communication. Unfortunately, there is a high level of functional illiteracy in the sector. The fishermen are not inclined to read the documents. This can give rise to a chain of misinterpretations, distorting, intentionally or not, the original message. When the message is complex, which is often true for the information from Brussels via Consellería do Mar or a provincial Galician Federation (e.g., the case of the European

regulation on discards) the communication efficiency can be low.

(iii) The role of the Galician Federation: the relevant information can also come from the respective provincial federations or from the Galician Federation. The main function of this institution is consultation and collaboration with the administration. It represents the provincial federations and the *cofradías* and defends their common interests. The Galician Federation of *Cofradías* provides administrative services and sectorial information. It puts forward proposals for regulations and encourages participation in projects and consultative bodies. Its main administrative task is to keep the *cofradías* informed by issuing circulars (more than 200 a year). The Federation deals with the temporary changes of fishing modality (more than 1400 a year). It also registers the entry and exit of documents, with a volume of more than 4,000 documents received per year and more than 1,800 issued. It participates as an interlocutor in the processing of all the fishing documentation by the public administration bodies (Consellería do Mar, MAPAMA, DG MARE). It also helps the *cofradías* to participate in the public hearing phase. However, the fishermen associations (mainly small organizations; 30% of the *cofradías*) perceive the federations as non-functional organisms, distanced from their real-life problems and, above all, defending the interests of the Consellería do Mar. (iv) The information generated by the CCS, where the federations are represented, is transmitted to the *cofradías*. However, most of them are unaware of the existence and functions of this advisory body and consider the information to be of low value. (v) To transmit the information from the fishermen to the Consellería do Mar and other public administration bodies, the SSF and contingent fishing-gear fleets are obliged to fill in the logbooks and the first-sale notebook. However, this information is biased due to the fear of inspection and the potential reduction in the quotas for certain fish species.

- **Connectivity:** (i) *Horizontal connectivity within the artisanal sector:* there are many factors causing the fragmentation of the artisanal sector. The process of trust generation between the fishermen and between the *cofradías* is complex. Private interests are generally prioritized over collective interests. There is a significant fragmentation of interests, hampering the collaboration between fishermen and between different *cofradías*. (ii) *The connectivity of the cofradías and the representatives in the provincial and Galician federations:* the atomization of the Galician fishing sector tends to generate local interpretations of the problems even though the problems might be sectorial. Some *cofradía* leaders are politically antagonistic toward their representatives in the federations; this makes the dialogue and collaboration difficult. (iii) *The connectivity between the SSF and the large scale fishing, LSF is low.* Collaboration between the parties is not frequent, and the demands of the artisanal sector tend to be less visible. This is a scenario involving many actors and representative organizations (*cofradías*, private associations). The organizations and individuals employ different systems of rules in their interactions and have different operative capacities. As a result, the generated governance is disparate in its mechanisms and methods as well as in intentions. Many of these strategies are oriented toward political pressure rather than the search for a consensual solution through dialogue. (iv) *The connectivity between organizations representing the artisanal sector and the different institutions with fisheries competences:* poor intra-sectorial connectivity makes it difficult to construct spaces for internal dialogue and therefore makes the consensus with public institutions less likely.
- **Fairness:** All political leaders of institutions with responsibilities in fisheries claim that they represent all fishing sectors with the same sense of impartiality and equity, whether artisanal or industrial. However, it should be noted that, in Galicia, there are 8 *cofradías* in

which the SSF and contingent fishing gears coincide, especially trawlers, purse-seiners, and gillnets (“volanta”). When the social weight of the contingent fishing gears is greater than that of the minor fishing gears, the role of the “Patrón Mayor” is usually played by a representative of the contingent fishing gears. In these cases, there might be a clear imbalance in the governability of organizations in favor of the contingent fishing gears.

- **Resilience:** (i) *The resilience of fishermen cofradías in search of economic viability:* one of the problems that cofradías are currently facing (especially those of small and medium size) is their economic viability. Many will not be able to develop the viability models that solve this problem in the medium-term and will disappear as the organization and its partners, joining a different cofradía.
(ii) *The resilience of the provincial and Galician federations in search of economic viability:* the main source of income of the federations are the quotas of the partners, in projects in which they participate as partners or some activity funded by the Consellería do Mar related to their objectives. The granting of the projects is uncertain. However, many of the cofradías do not pay their share. In 2016, the Galician Federation proposed a plan of updating the fees, so that the Federation could cover the minimum costs. In the assembly, most of the cofradías of the Federation of Pontevedra rejected this proposal while other cofradías presented an antagonistic point of view. This resulted in a strong dependence of the Galician Federation on the Consellería of the Sea, threatening with a potential further decrease in autonomy. Finally, in addition to the economic viability issues, (iii) the current governance structures greatly limit the possibility of improving the current rules. The procedures and governance structures are very rigid; the introduction of alternative proposals is difficult and complex, affecting the assessment of the resilience principle.
- **Perception of the community:** The representatives of the artisanal fisheries feel that the impartiality and equity principles are not followed. Their opinion is that the representation becomes more unbalanced, in favor of industrial fishing, as it rises through the levels of the institutional scale.

4.4. North of Portugal

4.4.1. The governance structure

Some key issues of the governance structure are presented here (see Figure 7):

- The governance model for fisheries in mainland Portugal (not in the autonomous regions of the Azores and Madeira), in terms of management, presents a completely centralized scheme. The central government is ultimately responsible for making all decisions. The five regions of the country are merely statistical divisions, created by Eurostat and used, inter alia, for the regional redistribution of the EU structural funds.
- Thus, in the northern region, as in the rest of the Portuguese mainland, the organizations representing SSF remain in direct and continuous contact with the General Directorate of Marine Resources, Safety, and Maritime Services, a department of the central government of Portugal. This organization is directly responsible for fishery management. The SSF may also request a meeting with the Secretary of State for Fisheries, who reports directly to the Minister of the Sea, or exceptionally, with different entities and heads of the EU.

- In the northern region, there is only one entity representing the SSF, and belonging to the Traditional-Fishing Working Group of the SSC, Vianaapesca OP.
- The Associação dos Armadores das Pescas Industriais (ADAPI) in Portugal also remains in direct contact with all the administrations, defending the interests of its partners. The industrial organizations, with their higher levels of professionalization, obtain better resources than the SSF. The general capacities of industrial organizations, in comparison with the SSF representatives, are greater and their relationship with political powers is closer and more immediate.




Figure 7. Governance structure diagram in the North of Portugal

4.4.2. The analysis of governance goodness

- **Legitimacy:** In the fishery governance model in Portugal, as shown in Figure 7, the decision-making is carried out by the central government, represented by the General Directorate of Natural Resources, Safety, and Maritime Services. Therefore, its legitimacy comes directly from the government, democratically chosen by the Portuguese people. The fishing sector in Portugal, particularly in the north, is represented by ship-owner associations. These organizations defend the interests of the sector and play the role of interlocutors with administrations in decision-making fora. These associations are of private legal nature and represent the interests of the owners of fishing vessels. The four most important and representative organizations of the sector in the north are Vianapesca, Apropesca, AAPN, and Propeixe. These four entities are recognized by the administrations as legitimate representatives and interlocutors of the sector, with the power to resolve and negotiate any matter that concerns them. These organizations maintain the governing bodies elected by their partners. At the end of each term, elections are called to appoint the new governing team. The candidates represent the different fleet segments.
- **Accountability:** Centralized, government-oriented governance in the Northern Portugal has channels for representation of SSF in public administration. At the first level, the most representative organizations in the artisanal sector maintain a direct, more or less fluid, communication with the responsible department of fisheries of the central government (DGRM). At the next level, in the European administration, only a ship-owner association of the northern region is included in the Traditional-Fishing Working Group of the SSC. Thus, accountability of the central government in the fishing sector for its decisions and actions is maintained through the direct and continuous contact between the representative associations of the fishermen. At the same time, the central government is accountable to the European fishery authorities.

The government and the representatives of the sector actually assume their role in this governance structure and, to a greater or lesser extent, accept responsibility for their role in the search for better management forms. However, the third group of stakeholders, the SSF fishermen, are more reluctant to accept their responsibility for improving governance; there is a certain lack of motivation and willingness to engage.
- **Inclusiveness:** The SSF participate through the main associations that represent them. Ship-owners delegate their representatives to defend their interests; the representatives inform them via briefings when required. Therefore, the participation of the sector is direct within its representative organizations. In relevant cases, the ship-owners involved hold internal meetings within their association to study the matter and to agree on a common position. The association then transmits this opinion to the corresponding administration. In such cases, the participation is strong and often belligerent if the sector considers that its rights are being violated. A large percentage of the SSF remains outside the most representative associations, the main interlocutors with the administration. Therefore, much of the fleet lacks representation (participation) in the decision-making processes. Some effort must be made, especially by the central government, to include this group and integrate it into the governance structure.
- **Transparency:** The transparency, as a fundamental principle to be evaluated in the analysis of fishery governance, is defined as the visibility of the decision-making processes, the clarity with which the reasoning behind the decisions is communicated, and the availability of the information on the performance of the governing authority. In the

ship-owners association, the information is transmitted to its members and associates in several ways (SMS, e-mail, post, etc.). In specific cases with great importance or urgency, informative meetings are called, to increase the effectiveness of the information and to determine the consensus. The ship-owner profiles vary greatly; in some cases, they are fairly advanced users of digital technology. However, many individuals are only partly computer-literate. In these cases, the direct transmission of information through ad-hoc briefings is the most effective method.

- **Connectivity:** Effective coordination allows the stakeholders in the North of Portugal to work collectively for the sustainable development of their activities. This is imperative to overcome the difficulties of the management. The artisanal and industrial fleets have been known to act together to defend their interests as a whole. The collaboration with the scientific community is also very relevant; the dialogue with the Portuguese Institute for Sea and Atmosphere, I. P. (IPMA in Portuguese) is also continuous and fluid. In fact, when the human resources of this institution are low, the fishermen collaborate actively in scientific tasks, such as the acquisition of samples for later analysis by the researchers.
- **Fairness:** According to the Portuguese central government, in this model of fishery governance, the respect, and attention to the opinions and needs of the SSF sector (through its representatives) is absolute and fair. In general, there is no evidence of unfair or discriminatory treatment of artisanal fisheries or other fleet segments in the North of Portugal.

However, the professionalism of industrial fleet representatives and better human and economic resources available to this group make their representation and contacts with the administration easier than for the artisanal fleet representatives. Generally, the fleet segments and its members or associates are always represented in its governing bodies. With the exception of ADAPI, the members of the associations are ship-owners of the artisanal fleet. In spite of that, the representation of the interests of the different fleet segments (local fishing, shellfish, polyvalent, purse-seiners, etc.) is fair and without discrimination.

- **Resilience:** The fishery governance, using its centralized and government-based model, is entirely the responsibility of the public administration. The responsibility of the management is exclusive of the central government and, based on this criterion, the decision-making process includes talks with representatives of the sector. Some sectorial organizations promote associationism (more fishermen involved), and a direct and continuous contact with the administration during the fishery management with the aim of moving toward a more collaborative model, not government-based. Even so, ultimately, the central government has the power to open, to a greater or lesser extent, the spaces of decision-making to the participation of the sector. The ability of this model to adapt and respond efficiently to the socio-economic, political, or environmental pressures will depend largely on its evolution toward a more participatory, community-based model. For their part, the organizations representing the sector, in their search of improved resilience, diversify the economic activities and increase the added value of the raw material of the fishery. For example, Vianapesca, the most important and representative entity of artisanal fishing in the North of Portugal has created several new companies, such as a fish-preserving company, shipyards, and several others.

4.5. Canary Islands

4.5.1. *The governance structure*

Figure 8 shows a simplified representation of the fishery governance system in the Canary Islands. The SSF sector, which constitutes approximately 87% of the fishing fleet in terms of vessels, is represented by the *cofradías* of fishermen. It is worth mentioning that the sector is also organized in cooperatives. This study, however, is focused on *cofradías* and their federations due to their role in the fishery governance and management. These institutions are in turn represented by the Regional Federation of *Cofradías* of Gran Canarias (with headquarters in El Hierro). This recently created federation has been formed to represent fully the regional issues. Currently, it coexists with the two federations that, until June 2016, represented the *cofradías* of Canarias: Las Palmas and Santa Cruz. The new federation is represented in the national government by the National Federation of *Cofradías* of Fishermen, by the regional government of the Canary Islands and, specifically, by the Directorate of Fisheries. The federation can also represent itself before the national government. Thus, there are three formal channels of representation. In the EU, the sector is represented in the CCS by the *cofradías* of Corralejo, Morrojable, and the PO IslaTuna.

It is worth commenting on the role of the “*cabildos insulares*.” These are institutions without competencies in the fishery matters. However, they collaborate with the fishing sector in matters of the governance. They act as facilitators on issues related to the use of the coast, in which other actors might be involved, such as the aquaculture or coastal tourism. The *cabildos* also provide support to the FLAGs, as they are the members of these groups. The Cabildo of Gran Canaria has created the sectorial round table of Fisheries and Aquaculture. The fishing sector represented by the Provincial Federation of *Cofradías* of Gran Canaria, the FLAG, and the professional, recreational, and aquaculture companies and associational entities take part in this round-table organization. The aim is to improve the competitiveness of the sector through training and professionalization and increase synergy with the tourism industry. This *cabildo* and some of the others have specialists providing technical support to the fishing and aquaculture sector, e.g., by the creation of Marine Protected Areas, MPAs. The *cabildos* also provide subsidies to these sectors.

Finally, there is a sector of larger vessels (large longliners and trawlers) which fish in the waters of third countries. These vessels are represented by the National Association of Boat-owners of Freezing Vessels of Cephalopod Fisheries (its Spanish acronym is ANACEF). These are represented in the national government by CEPESCA and in the EU, by the Distant Waters AC. The sector is geographically conferred to the largest ports of Las Palmas and Tenerife.




Figure 8. Structure of the governance system of the Canary Islands fishery sector

4.5.2. The analysis of governance goodness

- **Legitimacy:** As already mentioned in the discussion of the cofradía legitimacy in the Spanish case studies, the internal processes of choosing the cofradía decision-making bodies and its representatives are supported by the free, voluntary, and democratic election of its partners. Both the representatives of the decision-making bodies and their major elected officials are strongly legitimated before society and the administration bodies. The internal authority of the cofradías is recognized by all, as is their authority to represent the interests of the cofradía before other sectorial and non-sectorial organizations and public institutions.

Until recently, the Canary Islands lacked a regional representation. There were two federations of cofradías, the provincial federations of Las Palmas and Santa Cruz. These two federations are still operational and represent the interests of the cofradías of various islands in the two provinces. The regional representation is now conducted by a single regional federation: the Federation of Cofradías of the Canary Islands, which was created last May, following a democratic process. It is worth pointing out that the provincial federations of Gran Canarias and Santa Cruz are still in place but, officially, the only federation representing the interests of the region is the regional federation³. One of the problems in this archipelago is its fragmented territory and associated differing opinions on the needs of the SSF sector. The fact that some of the cofradías are represented by the provincial federations might cause legitimacy problems (who can take the legitimate

³ The model of a single regional federation of cofradías exists in Galicia but not in the Basque Country, which has two provincial federations of cofradías.

decisions), should the views of the provincial and regional federations differ. A part of the sector does not accept the representation by the regional federation and thus challenges its legitimacy to represent the interests of the whole sector.

- **Accountability:** On the regional level, the creation of the Regional Federation of Cofradías might improve the accountability in the decision-making process; there is now a single official channel to defend the interests of the whole Canarian sector. However, the provincial federations are still in place, representing the interests of a group of cofradías. The creation of the regional federation responds to the need to unify the representation. It is expected that the new professional structure in the Canarias will improve the stakeholder representation in the decision-making process. Considering the responsibility of the fishermen to engage in this process, their representatives take part in the diverse fora, where the various interests of the sector are being discussed. The sector is engaged in the two provincial federations, the regional federation, FNCP⁴, and CCS. At the EU level, the Canarian entities participating in the CCS consider that the current structure allows the effective discussion of the EU proposals. They believe that they have the means to contest those proposals by participating in the CCS and by submitting their own proposals for technical issues.
- **Inclusiveness:** The SSF sector participates in the governance process and is represented by the Regional Federation before the MAPAMA. At the EU level, the sector is represented in the SSC by the cofradías of Corralejo, Morrojable, and OP Isla Tuna. The regional federation has not yet become a member of the CCS. However, it seems that the aforementioned entities constitute a good representation of the sector in the CCS. It is worth mentioning the cooperation at the level of the Macaronesia, where the entry of the Canarian cofradías to the CCS was encouraged by the Portuguese associations. The current Canarias representatives in the CCS volunteered to participate in the CCS. They considered it a step forward and remarked that anybody can participate in the CCS as the entry is open to any fishing organization. The sector actively communicates with other SSF sectors at the level of the outermost regions (ORs), even envisaging the implementation of the new AC of the Outermost Regions. Thus, the SSF sector is included in the decision-making process at the regional, national, and EU level (including other ORs).

It seems that the participation is good at all levels. As we have already pointed out, it can be considered that the participation in CCS has been effective because the interests of the Canarians have been effectively defended in the EU. In spite of this, the interviewees believe that certain aspects of the decision-making process are difficult to accept. This opinion is mainly related to the case of the fishing possibilities for the bluefin tuna. The perception is that the National Federation does not defend the interests of the SSF sector effectively. According to the sector fishermen, national decisions on tuna fishing favor the interests of large industrial companies in other regions of Spain, especially in the Mediterranean. This is especially noticeable in the case of bluefin tuna.

- **Transparency:** The Vice-consejería⁵ of Fisheries is in charge of communicating the national and EU decisions to the federations and cofradías, concerning the management of fishing opportunities, CFP reform, EMFF, and FLAGs, among others. Federations of

⁴ As of October 2016, only the provincial federations were the parties in the FNCP. The regional federation has requested its inclusion in the FNCP.

⁵ The vice-consejería is the branch of the government in charge of the fishing and aquaculture sectors. In the autonomous communities of Spain, the consejerías play the role of ministries and the vice-consejerías are analogous to vice-ministries. The Vice-consejería of Fisheries of Canarias belongs to the Consejería of Agriculture, Fisheries, Livestock, and Water.

cofradías are in charge of transmitting the relevant information to its cofradías. The vice-consejería also provides information to the general community through its institutional web portal. The cofradías and POs participating in CSS disseminate information by e-mail after attending the CCS meetings.

- **Connectivity:** As shown in the governance diagram, there are channels of connectivity at the regional, national, and EU level. The SSF sector can have direct access to the national authorities although, in some cases, the Government of the Canary Islands (Directorate of Fisheries) represents the sector before the central government. The regional federation does not feel represented by the FNCP. They perceive that the interests of the FNCP are not in line with the interests of the SSF. As of October 2016, the regional federation is not yet a part of the FNCP. Its inclusion has been requested by the new president of the federation. It is also worth commenting that the provincial federations participate in the FNCP. The inclusion of the regional federation is a matter of time; it has been but recently created. We should also note the role of the three cabildos insulares (insular bodies with no competence over fisheries), which assist in the fishing sector governance, helping in the development of coastal areas through sectorial round-table meetings. The cabildos are part of the FLAGs and provide support to these groups.
- **Fairness:** The Canary Island fisheries are characterized by the predominance of the SSF. Eighty-seven percent of the fleet has vessels of less than 12 m in length. Thus, the SSF sector is not a marginal player as in the other autonomous communities. The SSF constitute the most important regional fleet both in number of vessels and geographical distribution (all islands). As a result, there are no differences in representation, which might be caused by the local predominance of specific fleet segments. However, some differences in representation might emerge due to the territorial fragmentation of the activity; some provinces might be more active or effective than others. A transfer of provincial federation competencies to the regional federation would guarantee a unified representation of regional issues.

In fact, the regional representatives consider that, at the regional level, there is a comprehensive representation in the governance system since all the actors are represented. In contrast, at the national and EU level, the effective representation might be affected by the capacities of other fishing organizations. This is especially noticeable in the case of CEPESCA, with its strong economic and technical abilities to defend the interests of its associates in all fora. In the case of the bluefin tuna fishing, for example, there is a conflict between the interests of the regional federation and those of CEPESCA.

- **Resilience:** The federations and cofradías are responsive to the new challenges of the fishery management. For example, there is a dialogue with other sectors of the ORs on the topics to be discussed in the future AC of the ORs. They maintain good relations with their counterparts of Madeira and Azores, who had encouraged the engagement of the Canarias Islands sector in the CCS. The sector is also involved in environmental concerns such as the harmful effects of certain fishing methods (traps) and the threat of aquaculture escapes and their potential damaging impact on the environment. They are also active in liaising with other small-scale sectors (e.g., with their Mediterranean counterparts) to solve the problems of the bluefin tuna fishing. In a process led by the regional federation, these sectors participated in the joint May and October meetings. These meetings were supported by a left-wing political party. The SSF sector claims a large proportion of this

resource, basing their arguments on the fishing activities of low ecological impact and on the need to implement Article 17 of the CFP.

- **Community perception:** The perception is that the fishery-management decisions at the national level do not take into consideration the needs of the SSF sector. Although the channels are provided to ensure representation and participation in the decision-making, the large industry interests are favored. Other groups, such as the aquaculture sector of this archipelago, are perceived as a threat because of the competition for space and the potential risk associated with the introduction of species such as sea bass.

4.6. The EU SSF governance space: special emphasis in the CCS Advisory Council

4.6.1. The SSF governance space at the European level

First, we will analyze the governance structure under which the SSF representatives develop their representativeness. Figure 9 represents a general institutional organization of the fishery management (Lagière et al., 2013), which is a reference used to promote discussion in the different organized focus groups. The CFP proposes the creation of regional advisory bodies (ACs, RACs under the last CFP) to increase the number of territorial management units, decentralizing management and promoting greater inclusion and participation of the sector in the development and implementation of the fishery policies. Although the functions and connectivity of these ACs with DG MARE have been expanded in the current CFP reform, their effectiveness is low in the perception of some members of the fishing sector. Even though the fisheries are represented in the ACs, these organizations are unknown in a significant proportion of the artisanal fisheries at the local level. For instance, in Spain, the activities of the federations in the ACs are not always known to the *cofradías*.

The South-Western Waters Advisory Council (CCS) is one of the seven ACs established to put forward opinions on the management of the fisheries in the South Atlantic to the Member States. It includes a specific working group devoted to the traditional fisheries in South Waters, which is the reason to analyze in this report. We analyzed both the internal workings of this council and its interactions with other European stakeholders in the framework shown in Figure 9 (this diagram is used as a base of discussion of the European decision space between stakeholders in different focus groups).




Figure 9. Institutional organization of the fishery management in the EU (Lagière et al., 2013)

Governance space at the European level with emphasis on the CCS role: key findings

- The CCS reaches the UE through the EC.
- The CCS role (and in particular, the role of the traditional fisheries working group) is consultative, which in practice implies little influence in the EU decision-making processes. According to the framework adopted for defining the type of co-management, the EU uses a consultative co-management when implementing a new consultation process through the CCS (in particular, for any topic relevant to the traditional-working group).
- In the SSF decision-making, the relationship between the CCS and the rest of EU stakeholders and European decision-making fora is weak, which reflects a weakness in the governance system. The European level space for the SSF influence should be improved.
- There is a lack of official stable links between the CCS (in particular, its traditional-fisheries working group) and the Scientific Committee, STECF. The current management is mainly based on scientific advice, leaving aside other sources of data (such as the CCS). In general, the collaboration between the CCS and the scientific organizations should be improved. The CCS should explicitly ask the EC to send specific CCS proposals to its consultative organism, the STECF.
- There are no effective links between the CCS and the Member States.
- The lack of common decision-making fora for all the CCs bodies is also significant. However, there have been some common resolutions affecting issues pertaining to more than one CC, which shows that the communication between CCs might be improved. It is important to increase the connectivity between the traditional fisheries working group and the European Parliament.
- In general, CCS and its traditional-fishery working group should be firmly placed in the decision-influencing sphere of the different European institutions, with an emphasis on their effective interactions.

A modified reinforced governance structure can be designed on the basis of the diagram shown in Figure 9. This new structure shows the necessity of stronger connectivity between the CCS and the rest of the stakeholders to improve the SSF engagement in the decision-making fora at the European level (Figure 10).




Figure 10. A proposal for an institutional organization of traditional-fishery management at the European level

4.6.2. The governance goodness analysis (covering the external and internal issues concerning the CCS)

The examination of the governance structure will be now completed with this goodness analysis. To achieve this, the current governance system at the European level is analyzed according to the governance principles under the methodological framework adopted in this report. However, the analysis is now separated into two sub-items. These are the issues mainly related to the internal structure and organization of the CCS and the external issues, concerning the European space in which the CCS takes part as a stakeholder.

✓ **Accountability:** *The ways of representing the SSF exist but should be improved.*

- **European issues.** The path connecting the EC and the CCS exists and can be used by the traditional- fisheries working group.
- **CCS internal issues.** **The traditional fisheries working group represents the channel by which the SSF stakeholders (representatives) could reach the EC.** However, this is not exactly a way to change the future rules affecting SSF but to provide advice within a consultative co-management process. The experience shows that very few proposals are sent from the working group to the EC and vice versa. The group should augment its effectiveness by increasing the number of proposals sent to the EC. This is related to the inclusiveness principle and will be discussed below.

This existing way of representation is not free of problems. In the particular case of the SSF, there are many definitions (around the SSF) due to a large number of geographical differences, fleet structures, targeted species, and fishing techniques. The main problem is to formulate a European definition applicable to all the

regions. This is associated with the complexity of transfer to the traditional-fisheries working group from the local, regional, and national levels of the three countries involved (Spain, France, and Portugal). The different interests presented at this working group make this process difficult. Among others, there are some problems with promoting the SSF-related proposals in the EC. It is common to put forward the proposals developed by specific associates in response to very specific interests. Thus, the existing system might seem more suitable for supporting the individual rather than the collective interests of the SSF. Therefore, the main weakness of the accountability principle is related to the incorporation of the different views affected by different fishing techniques, into a potential common decision process. Different stakeholders might hold different views on important aspects, such as the real goal of the fishery-management system. It is not easy to see how and whether to incorporate the goals of the SSF involved in the traditional-fishery working group into a common SSF-related proposal. It might be possible to form a predetermined set of fishery-management aims. Such issues weaken or diminish the sense of co-responsibility and commitment of the CCS partners, reducing the goodness of accountability.

The weakness of the accountability principle might result in a decrease in the influence at the European level. Figure 11 illustrates the influence capacity across the pyramid of influence for the SSF representation.




Figure 11. Influence pyramid at different regional levels

Without deep analysis of all the issues, the traditional- fisheries working group could be promoted by taking the lead in developing SSF-related proposals to be sent to the EC:

- Some issues related to the fishing quotas are decided at the national level; however, the traditional- fisheries working group might help in this task. One example might be the case in which some countries have already consumed the quota. Then, the working group could try to manage a part of the quota to avoid the discards.
- There is a possibility of establishing specific management plans for the shared stocks. One way of accommodating different regional interests is

by sharing the management of the stocks with a wide geographical distribution (such as the octopus stock).

✓ ***Inclusiveness:***

- ***CCS internal issues.*** (i) The organisms at the local and national level have the opportunity to participate as partners in the traditional- fisheries working group. However, (ii) in most of the cases, this merely implies attending the meetings, with little active participation. In general, the group should increase its activity by sending more proposals to the EC. However, then, the already mentioned accountability principle weakness arises.
- ***European issues.*** The consultative processes promoted by the EC are of high importance. In general, these processes do not allow real participation because the EC usually involves CCS at the late stage of the proceedings, when only comments on the specific EC proposals can be formulated. On some occasions, when a proposal is sent to the working group, there is no time to translate it and obtain the relevant comments in time (this is also related to the transparency principle). In addition, the EC should make it clear to what extent the proposal can be affected by the response of the members; sometimes the process cannot be influenced.

The “nature” of the organizations themselves is also relevant to the inclusiveness principle. The SSF are represented at the European level under the umbrella of different organisms, such as *cofradías* and federations, whose technical and economic capacity is much lower than in the organizations representing the industrial-scale fleets.

✓ ***Transparency: the transparency system is already in existence.***

- ***CCS internal issues:*** The CCS produces technical reports that are sent to all the CCS partners, to be disseminated among their respective associates. However, the local and regional institutions taking part in the traditional-fisheries working group find it difficult to distribute these reports in a top-down manner. This is due to the nature of the documents; they are often very long and very technical, without explanatory text that might help to understand them. In addition, the text is in English, which makes it more difficult to respond on time, as it has to be first translated into the three official languages.
- ***European issues:*** It must be emphasized that the proposals from the EC should contain a document giving a general overview of the proposal, its context, and an explanation of the technical background and details.

These weaknesses of the *transparency principle* complicate the task of representing the SSF at the European level. It is not surprising that more than a half of the SSF fishermen are not aware of the existence of the traditional-fisheries group or the CCS itself. Sending some local SSF fishermen as observers to the European-level traditional-fishery working group might help to improve their awareness, according to the Basque fishermen. The observers would pass down at least the fact of existence and the role of this working group. To improve the communication, some stakeholders suggested the possibility of establishing a potential new channel under the FLAG actions.

✓ ***Connectivity:***

- ***CCS internal issues.*** The CCS facilitates the connectivity between SSF stakeholders from different decision levels and from different regions.

- **European issues.** A weak *connectivity* exists between the traditional- fisheries working group and the scientific and political fora (identified while defining the European governance structure). The weakness of the connectivity reduces the SSF opportunities to take part in decision-making. The connectivity between the traditional fisheries and the EC is limited, and it should be improved. However, the SSF representatives emphasize the limited technical and economic capacity of their organisms, which makes it difficult to solve this problem. It seems to be unrealistic to increase the number of fora attended by SSF representatives. The solution should not involve new organizations or increase the complexity of the structure. To improve the collaboration between the European institutions, in particular, the links between the EC, the European Parliament (Fishery Committee), and the CCS should be reinforced. Finally, the EC should request advice from the STECF on the conservation and management of marine resources, including biological, economic, environmental, social, and technical considerations. However, the STECF might connect with the traditional-fishery working group more frequently by asking the EC consultative organization to provide advice on the CCS proposals, especially SSF-related.
- ✓ **Fairness:** The artisanal and industrial actors do not have the same economic and technical resources, which affects the pursuit of their respective goals. The industrial sector has access to sufficient human capital to convince the government to adopt the norms aligned with the interests and objectives of the sector. The *cofradías*, however, have limited human resources although they have a huge social capacity, which is sometimes exploited by the politicians. The stakeholders comment on the lack of specific human resources devoted to the representation as one of the main problems in the SSF, particularly apparent at the European level. In addition, the SSF heterogeneity and lack of data on SSF activities make it difficult to obtain a goodness evaluation for this fairness principle.
- ✓ **Engagement:** The engagement ability of the representative SSF organisms depends on the accountability and the inclusiveness. The better the goodness of these principles, the better will be the engagement of the SSF.
- ✓ **Resilience:** Given the results for the previous principles, the capacity to withstand pressure and adapt to changes in the management environment should be improved. The mechanism is in place, but the SSF representatives at this level should use the opportunities provided by the traditional-fishery group to influence the European fora.

5. Section 4. Conclusions: a Traffic Light Matrix

Taking into account the results shown in Sections 1 to 3, the general conclusions of all case studies can be now presented. We also show a final output: a Traffic Light Approach Matrix (TLAM). It includes a set of indicators to evaluate the degree of involvement of the SSF in public bodies and private organizations, and the degree of their participation and influence in the decision-making process. A brief summary is introduced in Table 4.

The key general outputs

Methodology framework:

- *This work uses a goodness-of-governance analysis as the framework* or the way of understanding how the representation of SSF stakeholders is established in different decision-making fora at the local, regional, national, and European levels. The goodness of the governance is analyzed by qualitative assessment of a set of governance principles: legitimacy, transparency, accountability, inclusiveness, engagement, fairness, connectivity, and resilience.
- *The inclusiveness and engagement are especially closely related to the degree of participation at the different decision levels*, but they both depend on the goodness of the rest of the principles. This is the reason why they are all analyzed in this report.

The analysis of governance goodness:

- *A legitimate SSF representation:* In general, the stakeholders recognize the SSF organizations as legitimate. The cofradías and federations in Spain and the French fishery committees are composed of elected professionals. The internal processes employed by SSF fishermen and cofradías to elect its decision-making bodies and their representatives are supported by the free, voluntary, and democratic election of its partners. Both the representatives of the decision-making bodies and the major elected officials are strongly legitimated before the society and before the administrative bodies.
However, it is important to state that the “internal legitimacy,” that is, the mechanisms of internal participation within each organization, can give rise to different degrees of legitimacy. The situation is different in Portugal, where the fishing associations have a completely private legal nature.
- *Accountability – a good structure in place.* The governance structure is in place in all the examined cases, creating the ways and conditions for stakeholder participation in the decision-making. The Spanish case studies analyzed a decentralized model, in contrast to the centralized model followed by the French and Portuguese. There are very few organizations exclusively representing the SSF. In France and some other regions, such as the Basque Country, representatives do not see the need to create more SSF-related organizations; they feel that the adequate governance structure is already in place. In other regions, SSF fishermen are not strong enough to create a specific entity that will bring together the artisanal fishing groups. There is no clear definition of an artisanal fleet, which makes the potential union of SSF fishermen difficult and weakens the case for the creation of one specific SSF channel. However, some exceptions are for mention. In France, some SSF fishermen consider the structure should be improved to increase the SSF participation.
- *Accountability – weak responsibility, commitment, and willingness to improve the sector and the sustainability of fishing resources.* Accountability means more than the mere presence of the governance structure. It also implies responsibility, commitment, and willingness to improve the activities leading to sustainability. This part of the accountability principle shows weaknesses across the regions. Some of the SSF fishermen lack the motivation to join trade unions or to be elected (in the case of French fishing committees). This lack of motivation and responsibility prevents achieving a good representation level of the fishermen who complain of weak representation. Spanish fishermen consider that under a government-based model, the degree of their influence is low, which reduces their motivation to participate in the decision-making fora. These weaknesses are less pronounced in the French community-based model. However, even in that model, the SSF representativeness by port diminishes at the higher levels of fishing

committees, which according to some SSF fishermen affect the accountability and reduces at certain degree the responsibility level.

A key issue here is that in France, the membership in the fishing committees is obligatory; the fishermen even have to pay a fee. In Spain, although all the fishermen belong to a *cofradía*, they do not usually pay a fee specifically associated with representation issues. An extreme situation is found in Portugal, where most of the SSF fishermen do not belong to fishing associations, which implies a complete lack of representation.

In general, the fishermen demand higher quotas and failing to obtain such quotas is perceived as a sign of bad representation. For a large proportion of the fishermen, a failure to meet their demands is a result of a weak representation. Therefore, the willingness to increase their commitment and responsibility gradually deteriorates even further.

- **Inclusiveness – good passive participation in decision-making fora but insufficient to influence the decisions.** The representatives take part in several decision-making fora at different levels. However, in most cases, the participation only implies a mere presence with little active participation, and, therefore, has little or no effect on the management processes. This passive participation is closely related to the level of connectivity between stakeholders taking part in the governance structure. Strong differences are found between French and Spanish governance models. Given the current governance structure good passive participation exists, but under the centralized French model specific SSF fishermen consider that passive participation could be improved.
- **Inclusiveness – low active participation and low degree of influence in decision-making.** Several factors affect the degree of goodness of the inclusiveness principle. One of the most important factors is the usually adopted co-management type (a consultative co-management in all the studied cases). However, in Spain and Portugal, although the government interacts with the fishermen and asks for advice using consultative processes, it still makes most of the decisions. Besides, the administration bodies lack the effective mechanisms for monitoring governance. Consultation with the sector is one such mechanism. However, the consultations are not always carried out under the conditions of appropriate participation and representation. In addition, the SSF fishermen remain at the local level, while their representatives reach the regional, national, and European levels. The governance model is completely different in the French case study, where a centralized model based on a more participatory system is in place. In particular, even though a consultative co-management is assumed (because the government makes the final decisions), it has elements of a collaborative co-management in practice. In addition, the SSF fishermen can also take responsibility at the national level (although the degree of SSF port representation becomes lower at higher decision levels which also reduce the active participation). However, other factors (mainly associated with the other principles) also affect the degree of active participation, such as the willingness to improve participation, responsibility, and commitment, the data and knowledge transfer, and the connectivity between stakeholders.

The difference between the degrees of influence exerted by the SSF and the LSF is especially important. The Galician case study provides significant results with special relevance to the two subsectors in that region. The scenario involves multiple actors and representative organizations (*cofradías*, private associations). The participants apply different rules to the interactions and have different operative capacities. Thus, they generate disparate governance systems, in mechanisms and methods as well as in

intentions. Many of the strategies are politically motivated rather than in search of a consensual solution through a dialogue between SSF and LSF.

- **Transparency exists but should be improved. There is a limited top-down transfer of the knowledge about European issues, moderate-to-high top-down transfer of knowledge on daily issues, and scarce-to-moderate bottom-up knowledge transfer on the SSF activity.**

On the one hand, the information related to topics of specific interest to the fishing community (such as the fishing allocation possibilities) or related to the technical measures (such as fishery closures) is efficiently transmitted. Consequently, all decision levels should be well informed. However, the information quality might decrease at a local level, depending on the engagement of the fishermen and their reaction to large amounts of information. Moreover, in the SSF sector, there is a high level of functional illiteracy, which makes maintaining transparency problematic.

On the other hand, when the information is related to general issues, the transparency principle is affected; it gradually weakens from the European to the local level. Important information about FLAGS or ACs, latest directives, transition from the last to the current CFP, or proposals discussed in the different decision-making fora might not be efficiently transmitted. They might even remain completely unknown at the local level. This weakness is due mostly to a lack of SSF fishermen interest and a lack of time and human and financial resources to promote a more appropriate (complete) information transfer. This is especially relevant for the European-level information, which is usually complex.

At the European level, the EC communication with the CCS is not sufficiently transparent. Some proposals arrive at the traditional-fishery group too late to provide feedback to the EC. They are also written English, without a general description or explanation of the technical background. These proposals are often very complex and difficult to understand; under such circumstances, it is unrealistic to expect timely advice from the CCS partners.

Finally, the bottom-up knowledge transfer should also be improved. The local-level representatives usually know little or nothing about the SSF vessel activity (the landed species, the weight of the landings, the fishing locations, etc.). It is true that the fishermen are obliged to fill logbooks and/or supply the first sales notes, depending on the LOA. However, sometimes, the provided information is insufficient or unreliable. The lack of accurate data makes the development of an appropriate SSF representation difficult. However, the knowledge transfer and availability have been gradually increasing during the last few decades. In particular, in France, the SSF data is being gathered, and other countries are progressively improving their data systems thanks to the introduction of new technology (e.g., the geographical location devices, AIS, in vessels under 12 m in the Basque Country).

- **Good connectivity between stakeholders has been established, but it is sometimes broken. Weak connectivity at the European level.** It is worth pointing out that the communication among existing stakeholders is usually good. Cofradías and federations (Spain), committees (France), and associations (Portugal) form a base for a good assessment of the accountability principle of governance. There are some exceptions, as in the case of the FNCP (Spain), whose degree of representativeness is low, providing very little functionality for the SSF. In some cases, the upward interactions between stakeholders might be broken due to the lack of clear rules of participation. This is especially relevant in Spain and Portugal but not in France, where the rules are clearly established.

It is also important to note that, in some cases, the good connectivity might have been affected by the disparate local views of sectorial problems, as in the case of Galicia, where the SSF is fragmented into 63 *cofradías*. In other cases, the connectivity is affected because of conflict of interests, which creates antagonistic attitudes and complicates the dialogue between representatives (The Canary Islands and Galicia).

At the European level, the CCS represents the traditional-fisheries working group, trying to change the future rules affecting the SSF. There is a way to maintain the European space that might be influenced by the SSF. However, the connectivity between the traditional-fishery working group and the scientific and political fora working in that European space should be improved.

Finally, it is also important to mention that the connectivity between the SSF and the LSF is weak in Galicia (this is one of the most important case studies for analysis of the relationship between SSF and LSF). Collaborative interactions between the parties are not frequent, and the demands of the artisanal sector tend to be less visible than those of the industrial sector.

- *Thus, the engagement could be improved* by reinforcing an active participation under the inclusiveness principle and strengthening the willingness to improve the responsibility and the commitment of the stakeholders under the accountability principle.
- *Low level of fairness: SSF vs. LSF representativeness. The SSF heterogeneity makes its representation difficult, and the LSF has higher lobbying capacity based on their abundant economic and management resources.*

Different regions have various distinctive definitions of artisanal fishing, which allows it to be identified at least at the regional level. However, such identification at the higher level (e.g., European) is not simple. This makes it difficult to establish a distinct SSF channel across the governance structure. In contrast, the LSF organizations are in a good position to participate in decision-making processes. They have large economic and human resources at their disposal. Their representatives are professionals with experience in management, in contrast to the representatives working in *cofradías* and federations, who usually come from the fishing sector. As a consequence, LSF organization can have a strong effect on decision-making (e.g., the Spanish cases, which the LSF negotiated directly with the EC through CEPESCA and/or EUROPÊCHE). The LSF are able to create lobbies with the aim of increasing their degree of influence at the high levels of decision-making.

Another reason why it is difficult to develop a good SSF representation is the complexity of this sector. SSF use a wide variety of fishing techniques to target a very large number of species even though the overall catch is low (in contrast to the overall catch of large-scale vessels). In addition, the SSF sector uses seasonal fishing techniques, changing during the year, which contributes to the management complexity. Thus, the complexity of their management and the difficulties in putting forward the SSF management-related proposals lead to problems in developing an effective representation. The management of the large vessels is less complex. However, the ability of SSF and LSF to represent their associates seems not only related to the complexity of their fishing activity but also to the availability of resources to address such problems. In the case of the SSF, the difficulty of representation is exacerbated by the lack of economic and technical resources.

The Galicia case study is worth a separate mention. It represents the best case in Spain for analysis of fairness and connectivity between the SSF and LSF. In Galicia, there are 8 *cofradías* including both the SSF and contingent fishing gears (especially trawlers, purse-

seiners; and nets (“volanta”). When the social weight of the contingent fishing gears is greater than that of the minor fishing gears, the role of the “Patrón Mayor” is usually played by a representative of contingent fishing gears. In some cases, there is a clear imbalance in the governability in favor of the contingent fishing gears.

- **Weak resilience in Spain and Portugal due to the rigid governance structure:** Current governance structures greatly limit the possibility of improving the current SSF management rules. Both the procedures and governance structures are very rigid and make it difficult to put forward alternative proposals. This is heavily affecting the Spanish and Portuguese SSF representation. The governance structure currently adopted in France is more collaborative, allowing a better resilience assessment.

Table 4. The analysis of governance goodness: key issues

Goodness analysis principles	Analysis of governance goodness
A legitimate SSF representation	Stakeholders recognize the SSF organizations as legitimate. However the internal legitimacy can give rise to different degrees of legitimacy
Accountability – a good structure in place	The structure is in place : ways and conditions to participate in decision-making exist
Accountability – weak responsibility, commitment, and willingness to improve the sector and the sustainability of fishing resources	Some of the SSF fishermen lack of motivation and responsibility prevent achieving a good representation
Inclusiveness – good passive participation in decision-making fora	The representatives take part in several decision-making for at different levels. In most cases, participation only implies mere presence with little active participation
Inclusiveness - Low active participation and low degree of influence in decision-making	Consultative co-management model of governance are not always carried out under the conditions of appropriate participation and representation
Transparency: limited top-down transfer of the knowledge about European issues, moderate-to-high top-down transfer of knowledge on daily issues, and scarce-to-moderate bottom-up knowledge transfer on the SSF activity	Topics of specific interest to the fishing community (such as the fishing allocation possibilities) are efficiently transmitted and, all decision levels are well informed. When the information is related to general issues, the transference is affected. It gradually weakens from the European to local level. Bottom-up knowledge transfer should be improved
Good connectivity between stakeholders has been established, but it is sometimes broken. Weak connectivity at the European level	The communication among existing stakeholders is usually good. However, in some cases the upward interactions between stakeholders might be broken due to the lack of clear rules of participation. In some cases, the good connectivity might have been affected by the disparate local views of sectorial problems, also because of conflict of interests which creates antagonistic attitudes.
Engagement could be improved	By reinforcing an active participation under the inclusiveness principle and strengthening the willingness to improve the responsibility and the commitment of the stakeholders under the accountability principle
Low level of fairness: SSF vs. LSF representativeness.	The SSF heterogeneity makes its representation difficult. The identification of a SSF definition at higher level is not easy, which makes difficult to establish a distinct SSF channel across the governance structure. The LSF has higher lobbying capacity based on their abundant economic and management resources. They have large economic and human resources at their disposal.
Weak resilience due to the rigid governance structure in Spain and Portugal	Both the procedures and governance structures are very rigid and make it difficult to put forward alternative proposals. This is heavily affecting the Spanish and Portuguese SSF representation.

5.1.Traffic Light Matrix (TLM)

Finally, we use a TLM to visualize the main outputs from the governance diagnostics. The traffic light ratings are described below. Good governance is rated against the principles already used in this report and the traffic light system is applied;

- 1. **Red** – the likelihood of this principle to be satisfied is **rare**
- 2. **Orange** - the likelihood of this principle to be satisfied is **unlikely**
- 3. **Yellow** – the likelihood of this principle to be satisfied is **possible**
- 4. **Green** - the likelihood of this principle to be satisfied is **likely**
- 5. **Dark Green** - the likelihood of this principle to be satisfied is **completely certain**



Table 5. TLM of SSF regions

Principles/case studies	Spain			France	Portugal	European space
	Basque Country	Canary Islands	Galicia	Aquitaine	North	
Legitimacy	4 ●	3 ●	4 ●	4 ●	3 ●	4 ●
Accountability – governance structure – existing ways	4 ●	3 ●	4 ●	4 ●	2 ●	3 ●
Accountability – degree of responsibility, willingness to improve (fishermen), ...	2 ●	2 ●	2 ●	3 ●	2 ●	---
Accountability – degree of responsibility, willingness to improve (administrations), ...	4 ●	3 ●	3 ●	4 ●	3 ●	---
Accountability – degree of responsibility, willingness to improve (SSF representatives), ...	4 ●	3 ●	3 ●	4 ●	3 ●	4 ●
Inclusiveness – active participation	3 ●	3 ●	2 ●	3 ●	2 ●	2 ●
Inclusiveness – passive participation	4 ●	3 ●	3 ●	4 ●	3 ●	3 ●
Transparency – top-down daily issues related to the fishing activity	4 ●	4 ●	4 ●	4 ●	4 ●	2 ●
Transparency – top-down European issues	2 ●	3 ●	2 ●	3 ●	2 ●	2 ●
Transparency – bottom-up activity knowledge	2 ●	3 ●	2 ●	3 ●	2 ●	2 ●
Connectivity	3 ●	3 ●	2 ●	4 ●	4 ●	3 ●
Fairness – SSF economic and human capacity	2 ●	2 ●	2 ●	3 ●	2 ●	2 ●
Fairness – SSF heterogeneity management ability	2 ●	2 ●	2 ●	4 ●	2 ●	2 ●
Resilience	2 ●	3 ●	2 ●	4 ●	3 ●	2 ●
Engagement	2 ●	3 ●	2 ●	4 ●	2 ●	2 ●

6. Glossary of terms

AAPN	Associação de Armadores de Pesca do Norte (Portugal)
AC	Advisory Council
ADAPI	Associação dos Armadores das Pescas Industriais (Portugal)
ANACEF	Asociación Nacional de Armadores de Buques Congeladores de Pesca de Cefalópodos
ASOAR-ARMEGA	Asociación de Armadores de Artes Menores en Galicia (Spain)
BGS	Blue Growth Strategy
CCS	Southwest waters advisory council
CEPESCA	Spanish Fish Confederation (Spain)
CNPMEM	National Committee (French)
CRPMEM	Regional Committee (French)
CDPMEM or DIDPMEM	Local and Interdepartmental Committees (French)
CV	“caballos de vapor” - horsepower (HP, metric unit in the English system)
DG - MARE	The Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries
DGPA	Directorate-General of Fisheries and Aquaculture (Portugal)
DGRM	Department of fisheries of the Central Government (in Portuguese)
DIRM	Interregional Directions of the Sea (French)
EU	European Union
EC	European Commission
EMFF	European Maritime and Fisheries Fund
EUROPÊCHE	Association of National Organizations of Fishing Enterprises in the European Union
FLAG	Fisheries Local Action Group
FNCP	Federación Nacional de Cofradías de Pesca (Spain)
IFREMER	French Research Institute for Exploitation of the Sea
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estatística (Portugal)
IPMA, IP	The Portuguese Institute for Sea and Atmosphere, I. P. (Portugal)
LSF	Large-scale fisheries
LOA	Length overall
MAPAMA	Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Food and Environment (Spain)
MPA	Marine Protected Area
ORs	Outermost regions
POs	Producers organizations
RAC	Regional Advisory Council
SSF	Small-scale fisheries
TLAM	Traffic Light Approach Matrix
UAPF	Union des Armateurs á la Pêche de France (France)
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

7. References

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